Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 apr 2004 - 348 pagine Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 97
Pagina
... Crises 32 52 Conclusions 70 3 Analytical Literature on Crisis Resolution 73 Four Approaches to Crisis Resolution 76 Crisis Resolution in IMF's Absence 79 IMF , Crises of Creditor Coordination , and Moral Hazard Do Partial Bailouts Ever ...
... Crises 32 52 Conclusions 70 3 Analytical Literature on Crisis Resolution 73 Four Approaches to Crisis Resolution 76 Crisis Resolution in IMF's Absence 79 IMF , Crises of Creditor Coordination , and Moral Hazard Do Partial Bailouts Ever ...
Pagina
... crisis cases than is commonly realized - and hence that the story of crisis response since Mexico is not one of all bailouts and no bail - ins . They also emphasize that sovereign bonds have not been the most important source of ...
... crisis cases than is commonly realized - and hence that the story of crisis response since Mexico is not one of all bailouts and no bail - ins . They also emphasize that sovereign bonds have not been the most important source of ...
Pagina
... Crisis countries ' aggregate balance sheet vulnerabilities 8 28 Table 2.1b Policy adjustment , bail - ins , bailouts , and other policies to resolve crises 30 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 IMF and bilateral first- and second - line ...
... Crisis countries ' aggregate balance sheet vulnerabilities 8 28 Table 2.1b Policy adjustment , bail - ins , bailouts , and other policies to resolve crises 30 Table 4.1 Table 4.2 Table 4.3 IMF and bilateral first- and second - line ...
Pagina 2
... crisis country's government - for example , a maturing international sovereign bond . They also can be cross - border loans to private borrowers - most often banks — in the crisis country . In ei- ther case , convincing the country's ...
... crisis country's government - for example , a maturing international sovereign bond . They also can be cross - border loans to private borrowers - most often banks — in the crisis country . In ei- ther case , convincing the country's ...
Pagina 5
Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini, Brad Setser. crisis resolution . Others are just impractical or inappropriate ways to re- solve crises . A long , hard slog through the details of past financial crises ...
Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini, Brad Setser. crisis resolution . Others are just impractical or inappropriate ways to re- solve crises . A long , hard slog through the details of past financial crises ...
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Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Parole e frasi comuni
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
Brani popolari
Pagina 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
Pagina 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as