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Germany, because the people of Schles- tile attitude against Prussia. Techniwig-Holstein desired it. It is a fact, not cally, Prussia may have been in the known to many, that in 1848 the peo- wrong; but for her to yield would have ple of Schleswig-ilolstein rose in arms been to yield to Austria, and to perpet. against Denmark, that they had re- uate the existing condition of things. ceived promises of help from Prussia, Austria's interests were very much more and that Prussia, after helping them to in Hungary and other non-German counbeat the Danes, finally, owing to Eng- tries belonging to her, than in Germany. lish interference, had given them up to Her influence in Germany was calculated Denmark, thereby loading herself with to keep the confederation in a state of the execration of the whole of Germany perfect impotency, and to prevent the and, of course, that of the people of realization of the fondest dream of the Schleswig-Holstein more especially. In German people—national unity. consequence of the failure of the rebel- Federal execution, i. e., war, having lion, many eminent citizens of Schles- been declared against Prussia, every wig-Holstein had to leave their coun- thing depended on rapidity of action, try. They came to the United States, courage, and ability. Prussia bad men and have ever since lived among us. who knew what was to be done, and Danes and Scandinavians generally how it had to be done. Sadowa crownclaim that Schleswig belongs to Den- ed her efforts, and the Prussian Parliamark by right; Germans deny it. That ment declared that the King of HanHolstein is entirely German is not dis- over and several other rulers had, by puted even by the Danes. Considering their hostile and treacherous action Schleswig and Holstein as one country, against Prussia, forfeited their rights as as we probably ought to do, there can sovereigns, and that their respective be no doubt that the majority of its countries should be annexed to Prussia. people desired annexation to Germany. Was this an act of aggression, of which The north of Schleswig has been large. France had a reason to complain? It ly settled by Danes, and it may readily might certainly go by the name of be granted that it would be better for “ self-defence." At any rate, there Prussia to let them join Denmark. The never could have been a doubt in the greater portion of the country was join- minds of Hanoverian, Hessian, and ed to Prussia as a necessary consequence Austrian statesmen, that if they should of the war with Austria. If France saw pot succeed in absorbing Prussia, Prus any cause for interference in this affair, sia would have a right to absorb them; she surely ought to have interfered for in war every party must be satisfied when Austria and Prussia were getting with accepting by the chance of war ready to go to war. Having neglected what it intended, by war, to inflict on to interfere then, she had clearly no the other. right to recur to the matter again; and The treaty of Prague has been referthe truth is, the French government bas red to by almost every French writer, never done so. Nevertheless, this sub- who has written on the subject at all, ject is almost constantly agitated by as a worthless document, a piece of pathe French press, and this agitation has per fit only to be toện up and scattered a great deal to do with the feeling in to the four winds, because, according to France against Prussia.
these writers, Prussia would never be Sadowa was the second " insult” of governed by it. If this was so, the which France complains; but Sadowa question might still be asked, in how was only an act of self-defence on the far this treaty, whether kept or broken, part of Prussia.
could have any effect on the attitude of In 1866 Prussia had to draw the France ? But the fact is, that with a sword for her very existence. The im- single exception this treaty has been potent federal Diet had at last allowed scrupulously observed by Prussia. Owitself to be forced by Austria into a hos- ing to French influence, Prussia had to consent to a virtual separation of the versy which preceded the breaking out North and South of Germany. Unna- of hostilities. Napoleon knew that, if tural as this separation was, Prussia he had made North Schleswig a clisus made no use of her chances to induce belli, Prussia, by yielding, would hare Bavaria, &c., to join her in a single left him po excuse for a war; and here, I confederacy. Prussia occupied Ma- think, we find the true reason why he yence, which is south of the Main, but never did refer to it. What lie wanted in so doing she did not violate the was the Rhine for France, not Schleswig treaty. She never made any open at- for Denmark. tempt at crossing the Main for the pur- Writers favoring the French side of pose of admitting Baden, which was the present war assert, that the danger willing to join the confederacy. Had for France lay not so much in the existPrussia really entered into a close union ing condition of things, as rather in the with the southern states, France would probable future of Germany. They prestill have had no right to interfere, but dicted that Prussia, not satisfied with she would at least have had an excuse. North Germany, would sooner or later As it is, Prussia did not even make the take Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, attempt, and, therefore, left France with- then pounce on German Austria, and out any excuse whatever.
