Game Theory: Analysis of ConflictEminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information. |
Cosa dicono le persone - Scrivi una recensione
LibraryThing Review
Recensione dell'utente - PaolaM - LibraryThingThis is a very good graduate level textbook in game theory. It is pretty hard going in terms of notation, so recommended for self study only to the most dedicated readers. However, if you do persevere ... Leggi recensione completa
Review: Game Theory. Analysis of conflict
Recensione dell'utente - Tista - Goodreadsread??? Leggi recensione completa
Sommario
DecisionTheoretic Foundations | 1 |
Basic Models | 37 |
Equilibria of StrategicForm Games | 88 |
Sequential Equilibria of ExtensiveForm Games | 154 |
Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form | 213 |
Games with Communication | 244 |
Repeated Games | 308 |
Bargaining and Cooperation in TwoPerson Games | 370 |
Coalitions in Cooperative Games | 417 |
Cooperation under Uncertainty | 483 |
| 539 | |
| 553 | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Parole e frasi comuni
accept according action actually allocation assume assumption average axioms bargaining bargaining solution Bayesian beginning behavior beliefs better called choose close coalition communication concept condition consider consistent constraints cooperative correlated decision defined denote depend described determine dominated efficient eliminate equal equation equilibrium equivalent event example Exercise exists expected payoff feasible Figure finite function given gives implement implies incentive independently individuals knows least less matching maximize mechanism mediator move Nash nature negotiate node normal representation Notice object observe occur offer optimal option outcome perfect play player 1's positive possible prefer probability probability distribution problem pure randomized rational repeated game represents result round satisfy selection sense sequential equilibrium shown situation solution specifies strategic form strategy structure subset suppose Table Theorem theory trade unique utility vector
Informazioni bibliografiche
| Titolo | Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict |
| Autore | Roger B. Myerson |
| Edizione | illustrata, ristampa |
| Editore | Harvard University Press, 1997 |
| ISBN | 0674341163, 9780674341166 |
| Lunghezza | 568 pagine |
| Esporta citazione | BiBTeX EndNote RefMan |