Strong Medicine: Creating Incentives for Pharmaceutical Research on Neglected Diseases

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Princeton University Press, 2004 - 153 pagine

"The public health of the developing world is the single issue of greatest significance for humanity over the next half century. This important book offers thoughtful analysis and practical ideas for confronting and addressing this issue through research and development of lifesaving vaccines."--Lawrence H. Summers, President, Harvard University

"Michael Kremer and Rachel Glennerster have produced a work of outstanding importance to the well-being of developing countries. "There are five billion people in the poor world, many suffering from debilitating or fatal diseases. The potential gains in overcoming this human suffering from the development of effective and cost-efficient vaccines are enormous. Yet the economic purchasing power of the rich world favors the development of vaccines and drugs for the rich world. Strong Medicine presents workable incentives for research and development to respond more powerfully to the human needs of poor people. Kremer and Glennerster have produced results that deserve the attention of all those who work in development and that chart a way forward for one of the greatest issues of our time."--Nicholas Stern, Second Permanent Secretary at HM Treasury in the United Kingdom, Visiting Professor at the London School of Economics, and former Chief Economist of the World Bank

"Strong Medicine is full of insights that can make a real difference to the morbid world in which we live. It combines powerful analytical reasoning with practical insights and empirical knowledge to explore a highly promising way of expanding incentives for medicinal research. The possibility of making a significant difference through a commitment to purchase effective vaccines as and when they are developed is thoroughly scrutinized in this definitive investigation, for which we have reason to be grateful."--Amartya Sen, Harvard University, Nobel Laureate in Economic Sciences

"This important book, on how to design markets for drugs to treat millions of diseased people in the developing world, has the added advantage of being an interesting read. The authors convey very well the intellectual excitement associated today with putting mechanism design into practice. They take the reader, one step at a time, through the various levels at which problems might arise and then show how the design is meant to take care of these problems."--Abhijit Banerjee, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

"Michael Kremer is likely the most thoughtful advocate of an exciting new approach for tackling the scourges of AIDS, malaria, and other diseases that primarily afflict the populations of less developed countries. In this book, he and Rachel Glennerster offer by far the most complete discussion I have seen of why this approach--one that would see authorities stimulate private efforts to develop medical treatment by providing a guaranteed market for them--should be adopted, and of how to deal with problems of implementation and design."--Kenneth Sokoloff, University of California, Los Angeles

 

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Sommario

INTRODUCTION
1
HEALTH IN LOWINCOME COUNTRIES
6
Weak HealthCare Infrastructure
7
Malaria Tuberculosis HIVAIDS
11
The Impact of Cheap Simple Technologies
20
THE PAUCITY OF PRIVATE RD TARGETED TO THE NEEDS OF LOWINCOME COUNTRIES
25
The Scientific Potential for New Vaccines
27
MARKET AND GOVERNMENT FAILURES
29
BestEntry Tournaments
72
Expanding the Market for Existing Vaccines and Drugs
73
DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY
76
Independent Adjudication Committee
78
MarketTest Requirement
81
Exit Clauses
84
HOW MUCH SHOULD WE PROMISE TO PAY FOR A VACCINE?
86
What Is a Vaccine Worth?
90

Why Target Foreign Assistance to Vaccine RD?
30
The Patent Tradeoff
33
LowIncome Countries and Intellectual Property
36
Some Quantitative Estimates
40
The Role of Public Purchases
42
THE ROLE OF PUSH PROGRAMS
45
An Example of a Successful Push Program
46
The USAID Malaria Vaccine Program
47
Incentives under Push Programs
49
THE POTENTIAL ROLE OF PULL PROGRAMS
55
The Impact of Financial Incentive Programs
56
Examples of Pull Programs Stimulating Research
59
Advantages and Limitations of Pull Programs
63
PULL PROGRAMS A MENU
68
Patent Extensions on Other Pharmaceuticals as Compensation for Vaccine Development
70
HOW SHOULD PAYMENT BE STRUCTURED?
97
Paying for Multiple Vaccines and Market Exclusivity
100
Bonus Payments Based on Product Quality
103
Increasing the Promised Price over Time
105
Avoiding Windfalls
106
Industry Consultations
107
SCOPE OF THE COMMITMENT
109
Incentives for Agricultural RD
112
MOVING FORWARD WITH VACCINE COMMITMENTS
115
Making a Commitment Legally Binding
116
The Politics of Creating Markets for Vaccines and Drugs
118
Potential Sponsors of New Markets for Vaccines and Drugs
119
References
127
Index
145
Copyright

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Informazioni sull'autore (2004)

Michael Kremer, the winner of the 2019 Nobel Prize in Economics, is the Gates Professor of Developing Societies at Harvard University. He is a recipient of a MacArthur Fellowship and was named a Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum. Rachel Glennerster is chief economist at the UK's Department for International Development. She is on leave as executive director of the Jameel Poverty Action Lab at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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