sea-weeds and lichens; all varieties of animals,—dogs, horses, elephants, fowls, fish, monkeys, and men, are but animalcules of a larger growth and more perfect development.

His theory of development is thus humorously set forth by one of his reviewers. In speaking of the author's theory of "the universal gestations of nature," he says:

"That is to say, all the higher races of plants and animals were not, in any proper sense of the word, created at all, but they grew. The Deity did not concern himself with originating each species after its kind, according to the common acceptation of Holy Writ, but made certain Monads capable of producing any and all of them.. Throughout his writings, our author explicitly teaches that the creation of species results necessarily from the operation of natural laws,—of laws as strictly natural as those through which the common changes on the face of the inorganic world are brought about, or the decomposition of a carcass effected, and no more than these requiring either in kind or degree the intervention of the Deity. He teaches not only that the origination of species and the production of progeny are equally natural and truly analogous, but in fact that the two are fundamentally the same. The one is merely a modification of the other. It is a law to which that of like reproduction is subordinate.'

*

"The animalcules, he says, produce animalcules in abundance, but they now and then produce a polype; the polype produces polypes, and also sometimes a mollusc; one of the latter occasionally engenders a fish; the fish stealthily gives birth to a salamander or a frog; the reptile plays the same trick, and behold a bird; and the unlineal offspring of a bird appears successively as an ornithorhynchus, a kangaroo, and a common mammal.”—North American Review.

If we search in the "Vestiges" for a statement how this development, this transmigration is effected, we find:

"That the immediate cause of the development of each line through its various general grades of being is to be sought in an internal impulse, the nature of which is unknown to us, but which resembles the equally mysterious impulse, by which an individual embryo is passed through its succession of grades until ushered into mature existence.”—Explanations, p. 50.

All this is sufficiently absurd; yet with as much reason may we attribute the changes in nature to "an internal impulse, the nature of which is unknown to us," or to "certain external conditions,"* or even to the Appetencies of Lamarck, as explained in the Philosophie Zoologique, as ascribe them to certain properties or qualities of matter of which we know as little as of either of the other alleged

causes.

It seems inconsistent for those who deny the direct agency of God in nature, to charge on the author of the "Vestiges" that his system is Atheistical. If law or the properties of matter can cause that from a seed shall arise a lofty tree, perfect in all its varied * Vestiges, p. 161.

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parts; if by the same means, in connexion with the agency of animals, the reproduction of species and their growth to maturity are secured, surely it is not a great step further in the same course to suppose that these agents may have formed the seed and combined the parts of the body of the first parent animal. All the elements of either exist in the earth and air. If from the crude earth, in connexion with a single seed, a gigantic tree, bearing flowers, fruit, and myriads of seeds may be formed, by the properties of matter, without the interposition of Deity, shall we be greatly startled, and Atheism, when we are told that the first simple seed may be formed by these agents? One supposition as much excludes God from his works as the other. There is nothing more irreligious and Atheistic in asserting that creation is carried on by universal laws, than there is in ascribing reproduction to the same cause. Is the power and wisdom displayed in the production of the highest inorganic combinations so much inferior to that displayed in the lowest vegetable, or does the lowest rank of animals so much excel the highest class of plants in the same qualities, (especially as it is very difficult to find one characteristic that divides the two kingdoms,) that the mighty power which sustains the material universe without the agency of its Creator, cannot pass the great abyss that separates these classes? We consider the theory developed in the "Vestiges" as the natural result of principles long maintained relative to changes in nature. We object to those principles, as well as to this theory.

The learned Agassiz seems disposed to admit the direct Divine intervention, in part, in nature's operations, and seems at a loss where to fix its limits. He says:

"If it is an obligation on science to proclaim the intervention of a Divine power in the development of the whole of nature, and if it is to that power alone that we must ascribe all things, it is not the less incumbent on science to ascertain what is the influence which physical forces, left to themselves, exercise in all natural phenomena, and what is the part of direct action which we must attribute to the Supreme Being in the revolutions to which nature has been subjected.

"It is now time for naturalists to occupy themselves likewise in their domain, in inquiring within what limits we can recognize the traces of a Divine interposition, and within what limits the phenomena take place in consequence of a state of things immutably established from the beginning of the creation.”—Jameson's Journal, 1842, quoted in the Explanations of the Vestiges, p. 99.

The proposed inquiry is a most important one; but if the great naturalist can show how "a state of things," with a degree of propriety, can be called a cause, he will remove a great obstacle in the way of successful investigation.

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We now return to a further brief consideration of the article of Mr. Chace. We have already noticed his main argument, which is a mere assertion. He has not attempted to prove that our senses teach us, that the material bodies by which we are surrounded are actual substances, possessing "properties and acting by virtue of those properties." This operation, for various reasons, we have denied, although he says, "We cannot question it, without questioning the truthfulness of our constitution, nay, the veracity of God himself; without questioning everything, through whatever channel derived.” Although, in view of so positive an assertion, our course may be one of great temerity, yet we are not conscious of having become as yet a universal skeptic. In his remaining arguments and illustrations he assumes the point to be proved, and brings forward particular instances under a general law, themselves requiring to be established as proof of the existence and universality of that law. His first illustration is drawn from the adaptation of animals, their powers and capabilities, to the varying conditions of different parts of the earth, in respect to soil, climate, &c. He says:

“Now in the actual constitution of animals, these powers and capabilities are not created, but developed. They are not brought into existence by the direct action of the Divine power, but attained by the proper employment of means fitted in their character to produce them. The material atoms are so combined with one another, and are wrought in such a manner into the fabric of the animal, as to develop by their own inherent endowments in each part the precise qualities required in it. The skeleton, which is the framework of the animal, and which, to a great extent, determines the character of the other parts, is constructed on strictly mechanical principles.”—Pp. 348, 349.

