Germany, because the people of Schleswig-Holstein desired it. It is a fact, not known to many, that in 1848 the people of Schleswig-Holstein rose in arms against Denmark, that they had received promises of help from Prussia, and that Prussia, after helping them to beat the Danes, finally, owing to English interference, had given them up to Denmark, thereby loading herself with the execration of the whole of Germany and, of course, that of the people of Schleswig-Holstein more especially. In consequence of the failure of the rebellion, many eminent citizens of Schleswig-Holstein had to leave their country. They came to the United States, and have ever since lived among us. Danes and Scandinavians generally claim that Schleswig belongs to Denmark by right; Germans deny it. That Holstein is entirely German is not disputed even by the Danes. Considering Schleswig and Holstein as one country, as we probably ought to do, there can be no doubt that the majority of its people desired annexation to Germany. The north of Schleswig has been largely settled by Danes, and it may readily be granted that it would be better for Prussia to let them join Denmark. The greater portion of the country was joined to Prussia as a necessary consequence of the war with Austria. If France saw any cause for interference in this affair, she surely ought to have interfered when Austria and Prussia were getting ready to go to war. Having neglected to interfere then, she had clearly no right to recur to the matter again; and the truth is, the French government has never done so. Nevertheless, this subject is almost constantly agitated by the French press, and this agitation has a great deal to do with the feeling in France against Prussia.

Sadowa was the second "insult" of which France complains; but Sadowa was only an act of self-defence on the part of Prussia.

In 1866 Prussia had to draw the sword for her very existence. The impotent federal Diet had at last allowed itself to be forced by Austria into a hos

tile attitude against Prussia. Technically, Prussia may have been in the wrong; but for her to yield would have been to yield to Austria, and to perpetuate the existing condition of things. Austria's interests were very much more in Hungary and other non-German countries belonging to her, than in Germany. Her influence in Germany was calculated to keep the confederation in a state of perfect impotency, and to prevent the realization of the fondest dream of the German people-national unity.

Federal execution, i. e., war, having been declared against Prussia, every thing depended on rapidity of action, courage, and ability. Prussia had men who knew what was to be done, and how it had to be done. Sadowa crowned her efforts, and the Prussian Parliament declared that the King of Hanover and several other rulers had, by their hostile and treacherous action against Prussia, forfeited their rights as sovereigns, and that their respective countries should be annexed to Prussia. Was this an act of aggression, of which France had a reason to complain? It might certainly go by the name of "self-defence." At any rate, there never could have been a doubt in the minds of Hanoverian, Hessian, and Austrian statesmen, that if they should not succeed in absorbing Prussia, Prussia would have a right to absorb them; for in war every party must be satisfied with accepting by the chance of war what it intended, by war, to inflict on the other.

The treaty of Prague has been referred to by almost every French writer, who has written on the subject at all, as a worthless document, a piece of paper fit only to be torn up and scattered to the four winds, because, according to these writers, Prussia would never be governed by it. If this was so, the question might still be asked, in how far this treaty, whether kept or broken, could have any effect on the attitude of France? But the fact is, that with a single exception this treaty has been scrupulously observed by Prussia. Owing to French influence, Prussia had to

consent to a virtual separation of the North and South of Germany. Unnatural as this separation was, Prussia made no use of her chances to induce Bavaria, &c., to join her in a single confederacy. Prussia occupied Mayence, which is south of the Main, but in so doing she did not violate the treaty. She never made any open attempt at crossing the Main for the purpose of admitting Baden, which was willing to join the confederacy. Had Prussia really entered into a close union with the southern states, France would still have had no right to interfere, but she would at least have had an excuse. As it is, Prussia did not even make the attempt, and, therefore, left France without any excuse whatever.

In one particular, it is true, Prussia did not observe the treaty of Prague. I refer to the case of North Schleswig. The treaty provides that the inhabitants of North Schleswig should be allowed to join Denmark, if they declared so by a general vote, and that they should be allowed to vote on the question. Prussia bas thus far refused to observe this point of the treaty, evidently from fear of losing the good-will of Germany. The German people, and the majority of the people of Schleswig-Holstein, claim Schleswig as German territory, and would brand as an act of infamy the giving up to Denmark of any part of German soil. We need not discuss here the point whether their claim to Schleswig is just or not; suffice it to say that no German, and no inhabitant of Holstein more especially, has ever doubted its entire justice and correctness, and that the whole people are extremely sensitive on this point.

It is all very well to say that what is written is written, and that a treaty should not be made to be violated. Prussia can hardly care enough for the little strip of territory involved, to go to war on account of it, and nothing shows more clearly that neither France nor Prussia considers this matter as of any importance, than the fact that it has not even been mentioned during the entire course of diplomatic contro

versy which preceded the breaking out of hostilities. Napoleon knew that, if he had made North Schleswig a casus belli, Prussia, by yielding, would have left him no excuse for a war; and here, I think, we find the true reason why he never did refer to it. What he wanted was the Rhine for France, not Schleswig for Denmark.

