Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 apr 2004 - 348 pagine Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 90
Pagina
... lending at some unspecified point in the future - calls that lack credibility , as recent experience suggests they will be ignored in the heat of crisis . Far better , the authors argue , is to define the set of problems that large ...
... lending at some unspecified point in the future - calls that lack credibility , as recent experience suggests they will be ignored in the heat of crisis . Far better , the authors argue , is to define the set of problems that large ...
Pagina
... lending limits compared with actual lending Exposure of official sector , annual data 132 353 380 Table A.2 Exposure of private creditors , annual data 382 Table A.3 Summary of past restructuring cases 383 Figures Figure 1.1 IMF loans ...
... lending limits compared with actual lending Exposure of official sector , annual data 132 353 380 Table A.2 Exposure of private creditors , annual data 382 Table A.3 Summary of past restructuring cases 383 Figures Figure 1.1 IMF loans ...
Pagina 4
... lending to countries that discover macroeconomic virtue only when they are close to default and that instead it lend large sums only to countries with good policies that qualified in advance for extra protection - assuming those ...
... lending to countries that discover macroeconomic virtue only when they are close to default and that instead it lend large sums only to countries with good policies that qualified in advance for extra protection - assuming those ...
Pagina 6
... lending acceptable only if it is balanced by a commensurate commitment by private creditors to restructure their claims to help the crisis country ? If the IMF is going to lend less , should the IMF or the G - 7 countries - do more to ...
... lending acceptable only if it is balanced by a commensurate commitment by private creditors to restructure their claims to help the crisis country ? If the IMF is going to lend less , should the IMF or the G - 7 countries - do more to ...
Pagina 9
... lending . Figure 1.2 IMF lending , 1997-98 versus 2000-02 billions of INTRODUCTION 9 VII.
... lending . Figure 1.2 IMF lending , 1997-98 versus 2000-02 billions of INTRODUCTION 9 VII.
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Parole e frasi comuni
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
Brani popolari
Pagina 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
Pagina 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as