wind up with Holland. These fears In one particular, it is true, Prussia were entertained by the French, and did not observe the treaty of Prague. seem to have been suggested by a guilty I refer to the case of North Schleswig. conscience; for has not France been The treaty provides that the inhabitants always intent on abusing her power ? of North Schleswig should be allowed Has she not always made war on forto join Denmark, if they declared so by eign nations whenever she felt strong a general vote, and that they should be enough? Does she not at the present allowed to vote on the question. Prus- time hold two provinces which she sia bas thus far refused to observe this wrested from Germany under circumpoint of the treaty, evidently from fear stances not by any means creditable to of losing the good-will of Germany. France ? Is not Nice, the birth place The German people, and the majority of the great Italian patriot, Garibaldi, a of the people of Schleswig-Holstein, part of France now? Have not French claim Schleswig as German territory, troops again and again invaded and and would brand as an act of infamy devastated Italy, Germany, Belgium, the giving up to Denmark of any part and Holland ? How natural, then, to of German soil. We need not discuss suppose that Germany, if once united here the point whether their claim to like France, would follow the example Schleswig is just or not; suffice it to of France ! It was this fear which, say that no German, and no inhabitant according to the best of French writof Holstein more especially, has ever ers, forms the true and only reason doubted its entire justice and correct- France has had for going to war with ness, and that the whole people are ex- Prussia, tremely sensitive on this point.
The gross injustice towards Germany It is all very well to say that what is which lurks in this fear, is not at first written is written, and that a treaty sight apparent. While Germany claims should not be made to be violated. to be entirely able to defend herself Prussia can hardly care enough for the against Prussia, if this power should little strip of territory involved, to go abuse her position, France takes it for to war on account of it, and nothing granted that the
the intelligence and shows more clearly that neither France strength of the German people can be nor Prussia considers this matter as of made subject to the will of a single any importance, than the fact that it ruler as completely as the intelligence has not even been mentioned during and strength of the French people have the entire course of diplomatic contro- been brought under the power of Napoleon III. France judges Germany by unity of the one can be assumed to be herself; and she wrongs her not only in an excuse for war, what reason is there this particular, but also by supposing to believe that the unity of the other that the German people and the Prus- might not likewise be made such an sian King are of the same disposition excuse? And, if Spain and Portugal as the French and their Emperor. It should succeed in uniting, would there may be safely asserted that there is not not be a third case for war? And now a country in Europe in which free again, if Ireland should declare herself dom is growing as rapidly as in Ger- perfectly satisfied with remaining in the many. And along with freedom, cul- British confederation, would not there ture and all the blessings of civilization be a fourth case? And, if Sweden, Norare rapidly extending their benign in- way, and Denmark should unite, would fluence among all classes of the people. not that constitute the fifth ? How much of this progress Germany It must be remembered that, thanks owes to Prussia, it is not easy to tell; to Prussia and the enlightened policy but it is certain that without Prussia of Bismarck, there is at present in GerGermany would not now be what she many scarcely any difference in opinion is. The success of Prussia insures the as regards the future of the land. unity of Germany, which after Sadowa In 1866 Prussia had urged the stupid was threatened by, no power except federal Diet to adopt a new federal conFrance. France once humiliated, Ger- stitution, based upon universal suffrage, man unity is no longer a dream, but a and calculated to make the federal union solid reality. While France was get- a serious reality, and not a mere farce. ting ready to make war on Germany, Her proposals were rejected by the mathe Germans wondered why the French jority, and she herself put under the could be so eager to shed blood. When ban. Had she not been strong enough war was finally declared by France, the to smite her enemies, who in point of French were wild with joy, while the territory and population were far supeGermans sent forth a shout of indigna- rior to her, Germany would not be able, tion and defiance.
