Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 apr 2004 - 348 pagine Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 91
Pagina
... exposure and 125 126 international bank claims on crisis countries 131 Table 4.4 Table 9.1 Table A.1 Changes in IMF / bilateral exposure and in international debt securities outstanding IMF lending limits compared with actual lending ...
... exposure and 125 126 international bank claims on crisis countries 131 Table 4.4 Table 9.1 Table A.1 Changes in IMF / bilateral exposure and in international debt securities outstanding IMF lending limits compared with actual lending ...
Pagina 5
... exposed IMF will not be able to lend more to try to avert a deeper crisis . Rather than being in a position to help shape the country's policies during its restructuring , the IMF is left negotiating to get its money back as the crisis ...
... exposed IMF will not be able to lend more to try to avert a deeper crisis . Rather than being in a position to help shape the country's policies during its restructuring , the IMF is left negotiating to get its money back as the crisis ...
Pagina 8
... exposure . Special drawing rights ( SDR ) are converted into dollars at the SDR / dollar exchange rate at the time of the initial program . Sources : Financial data from International Monetary Fund , www.imf.org/external/fin.htm . GDP ...
... exposure . Special drawing rights ( SDR ) are converted into dollars at the SDR / dollar exchange rate at the time of the initial program . Sources : Financial data from International Monetary Fund , www.imf.org/external/fin.htm . GDP ...
Pagina 9
... exposure to its largest borrowers in the near term . All data are from the IMF and refer to its nonconcessional ( general resources account ) lending . Figure 1.2 IMF lending , 1997-98 versus 2000-02 billions of INTRODUCTION 9 VII.
... exposure to its largest borrowers in the near term . All data are from the IMF and refer to its nonconcessional ( general resources account ) lending . Figure 1.2 IMF lending , 1997-98 versus 2000-02 billions of INTRODUCTION 9 VII.
Pagina 11
... exposure had fallen to $ 809 billion , bank claims to $ 477 billion , and the stock of outstanding bonds to $ 331 billion . 13 Cross - border bank claims remain an important source of financing . Myth 4 A better means of restructuring ...
... exposure had fallen to $ 809 billion , bank claims to $ 477 billion , and the stock of outstanding bonds to $ 331 billion . 13 Cross - border bank claims remain an important source of financing . Myth 4 A better means of restructuring ...
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Parole e frasi comuni
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
Brani popolari
Pagina 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
Pagina 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as