Bailouts Or Bail-Ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging EconomiesPeterson Institute, 30 apr 2004 - 348 pagine Roughly once a year, the managing director of the International Monetary Fund, the US treasury secretary and in some cases the finance ministers of other G-7 countries will get a call from the finance minister of a large emerging market economy. The emerging market finance minister will indicate that the country is rapidly running out of foreign reserves, that it has lost access to international capital markets and, perhaps, that is has lost the confidence of its own citizens. Without a rescue loan, it will be forced to devalue its currency and default either on its government debt or on loans to the country's banks that the government has guaranteed. This book looks at these situations and the options available to alleviate the problem. It argues for a policy that recognizes that every crisis is different and that different cases need to be handled within a framework that provides consistency and predictability to borrowing countries as well as those who invest in their debt. |
Dall'interno del libro
Risultati 1-5 di 92
Pagina
... Official Financing 121 Experience with Bail - in Policies : Rollover Arrangements and Debt Exchanges 139 Lessons for the Official Sector 160 Lessons from Bond Restructurings 166 Lessons from Restructuring of Bank Claims 174 Conclusions ...
... Official Financing 121 Experience with Bail - in Policies : Rollover Arrangements and Debt Exchanges 139 Lessons for the Official Sector 160 Lessons from Bond Restructurings 166 Lessons from Restructuring of Bank Claims 174 Conclusions ...
Pagina 1
... official sector1 for help since 1994 is long and covers all parts of the globe . It includes major emerging economies like Mexico , Thailand , Indonesia , Korea , Russia , Brazil , Tur- key , and Argentina - as well as smaller economies ...
... official sector1 for help since 1994 is long and covers all parts of the globe . It includes major emerging economies like Mexico , Thailand , Indonesia , Korea , Russia , Brazil , Tur- key , and Argentina - as well as smaller economies ...
Pagina 4
... official intervention , IMF or G - 7 efforts to catalyze a consensual restructuring are just as bad , if not worse , than large bailouts : The involvement of the IMF tarnishes the official sector with the country's decision not to pay ...
... official intervention , IMF or G - 7 efforts to catalyze a consensual restructuring are just as bad , if not worse , than large bailouts : The involvement of the IMF tarnishes the official sector with the country's decision not to pay ...
Pagina 6
... official lending or , at least , make it easier for the IMF and the G - 7 to refuse the country asking for a large bailout ? The official sector remains uncomfortable both with providing large fi- nancial bailouts to emerging economies ...
... official lending or , at least , make it easier for the IMF and the G - 7 to refuse the country asking for a large bailout ? The official sector remains uncomfortable both with providing large fi- nancial bailouts to emerging economies ...
Pagina 7
... official sec- tor's goals and its actual actions . The G - 7 countries agree in principle that IMF financing should be less forthcoming if a country's debts are unsus- tainable , yet they continue to support large bailouts for countries ...
... official sec- tor's goals and its actual actions . The G - 7 countries agree in principle that IMF financing should be less forthcoming if a country's debts are unsus- tainable , yet they continue to support large bailouts for countries ...
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Bailouts Or Bail-ins?: Responding to Financial Crises in Emerging Economies Nouriel Roubini,Brad Setser Visualizzazione estratti - 2004 |
Parole e frasi comuni
adjustment Argentina assets avoid bail-in bailout bank run banking system bankruptcy regime bilateral billion bond's bondholders borrowing Brady bonds Brazil capital claims collective action clauses commitment country's crisis country crisis resolution cross-border current account deficit debt restructuring debtor default depositors dollar domestic banks domestic debt Ecuador emerging economies emerging markets emerging-market exchange rate exposure external creditors external debt firms fiscal foreign currency foreign-currency Fred Bergsten Global guarantee holdouts IMF lending IMF loan IMF program IMF's incentives Indonesia interbank interest rates international bonds International Monetary Fund investors ISBN Korea lender of last liquidity litigation long-term maturing ment Mexico models moral hazard official financing official sector options Paris Club payments precrisis priority private creditors problems proposal reduce repay reserves restruc restructuring process restructuring terms risk rollover Russia SDRM short-term debt sovereign bonds sovereign debt sovereign debt restructuring standstill triggering Turkey Uruguay York-law
Brani popolari
Pagina 1 - The G-7 countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Canada.
Pagina 190 - No one category of private creditors should be regarded as inherently privileged relative to others in a similar position. When both are material, claims of bondholders should not be viewed as