great stores of ammunition, after having made a most gallant defence.* CHAP. 1810. 63. the Coa. Having thus secured this important fortress, in which he deposited the heavy train and reserve parks of his Combat on army, Massena lost no time in moving forward across the frontier; while Wellington, in pursuance of the system he had adopted, retired before him, leaving Almeida also to its fate. Before its investment took place, however, a very gallant action occurred between the French advanced guard and General Crauford, who commanded the British rearguard, four thousand five hundred strong, on the banks of the Coa. Crauford, during the whole siege of Ciudad Rodrigo, had with this small force maintained his position on the French side of that stream; and he maintained it even when they approached Almeida. He was there assailed, on the 24th of July, by a French force of twenty thousand infantry and four thousand cavalry, with thirty guns. The river in the rear could be passed only by a single bridge; but by the great steadiness of the men, and the resolution with which the light troops fought, they succeeded in crossing the ravine without any considerable loss. No sooner were they passed, however, than the French, with extraordinary courage, dashed 493. Vict. across the bridge; but the head of the column was swept 71, 73. away by the terrible fire of the British infantry and 364. artillery ; and, after a bloody combat of two hours, a * How severely Wellington felt the necessity under which he lay, at this period, of abandoning the garrison of Ciudad Rodrigo, and the vast importance of the cautious system in which he then persisted, is well stated in a despatch from the English general, and a passage in the Spanish historian, Toreno, which are equally honourable to the feelings of both. Nothing can be more irksome to me than the operations which have been carried on for the last year; and it is very obvious that a continuance of the same cautious system will lose the little reputation which I had acquired, and the good opinion of the people of this country. Nothing, therefore, could be more desirable to me personally, than that either the contest should be given up at once, or that it should be continued with a force so sufficient as to render all opposition hopeless. In either case, the obloquy heaped upon me by the ignorant of our own country, as well as of this, and by those of this whom I am obliged to force to exertion, and who, after all, will be but imperfectly protected in their persons and property, would fall upon the government. But seeing, as I 1 Lond. i. et Conq. xx. Gurw. vi. CHAP. heavy rain separated the combatants, and Crauford LXIII. retired with his division to the main body of the army. In this gallant affair, both parties sustained a loss of between four and five hundred men. 1810. 64. fall of Al meida. Aug. 15. Aug. 26. All obstacles to the investment of Almeida being now Siege and removed, it took place on the following day. The trenches were opened on the 15th of August. The fire of the place was at first extremely well sustained; and as the garrison consisted of four thousand Portuguese regulars and militia, and the governor, General Cox, was a man of known resolution, a protracted resistance was expected. But these anticipations proved fallacious, in consequence of a frightful catastrophe, which, at the very outset of the bombardment, deprived the besieged of all their means of defence. At daybreak of the 26th, a heavy fire commenced upon the place from sixty-five guns, to which the garrison replied during the whole forenoon with great vigour and effect; but at five o'clock in the evening a bomb was thrown, which accidentally fell into the great magazine of the fortress containing one hundred and fifty thousand pounds of powder. The terrible explosion which followed blew up the cathedral, 71,75. Nap. the principal edifices in the town, a large part of the houses, Well. Desp. and occasioned many breaches in the ramparts.1 The consternation produced by this frightful catastrophe was such that on the same evening the garrison mutinied, and do, more than a chance of final success, if we can maintain our position in this country, although probably none of a departure from our cautious defensive system; I should not do my duty by the government, if I did not inform them of the real situation of affairs, and urge them, with importunity even, to greater exertion."-Despatch, 19th August 1810; GURW. vii. 346, 347. "We feel ourselves bound to say," says Toreno, “that Wellington on that occasion acted as a prudent captain, if to raise the siege it was necessary to risk a battle. His forces were not superior to those of the enemy; and his troops and the Portuguese were not sufficiently disciplined to be able to manœuvre with effect in presence of such a foe, or feel sufficient confidence in themselves to go into battle with the enemy. The battle, if gained, would only have saved Ciudad Rodrigo, but not decided the fate of the war. If lost, the English army would have been totally destroyed, the road to Lisbon laid open, and the Spanish cause rudely shaken, if not struck to the ground." -TORENO, iii. 367. 1 Lond. i. 494, 497. Vict. et Conq. xx. iii. 304, 306. Gurw. vi. 364. LXIII. 1810. 