Game Theory: Analysis of ConflictEminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information. |
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LibraryThing Review
Recensione dell'utente - PaolaM - LibraryThingThis is a very good graduate level textbook in game theory. It is pretty hard going in terms of notation, so recommended for self study only to the most dedicated readers. However, if you do persevere ... Leggi recensione completa
Review: Game Theory. Analysis of conflict
Recensione dell'utente - Tista - Goodreadsread??? Leggi recensione completa
Sommario
7 | 22 |
Basic Models | 37 |
Equilibria of StrategicForm Games | 88 |
5 | 105 |
6 | 148 |
Sequential Equilibria of ExtensiveForm Games | 154 |
States | 168 |
8 | 178 |
Refinements of Equilibrium in Strategic Form | 213 |
Games with Communication | 244 |
9 | 269 |
Repeated Games | 308 |
Bargaining and Cooperation in TwoPerson Games | 370 |
Coalitions in Cooperative Games | 417 |
Cooperation under Uncertainty | 483 |
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