to-day, to repel a French invasion and War for a reason so flimsy and imag- uphold the honor of Germany; the inary as that alleged by France, made old, impotent federal union would have Germany feel that there could never be dragged on its miserable existence, too peace in Europe until the foolish ideas stupid even to furnish food for laughof French superiority over every other ter, a standing reproach to all Germany, nation were completely dispelled. and a source of shame and anger to The indignation of Germany was
every German. natural and legitimate, the war-fury of After Prussia's success in Bohemia France savage and artificial. The Ger- and Germany, Austria was no more to mans felt their blood boil at the thought be thought of in the regulation of the that a neighboring nation should feel affairs of Germany, and hence it became itself called upon to interfere with the apparent to all that Prussia would have allairs of another nation, and that death, to do for Germany what Sardinia had wounds, and misery should be dealt out done for Italy. If Prussia had not to hundreds of thousands of innocent proved herself liberal and disposed to and peaceful citizens, merely because favor progress, the people of Germany the French were jealous of the Germans ! would not to-day follow her so enthusiWhat had Prussia or Germany done to astically and devotedly in her great deserve such a fearful calamity? Noth- struggle with France. ing but what Sardinia and Italy, aided As it is, she has gained the sympaby Frunce, had done before ! If the thics of united Germany! To-day, union of Germany was a menace to Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse, France, why was not that of Italy a and the city of Frankfort, together menace to Germany ? If the prospective with Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria, vie with Prussia proper in deeds and It is precisely on account of the reprofessions of loyalty to the great cause proach brought on the German name by of German unity, which, henceforth, the selfish and perfidious policy of her will forever be identified with the name petty princes, that all Germany is so of Prussia,
intent on being united under a single As republicans, we sympathize with ruler, be his title president, king, or the people everywhere. We have no emperor. But this single ruler should reason to favor one nation more than have no interests outside of Germany. another. A Bourbon king, from hatred As long as Austria had the imperial of England, once did us a good service power, Germany was weak, because her by sending us troops for the purpose of emperors would forever drain her of her fighting England. A German prince best blood in their attempts at subduonce sold a portion of his subjects, some ing or keeping in subjection non-Gerof them convicts, to that same England manic countries. For this reason Prusfor the purpose of fighting us. In either sia wisely insisted that Austria should case, the action was dictated by selfish be entirely excluded from the Germotives. The soldiers of the king of man confederation. The Germans of France had no more choice in the mat- Austria complain bitterly of this exter than the wretched subjects of the clusion, but it was unavoidable. After sovereign of Hesse. They all acted the exclusion of Austria, no German under compulsion. We owe gratitude power but Prussia could claim the to the French people who sympathized leadership of Germany. Every one with us, and shall never forget their saw that, and, certainly, Napoleon III brave and magnanimous Lafayette; but was among those who saw it the most we owe both sympathy and gratitude distinctly. to Prussia and Germany also. Prussia It is certain that he was disappointed was the first state after France to rec- in the results of the Prussian-Austrian ognize our independence. Frederick war. Seeing that Prussia was increasthe Great expressed a high admiration ing her strength and territory, he for General Washington. An excellent thought the propitious moment had Prussian officer, Baron Steuben, served come for taking steps in reference to in the American army. Stcuben, De the acquisition of Belgium. The draft Kalb, and other Germans, fought for us of a treaty was written by the French as well as Lafayette, and our gratitude Ambassador Benedetti, and got into is due to all. We are under no obliga- the possession of Bismarck. We do tion to a Bonaparte; while we should not know any thing about the game the not forget that two hundred thousand latter played with his adversary in the Germans only lately fought on our side Tuileries, but recent events have shown against an intestine foe who had the that Napoleon III, either by his own synpathy of Napoleon III. Ignorant fault or that of his Minister, had been or unscrupulous writers have adroitly fairly entrapped by the astute Prussian. coupled the case of the Hessians with We do not know how often Napoleon the case of Prussia, as though Prussia III may have asked the Prussian govcould in any sense be made responsible ernment to return the draft of that for the action of Hesse. The truth is, treaty; but it is not difficult to imagine that Hesse was as independent a state that the refusal on the part of Prussia as Prussia, and the former has been the to return the document had something traditional enemy of the latter. In 1806 to do with the sudden declaration of the Prince of Hesse was among the first war on the part of France. to join Napoleon, and to send his troops For Prussia, the possession of a docuagainst Prussia. Hessians fought Prus- ment that furnished a tangible proof of sians in 1806 as they had fought Ameri- the intentions of Napoleon III in regard cans in 1776, and they were again found to Belgium was of the greatest imporamong Prussia's enemies in 1866.