The alleged adaptation of animals to the different regions of the earth, the development of their powers and capabilities, are admitted. The question at issue relates not to the fact, but the cause. Is the indefinite assertion, that it is "the proper employment of means fitted in their character to produce them,” a satisfactory explanation? What is the proof of the existence of those means, and what is their character? They are said to be employed; who or what employs them? Does not the very nature of the assertion imply the direct agency of another power not described? Do the "inherent properties of matter" cause the diversity in the earth's surface, and then, with wonderful foresight, adapt animals accordingly? He says, "The material atoms are so combined with one another," &c., as to constitute the parts of an animal. We ask, what combines them? Does blind, inert matter, the mere dust we tread, by its own choice, its own energy, with

knowledge surpassing the highest attainment of a human soul, take its place in the bones, adapt joint to joint, form the muscles, and arrange them in their places, design and construct every organ, and give the whole body its compactness, symmetry, and perfection in all its parts? Every distinct action must of necessity be immediately preceded by a choice and an exertion of power. If the capability of exercising these is not in matter, then in all these wonderful operations the direct agency of an intelligent being must be exerted: that being we assert is God.

The author tells us,

"Thus far in the animal structure all proceeds upon purely mechanical principles. It is simple machinery, the several parts of which act upon one another in the same manner as the springs and wheels of a watch, or the pistons, levers, and valves of a steam-engine."-P. 349.

But what are mechanical principles? Are they a self-acting cause, or merely modes, as we assert, in which a power operates? Has it ever been proved that springs, wheels, pistons, levers, and valves, have any power to act in any way; or even that water, wind, or steam, by their own inherent energy, act on them?

It is true that, "with a full comprehension of the ends proposed, a thorough acquaintance with the means to be employed for attaining them, and the necessary skill in effecting combinations, we ourselves should form just such a structure." God has the requisite knowledge, and thus operates. In further illustrating the subject, he says,—“The circulation of the blood, through the agency of the heart and arteries, is conducted on mechanical principles, and governed by mechanical laws, as much as the irrigation of a field by means of ponds and canals." But has it been proved that ponds and canals by their own power irrigate fields? or that the heart and arteries are anything more than instruments through which the blood is conveyed? There is as much reason for one supposition as the other. We claim that Divine power is the agent in both cases, operating in certain modes called mechanical principles.

Again:-"The digestion of food in the stomach is as much a chemical process as the solution of marble in muriatic acid, or the production of alcohol from sugar." Granted: but has it been shown that muriatic acid, by its inherent energy, dissolves marble, or that sugar, through the properties of matter, is changed into alcohol? Further:-"The eye is constructed as strictly in accordance with the laws of optics as the telescope or microscope; and, in ministering to vision, it acts upon light in the same manner, and by virtue of the same properties." Is it certain that the laws of optics are a

cause, and does the telescope act on light? No more does the eye act on it.

In the discussion, the author's faith in the wonderful energy of the properties of matter increases, and he thinks that inquiries have already been entered upon,

"Which shall enable us to explain the vital phenomena by resolving life itself, so long regarded as a mysterious, unknown power, presiding over the mere physical properties of matter, into a simple modification of these properties, effected through the influence of organization.”—P. 350.

As organization, he claims, results from the properties of matter, the amount of this explanation is this,-that the properties of matter modifying themselves to some extent constitute life. We confess that the comprehension of this is beyond the grasp of our understanding. He makes frequent use of indefinite terms, the force of which he does not explain, and which, in their connexion, can convey no clear meaning, such as "properties of matter,” “inherent endowments," "means fitted in their character," to produce given results. He is perpetually substituting facts for principles. He speaks of things being done, "atoms of matter combined," &c., while the agent, namely, these indefinite, undefinable properties of matter, is not clearly brought to view. If his theory were more clearly stated, it would be instantly rejected as absurd by many, who may not in its present form perceive its inconsistency.

The next argument is drawn from the mode of counteracting harmful qualities and injurious tendencies found in the organization of animals, and resulting from the laws of matter. An illustration is found in the eye. Such is its structure, that it must be kept moist. A constant supply of liquid must be provided to meet the waste occasioned by evaporation, and, furthermore, to constitute a wash for the eye, since if all were allowed to evaporate, a residuum of various articles would collect, which would soon destroy vision. A delicate tube inserted at the inner angle of the eye conveys this liquid, it having answered its design, into the nose, when a warm current of air passing over it causes it rapidly to evaporate. The inference is,

"So complex is the lachrymal apparatus appended to the eye, for the express purpose of securing what, upon any one of the suppositions of idealism, required only a suspension of the Divine agency.”

Further, the supposition of direct Divine agency,

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"Presents to us the surprising fact of the Creator sustaining, by the immediate exercise of his power, an injurious quality in the lachrymal fluid, and then, by the further exercise of his power, preventing the evils that would naturally arise from it."-P. 352.

FOURTH SERIES, VOL. III.—2