Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 apr 2004 - 348 pagine Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 47
Pagina
... litigation is not the most important problem that arises in a sover- eign debt restructuring , and that the recent success of efforts to introduce collective action clauses into sovereign bond contracts is unlikely to sig- nificantly ...
... litigation is not the most important problem that arises in a sover- eign debt restructuring , and that the recent success of efforts to introduce collective action clauses into sovereign bond contracts is unlikely to sig- nificantly ...
Pagina 6
... litigation substitute for official lending or , at least , make it easier for the IMF and the G - 7 to refuse the country asking for a large bailout ? The official sector remains uncomfortable both with providing large fi- nancial ...
... litigation substitute for official lending or , at least , make it easier for the IMF and the G - 7 to refuse the country asking for a large bailout ? The official sector remains uncomfortable both with providing large fi- nancial ...
Pagina 12
... litigation and keep all the proceeds of the litigation for itself . principal and provide " new money " to help the 12 BAILOUTS OR BAIL - INS ?
... litigation and keep all the proceeds of the litigation for itself . principal and provide " new money " to help the 12 BAILOUTS OR BAIL - INS ?
Pagina 77
... litigation , as will be dis- cussed in chapter 8. Moreover , any country could in principle reduce its consumption and spending to mobilize the resources to service its external debts ; thus all defaults are strategic or opportunistic ...
... litigation , as will be dis- cussed in chapter 8. Moreover , any country could in principle reduce its consumption and spending to mobilize the resources to service its external debts ; thus all defaults are strategic or opportunistic ...
Pagina 81
... litigation , but it is still hard to use litigation to force payment.6 Consequently , the central paradox addressed in much of the literature on sovereign debt is why any sovereign would ever want to service its debts once it has ...
... litigation , but it is still hard to use litigation to force payment.6 Consequently , the central paradox addressed in much of the literature on sovereign debt is why any sovereign would ever want to service its debts once it has ...
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Parole e frasi comuni
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
Brani popolari
Pagina 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
Pagina 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as