Writers favoring the French side of the present war assert, that the danger for France lay not so much in the existing condition of things, as rather in the probable future of Germany. They predicted that Prussia, not satisfied with North Germany, would sooner or later take Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Baden, then pounce on German Austria, and wind up with Holland. These fears were entertained by the French, and seem to have been suggested by a guilty conscience; for has not France been always intent on abusing her power? Has she not always made war on foreign nations whenever she felt strong enough? Does she not at the present time hold two provinces which she wrested from Germany under circumstances not by any means creditable to France? Is not Nice, the birthplace of the great Italian patriot, Garibaldi, a part of France now? Have not French troops again and again invaded and devastated Italy, Germany, Belgium, and Holland? How natural, then, to suppose that Germany, if once united like France, would follow the example of France! It was this fear which, according to the best of French writers, forms the true and only reason France has had for going to war with Prussia.

The gross injustice towards Germany which lurks in this fear, is not at first sight apparent. While Germany claims to be entirely able to defend herself against Prussia, if this power should abuse her position, France takes it for granted that the intelligence and strength of the German people can be made subject to the will of a single ruler as completely as the intelligence and strength of the French people have been brought under the power of Na

poleon III. France judges Germany by herself; and she wrongs her not only in this particular, but also by supposing that the German people and the Prussian King are of the same disposition as the French and their Emperor. It may be safely asserted that there is not now a country in Europe in which freedom is growing as rapidly as in Germany. And along with freedom, culture and all the blessings of civilization are rapidly extending their benign influence among all classes of the people. How much of this progress Germany owes to Prussia, it is not easy to tell; but it is certain that without Prussia Germany would not now be what she is. The success of Prussia insures the unity of Germany, which after Sadowa was threatened by no power except France. France once humiliated, German unity is no longer a dream, but a solid reality. While France was getting ready to make war on Germany, the Germans wondered why the French could be so eager to shed blood. When war was finally declared by France, the French were wild with joy, while the Germans sent forth a shout of indignation and defiance.

War for a reason so flimsy and imaginary as that alleged by France, made Germany feel that there could never be peace in Europe until the foolish ideas of French superiority over every other nation were completely dispelled.

The indignation of Germany was natural and legitimate, the war-fury of France savage and artificial. The Germans felt their blood boil at the thought that a neighboring nation should feel itself called upon to interfere with the affairs of another nation, and that death, wounds, and misery should be dealt out to hundreds of thousands of innocent and peaceful citizens, merely because the French were jealous of the Germans! What had Prussia or Germany done to deserve such a fearful calamity? Noth ing but what Sardinia and Italy, aided by France, had done before! If the union of Germany was a menace to France, why was not that of Italy a menace to Germany? If the prospective

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unity of the one can be assumed to be an excuse for war, what reason is there to believe that the unity of the other might not likewise be made such an excuse? And, if Spain and Portugal should succeed in uniting, would there not be a third case for war? again, if Ireland should declare herself perfectly satisfied with remaining in the British confederation, would not there be a fourth case? And, if Sweden, Norway, and Denmark should unite, would not that constitute the fifth?

It must be remembered that, thanks to Prussia and the enlightened policy of Bismarck, there is at present in Germany scarcely any difference in opinion as regards the future of the land.

In 1866 Prussia had urged the stupid federal Diet to adopt a new federal constitution, based upon universal suffrage, and calculated to make the federal union a serious reality, and not a mere farce. Her proposals were rejected by the majority, and she herself put under the ban. Had she not been strong enough to smite her enemies, who in point of territory and population were far superior to her, Germany would not be able, to-day, to repel a French invasion and uphold the honor of Germany; the old, impotent federal union would have dragged on its miserable existence, too stupid even to furnish food for laughter, a standing reproach to all Germany, and a source of shame and anger to every German.

After Prussia's success in Bohemia and Germany, Austria was no more to be thought of in the regulation of the affairs of Germany, and hence it became apparent to all that Prussia would have to do for Germany what Sardinia had done for Italy. If Prussia had not proved herself liberal and disposed to favor progress, the people of Germany would not to-day follow her so enthusiastically and devotedly in her great struggle with France.

As it is, she has gained the sympathies of united Germany! To-day, Schleswig-Holstein, Hanover, Hesse, and the city of Frankfort, together with Baden, Wurtemberg, and Bavaria,

vie with Prussia proper in deeds and professions of loyalty to the great cause of German unity, which, henceforth, will forever be identified with the name of Prussia.

