Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 apr 2004 - 348 pagine Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 84
Pagina 2
... interest , as do loans from the G - 7 or G - 10 , the World Bank , and other multilateral development banks ( MDBs ) . The other option is to encourage the country to ask its creditors to agree to roll over or reschedule their maturing ...
... interest , as do loans from the G - 7 or G - 10 , the World Bank , and other multilateral development banks ( MDBs ) . The other option is to encourage the country to ask its creditors to agree to roll over or reschedule their maturing ...
Pagina 3
... interest rate the country must pay . Such restructurings are often called a rescheduling . Alternatively , a re- structuring could both defer principal payments and reduce interest payments . The loss as- sociated with such ...
... interest rate the country must pay . Such restructurings are often called a rescheduling . Alternatively , a re- structuring could both defer principal payments and reduce interest payments . The loss as- sociated with such ...
Pagina 7
... interest - rate loan directly from the United States . Brazil has borrowed over $ 30 billion from the IMF , around 5 percent of its precrisis GDP . Uruguay's $ 2.7 billion IMF credit line was 13 percent of its precrisis GDP . Argentina ...
... interest - rate loan directly from the United States . Brazil has borrowed over $ 30 billion from the IMF , around 5 percent of its precrisis GDP . Uruguay's $ 2.7 billion IMF credit line was 13 percent of its precrisis GDP . Argentina ...
Pagina 13
... interest payments on its existing debt was difficult from the beginning and be- came more difficult with time . Banks were also reluctant to recognize the need for some debt forgiveness : It took a very long time for serial restruc ...
... interest payments on its existing debt was difficult from the beginning and be- came more difficult with time . Banks were also reluctant to recognize the need for some debt forgiveness : It took a very long time for serial restruc ...
Pagina 32
... interest rate changes in the world's major financial centers , and sudden changes in the willingness of domestic and in- ternational investors to invest in risky financial assets - that tend to hit emerging economies more frequently and ...
... interest rate changes in the world's major financial centers , and sudden changes in the willingness of domestic and in- ternational investors to invest in risky financial assets - that tend to hit emerging economies more frequently and ...
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Parole e frasi comuni
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
Brani popolari
Pagina 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
Pagina 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as