Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 apr 2004 - 348 pagine Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 82
Pagina
... action clauses into sovereign bond contracts is unlikely to sig- nificantly reduce pressure to bail out crisis countries . It is not surprising , then , that Roubini and Setser argue that the end of the recent efforts to create a new ...
... action clauses into sovereign bond contracts is unlikely to sig- nificantly reduce pressure to bail out crisis countries . It is not surprising , then , that Roubini and Setser argue that the end of the recent efforts to create a new ...
Pagina 7
... actions . The G - 7 countries agree in principle that IMF financing should be less forthcoming if a country's debts are unsus- tainable , yet they continue to support large bailouts for countries whose debt levels put their ...
... actions . The G - 7 countries agree in principle that IMF financing should be less forthcoming if a country's debts are unsus- tainable , yet they continue to support large bailouts for countries whose debt levels put their ...
Pagina 12
... action clauses.15 In reality , bonds and other widely traded debt instruments can and have been restructured by Pakistan , Ukraine , Russia , Ecuador , and Uruguay . Ecuador , Ukraine , and Uruguay all restructured some bonds that ...
... action clauses.15 In reality , bonds and other widely traded debt instruments can and have been restructured by Pakistan , Ukraine , Russia , Ecuador , and Uruguay . Ecuador , Ukraine , and Uruguay all restructured some bonds that ...
Pagina 21
... action by an emerging - market government to address its debt problem . A run on the currency that leads the country's exchange rate to overshoot or a run on the domestic banking system that leads the financial system to collapse can ...
... action by an emerging - market government to address its debt problem . A run on the currency that leads the country's exchange rate to overshoot or a run on the domestic banking system that leads the financial system to collapse can ...
Pagina 23
... action problems in a sovereign debt restructuring . The key policy question is whether legal reform can reduce the economic disruption that can accompany a sovereign debt restructuring without upsetting the balance between the rights of ...
... action problems in a sovereign debt restructuring . The key policy question is whether legal reform can reduce the economic disruption that can accompany a sovereign debt restructuring without upsetting the balance between the rights of ...
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Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Parole e frasi comuni
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
Brani popolari
Pagina 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
Pagina 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as