The Constitution of Risk
Cambridge University Press, 2014 - 200 pagine
The Constitution of Risk is the first book to combine constitutional theory with the theory of risk regulation. The book argues that constitutional rulemaking is best understood as a means of managing political risks. Constitutional law structures and regulates the risks that arise in and from political life, such as an executive coup or military putsch, political abuse of ideological or ethnic minorities, or corrupt self-dealing by officials. The book claims that the best way to manage political risks is an approach it calls "optimizing constitutionalism" - in contrast to the worst-case thinking that underpins "precautionary constitutionalism," a mainstay of liberal constitutional theory. Drawing on a broad range of disciplines such as decision theory, game theory, welfare economics, political science, and psychology, this book advocates constitutional rulemaking undertaken in a spirit of welfare maximization, and offers a corrective to the pervasive and frequently irrational attitude of distrust of official power that is so prominent in American constitutional history and discourse.
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The Mature Position
The Framers SelfDefeating Precautions
On Judging in Ones Own Cause
Political Administration and Expert
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abuses actors administrative Adrian Vermeule agencies agency’s analysis Antifederalists argued argument assessment benefits bias biases bicameralism Bryce checks and balances claim Clinton Rossiter competence constitutional design constitutional law constitutional rulemakers constitutional rules costs countervailing risks create critique decision makers decision-making democracy epistemic ex ante example executive expert panel federal Federalist first-order framers free speech groupthink harms Harv impartiality independent information cascade institutional interpretation issue James Madison Jon Elster Joseph Story judges judicial review justified legislative legislatures liberty majority marginal mature position maxim maximin nemo iudex principle officials ofthe opinion-givers opportunity costs optimizing approach optimizing constitutionalism pathologies perversity political risks possible precautionary constitutionalism precautionary principle precautions presidential problem public opinion recess appointments relevant risks require risk regulation second opinion second-opinion mechanisms second-order reason self-dealing standing armies statutes structure Sunstein supra note target risk theory tion tradeoffs tutional U.S. Const uncertainty violation vote