tance. If England, Belgium, Holland,
&c., could be made to see that France, the price of peace to be paid by France. while laying claim to the Rhine as her Thus Prussia will have taken another natural frontier, really threatened Bel- step towards fulfilling the expectations gium and Holland far more than Prus- of Germany, to see all German territory sia, the chances would be that in case joined in one powerful union. France of a war these countries would side may complain of this, but America has with Prussia against France, or at any no reason to deny the German people a rate preserve a strict neutrality. boon which we prize so highly our
A war with France, Prussia had no selves. Germans do not grudge Frenchreason to dread, as her brilliant suc- men their unity; why should Frenchmen cesses in the Austrian campaign had be jealous of German unity? Yet this sufficiently proven the superiority of jealousy was the real cause why France her army. The rest of Germany being went to war with Prussia, which, as united with her for the purposes of de- France ought to have known, reprefence, she could afford to await the sented the interests of Germany, and threatened French invasion. Two weeks was the only power able and willing to were sufficient to place her admirably maintain intact the honor and safety of organized army on a war-footing, ready Germany. Thiers was indeed right when to march into France. Two weeks more he pronounced that this war was due to of brilliant fighting satisfied the world a blunder worse than that of Mexico. that she would be as victorious in this It was a blunder as far as France was struggle as she had been in that of concerned, while Germany can justly 1866. Alsace and Lorraine, two ancient regard it as the price of national unity German provinces, will very likely be and greatness.
AMERICAN SYMPATHY IN THE WAR.
ed with the Prussians. The presence With few and inconsiderable excep- among us of large numbers of the Gertions, the American people have syir. man race inclines us naturally towards pathized entirely with the Germans, them ; but we have French among us during their war against the French. also, and multitudes of our citizens are Hardly a newspaper anywhere, not so in the habit every year of cultivating much as an individual of any promi- the most intimate intercourse of trade nence, has expressed a wish that the and friendship with them. Yet from French might be successful in their the outbreak of the war to the present final appeal to arms. We have uni. time we have desired the defeat of the versally hailed with delight the succes- French; and we have desired it, almost sive advances of the Prussians, felt de- instinctively, for three reasons: first, pressed when they were momentarily because we think the war was precipichecked, and given our contributions, tately declared by the French Governwhen we have given any, to their com- ment, without sufficient cause, with no mittees. What is the cause of this de- further provocation, in fact, than the cided manifestation of feeling? We steady and continuous growth of Prushave as a nation assuredly no reason to sia in political power, which is not a regard the French with rancor or ani- legitimate ground for war; secondly, mosity. They were our allies in the because, in our own late combat for most trying period of our struggle for union and liberty we had no more manational existence, and we have always lignant or stealthy enemy than the ruler cherished towards them a friendly and of the French, whose policy has been grateful disposition. On the other hand, subsequently approved by the votes of we have never been very closely connect- the nation; and, thirdly, because every