65. Wellington Portugal. compelled the governor, who had retired into the citadel, CHAP. to surrender; and on the following day the garrison, still consisting of three thousand men, were made prisoners, and a hundred and fifteen pieces of heavy cannon taken. Wellington now retreated down the valley of the Mondego, and the dispositions of Massena soon showed that Retreat of he was about to follow in the same direction; the extra-inte ordinary difficulties experienced by Junot in 1808, in interior of his advance into Portugal by the road of Abrantes, having deterred the French general from penetrating into the country by that route. For the same reason Reynier's corps, which had been posted in the valley of the Tagus opposite to Hill's division, marched rapidly across the mountains from the valley of the Tagus to that of the Mondego; upon which Hill, moving parallel to him, crossed the Tagus at Villa Velha, and moved swiftly to join Wellington by the pass of Espinhal. The French marshal's instructions had been to invade Portugal at the same time by both banks of the Tagus; but as the English general was possessed of an interior line of communication, by the bridge of Villa Velha, over the Tagus, he justly deemed it too hazardous an experiment to attempt such a division of his force in presence of an enterprising enemy, who might suddenly fall with superior force upon one division of his forces, when detached by a broad river from the other. The whole French force, accordingly, was ordered to assemble in the valley of the Mondego, on the 16th of September; and Wellington, having ascertained that the enemy were concentrating all their forces, immediately ordered Hill to join him with the right wing of the army. This important movement through the mountains was effected with great expedition, 312, 320. 1 Nap. iii. and on the 21st the two corps of the allies completed Jom. iii, their junction at Alva, in the valley of the Mondego. Well. Mem. Meanwhile ten thousand militia, under General Trant, 296, 297. were collected in the mountains between that river and 129, 130. Oporto, and already occupied the defiles leading to Sept. 21. 428, 429. Gurw. vii. Belm. i. LXIII. CHAP. Lamego. The most peremptory orders had been given by the retreating general to lay waste the country, destroy the mills, and deprive the enemy of all their means of subsistence. 1810. 66. He crosses the Mondetakes post go, and at Busaco. Atlas, Meanwhile, however, the continued retreat of the English troops, and the multitude of fugitive peasants and proprietors who flocked into Lisbon, produced the utmost consternation in that capital. Wellington soon felt the necessity of making an effort to support the Plate 63. drooping spirits of the people, and inspire additional energy into the governments of both countries. He therefore resolved to take post on the first favourable ground which might present itself; and as Massena was descending the valley of the Mondego by the northern bank of the river, he crossed his whole army over, and took post on the summit of the ridge of Busaco. This mountain range runs from the northern shores of the Mondego in a northerly direction, for about eight miles, till it unites with the great ridge which separates the valley of the Mondego from that of the Douro. Thus this sierra forms a natural barrier, running along the northern bank of the Mondego; and the same ridge is continued on the opposite side of the river under the name of Sierra da Murcella, which runs in a southerly direction till it joins the great chain which separates the valley of Mem. vii. the Mondego from that of the Tagus. On the summit 446. Jom. of the northern portion of this range Wellington collected his whole army on the evening of the 26th, in all about fifty thousand men; while Massena, with seventy-two thousand, lay at its foot, determined to force the passage.1 The French marshal was not ignorant of the strength Night before of the position which the English general had now Busaco. assumed, or of the perilous nature of the situation in Sept. 26. which he was placed; for, while lying at the foot of the ridge of Busaco, he received intelligence that Colonel Trant had, with ten regiments of militia, attacked the reserve artillery and military chest, and captured Sept. 26. 1 Well. 296; vi. 445, iii. 429, 430. 67. the battle of LXIII. the whole, with eight hundred prisoners; and already CHAP. the communication with the Spanish frontier was 1810. entirely cut off by the Portuguese light parties. But the orders of the Emperor were pressing, and he was well aware that fight he must, at whatever disadvantage.* Next day, therefore, collecting all his force, Massena made preparations for a desperate attack upon the English position, at daybreak of the morning of the 27th. Sept. 27. The British army, during the night, lay in dense masses on the summit of the mountain. The sky was clear, and the dark rocky eminences rising on both sides of the pass were crowned by the fires of countless bivouacs. The veterans in the English army, accustomed to similar scenes of excitement, slept profoundly on their stony beds; but many of the younger soldiers, who were now to witness a battle for the first time, were kept awake by the novelty and solemnity of the scene around them. As the first streaks of dawn were beginning to appear over the eastern hills, a rustling noise was heard in the wooded dells which ran up to the crest of the mountains. It arose from the French outposts, who, stealing forward Gurw. vi. unobserved during the night, had thus got close to the Vict. et pickets of the English position without being perceived. 83, 85. The alarm was instantly given, and the troops started to 331. their arms at all points.1 1 446, 447. Conq. xx. Nap. iii. 68. Busaco. It was full time, for, in a few minutes more, the French in two massive columns were upon them. Ney, with Battle of three divisions, numbering fully twenty-five thousand combatants, advanced against the British left, by the great road leading to the convent of Busaco; while Reynier, with two, moved by St Antonio de Cantaro, In an intercepted letter from Napoleon at this period, to Massena, he says, "Lord Wellington has only 18,000 men, Hill has only 6000-and it would be ridiculous to suppose that 25,000 English can balance 60,000 French, if the latter do not trifle, but fall boldly on, after having well observed where the blow may be given. You have 12,000 cavalry, and four times as much artillery as is necessary for Portugal. Leave 6000 cavalry and a proportion of guns between Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcantara, and Salamanca, and with the rest commence operations."-NAP. iii. 307, 308. |