As republicans, we sympathize with the people everywhere. We have no reason to favor one nation more than another. A Bourbon king, from hatred of England, once did us a good service by sending us troops for the purpose of fighting England. A German prince once sold a portion of his subjects, some of them convicts, to that same England for the purpose of fighting us. In either case, the action was dictated by selfish motives. The soldiers of the king of France had no more choice in the matter than the wretched subjects of the sovereign of Hesse. They all acted under compulsion. We owe gratitude to the French people who sympathized with us, and shall never forget their brave and magnanimous Lafayette; but we owe both sympathy and gratitude to Prussia and Germany also. Prussia was the first state after France to recognize our independence. Frederick the Great expressed a high admiration for General Washington. An excellent Prussian officer, Baron Steuben, served in the American army. Steuben, De Kalb, and other Germans, fought for us as well as Lafayette, and our gratitude is due to all. We are under no obligation to a Bonaparte; while we should not forget that two hundred thousand Germans only lately fought on our side against an intestine foe who had the sympathy of Napoleon III. Ignorant or unscrupulous writers have adroitly coupled the case of the Hessians with the case of Prussia, as though Prussia could in any sense be made responsible for the action of Hesse. The truth is, that Hesse was as independent a state as Prussia, and the former has been the traditional enemy of the latter. In 1806 the Prince of Hesse was among the first to join Napoleon, and to send his troops against Prussia. Hessians fought Prussians in 1806 as they had fought Americans in 1776, and they were again found among Prussia's enemies in 1866.

It is precisely on account of the reproach brought on the German name by the selfish and perfidious policy of her petty princes, that all Germany is so intent on being united under a single ruler, be his title president, king, or emperor. But this single ruler should have no interests outside of Germany. As long as Austria had the imperial power, Germany was weak, because her emperors would forever drain her of her best blood in their attempts at subduing or keeping in subjection non-Germanic countries. For this reason Prussia wisely insisted that Austria should be entirely excluded from the German confederation. The Germans of Austria complain bitterly of this exclusion, but it was unavoidable. After the exclusion of Austria, no German power but Prussia could claim the leadership of Germany. Every one saw that, and, certainly, Napoleon III was among those who saw it the most distinctly.

It is certain that he was disappointed in the results of the Prussian-Austrian war. Seeing that Prussia was increasing her strength and territory, he thought the propitious moment had come for taking steps in reference to the acquisition of Belgium. The draft of a treaty was written by the French Ambassador Benedetti, and got into the possession of Bismarck. We do not know any thing about the game the latter played with his adversary in the Tuileries, but recent events have shown that Napoleon III, either by his own fault or that of his Minister, had been fairly entrapped by the astute Prussian. We do not know how often Napoleon III may have asked the Prussian government to return the draft of that treaty; but it is not difficult to imagine that the refusal on the part of Prussia to return the document had something to do with the sudden declaration of war on the part of France.

For Prussia, the possession of a document that furnished a tangible proof of the intentions of Napoleon III in regard to Belgium was of the greatest importance. If England, Belgium, Holland,

&c., could be made to see that France, while laying claim to the Rhine as her natural frontier, really threatened Belgium and Holland far more than Prussia, the chances would be that in case of a war these countries would side with Prussia against France, or at any rate preserve a strict neutrality.

A war with France, Prussia had no reason to dread, as her brilliant successes in the Austrian campaign had sufficiently proven the superiority of her army. The rest of Germany being united with her for the purposes of defence, she could afford to await the threatened French invasion. Two weeks were sufficient to place her admirably organized army on a war-footing, ready to march into France. Two weeks more of brilliant fighting satisfied the world that she would be as victorious in this struggle as she had been in that of 1866. Alsace and Lorraine, two ancient German provinces, will very likely be

the price of peace to be paid by France. Thus Prussia will have taken another step towards fulfilling the expectations of Germany, to see all German territory joined in one powerful union. France may complain of this, but America has no reason to deny the German people a boon which we prize so highly ourselves. Germans do not grudge Frenchmen their unity; why should Frenchmen be jealous of German unity? Yet this jealousy was the real cause why France went to war with Prussia, which, as France ought to have known, represented the interests of Germany, and was the only power able and willing to maintain intact the honor and safety of Germany. Thiers was indeed right when he pronounced that this war was due to a blunder worse than that of Mexico. It was a blunder as far as France was concerned, while Germany can justly regard it as the price of national unity and greatness.

AMERICAN SYMPATHY IN THE WAR.

WITH few and inconsiderable exceptions, the American people have sym pathized entirely with the Germans, during their war against the French. Hardly a newspaper anywhere, not so much as an individual of any prominence, has expressed a wish that the French might be successful in their final appeal to arms. We have universally hailed with delight the successive advances of the Prussians, felt depressed when they were momentarily checked, and given our contributions, when we have given any, to their committees. What is the cause of this decided manifestation of feeling? We have as a nation assuredly no reason to regard the French with rancor or animosity. They were our allies in the most trying period of our struggle for national existence, and we have always cherished towards them a friendly and grateful disposition. On the other hand, we have never been very closely connect

ed with the Prussians. The presence among us of large numbers of the German race inclines us naturally towards them; but we have French among us also, and multitudes of our citizens are in the habit every year of cultivating the most intimate intercourse of trade and friendship with them. Yet from the outbreak of the war to the present time we have desired the defeat of the French; and we have desired it, almost instinctively, for three reasons: first, because we think the war was precipitately declared by the French Government, without sufficient cause, with no further provocation, in fact, than the steady and continuous growth of Prussia in political power, which is not a legitimate ground for war; secondly, because, in our own late combat for union and liberty we had no more malignant or stealthy enemy than the ruler of the French, whose policy has been subsequently approved by the votes of the nation; and, thirdly, because every