BOOK 192-189 B.C. Roman delay and indecision. Flamininus had only weakened but not crushed, lest the The Romans were now fully aware that the time for immediate action had come. But in spite of this, they delayed, with their accustomed slowness, not only to declare themselves, but even to make the necessary preparations. It is true, one of the consuls of the year 192 B.C. was instructed to levy two new legions, with twenty thousand infantry and eight hundred cavalry of the allies; but only an insignificant fleet was sent to the Peloponnesus under the prætor, Atilius Serranus, while the prætor, Bæbius Tamphilus, received only three thousand men (one thousand Romans and two thousand allies), with whom, after a time, he crossed over to Apollonia. In the meantime Flamininus was sent once more to In a similar manner the Rhodians, without formally declaring war against Antiochus, and without being looked upon as belligerents, had come to the assistance of the towns threatened by him. See above, p. 83. The international code of peace and war was less stringent and logical in a question of this sort than that of modern times, when even the furnishing of arms to either belligerents by neutrals is not allowed. * Livy, xxxv. 20, 1: Romæ destinabant quidem sermonibus hostem Antiochum, sed nihildum ad id bellum præter animos parabant. Greece, in order, if possible, to compose the quarrel in the Peloponnesus, to prevent the spreading of the war, and, above all, to warn the Etolians. Flamininus sent instructions to the Achaeans to abstain from hostilities against Nabis until the arrival of the Roman fleet. The able Philopomen, who was now strategos of the Achaean league, saw that the chief object of the Romans was to prevent the overthrow of Nabis. He therefore resolved to put him down before the arrival of the Roman force, though he was well aware that Achaia would incur the displeasure of Rome by trying to assert her own right without waiting for the approval of the protecting power. CHAP. II. 192-189 B.C. Nabis. Unfortunately, the precipitation with which this plan Philopowas carried out led to a sad failure. Philopomen, who men's campaign did not shine as a naval commander, nevertheless tried an against attack by sea. He sailed from Ægium on the Corinthian Gulf to Gythium with a squadron of a few ships, one of which had four tiers of oars and served as a flag-ship, though it was more than eighty years old, and of course rotten and unseaworthy. He was completely defeated by the small fleet of Nabis, consisting of only three decked vessels and a few smaller boats, so that he himself escaped with difficulty. A second naval expedition, starting from Argolis, landed Philopomen in the neighbourhood of the besieged town, where he annihilated a part of the hostile troops by a night surprise, and hoped by devastating the Spartan territory and threatening Sparta to draw the besiegers off from Gythium. But this hope was disappointed. Gythium, which might easily have been relieved by the Romans, fell into the hands of Nabis, who now turned with all his forces against Philopomen. Meanwhile the latter had collected a sufficient number of troops out of the Achaean towns, and so completely defeated Nabis in the mountainous region (called Barbosthenes), north of Sparta, that only the fourth part of the beaten army escaped to Sparta. Nabis was again in a desperate position, and this time he had been put down by the Achaeans 1 Livy, xxxv. 25-30. BOOK 192-189 B.C. Discontent in Greece. Macedonian alliance Rome. alone, without the aid of the Romans. No wonder they were elated, and with pardonable vanity extolled the merits of their own general Philopomen high above those of Flamininus.' In this however they acted very unwisely; for the Roman held their fate in his hands. He wished naturally to uphold his former policy, and the bold and independent attitude which the Achaeans had assumed under the enterprising Philopomen was calculated, even if his vanity had not been hurt,2 to induce Flamininus to put a stop to the military action of the Achaeans, and once more to take the wretched Nabis under his protection. At his bidding an armistice was concluded, and Philopomen was obliged to evacuate Laconia with the Achaean troops.3 Flamininus had now a difficult task to perform. It had been easier to "liberate "the Greek states than it was now to keep alive the persuasion that real liberty had been gained. A cry went through the whole of Greece that a new and a real liberation was needed, a liberation from the unbearable dominion of Rome. In all places the old enemies of Rome and the new malcontents rallied under this watchword. There was almost everywhere an active anti-Roman party, even in Athens, which had been so tenderly patronised by Rome, and where but a short time before the admiration for the Romans was without bounds.1 The discontent of most of the Greek states counted for very little, for only three states in Greece were of any secured by weight at that time. These were Macedonia, and the Achaean and Ætolian leagues. Before all, the Romans were bent on securing the alliance of the king of Macedonia, the more so as Antiochus was bidding for his friendship. Various promises, of the nature of which we are unfortunately not informed, were made to him by Rome. So much, however, is known for certain, that he was assured that Livy, xxxv. 30, 13. 1 2 Livy is too partial to mention this foible of his countryman. But Plutarch (Philip, 15) on the authority probably of Polybius, has preserved this trait. 3 Pausanias, viii. 50, 10. 4 Livy, xxxv. 50, 4. if he remained true to the Roman alliance, his son Demetrius, who was then a hostage in Rome, would be sent back to him, and that the remainder of the contributions of war should be remitted. It is probable that the prospect was opened to him of recovering several of the lost possessions in Thessaly, especially the important fortress of Demetrias, as well as parts of Thrace, for instance, those towns which had been taken by Antiochus. The equivocal attitude of Amynander of Athamania probably induced Philip to reckon, in case of victory, on the acquisition of the district possessed by that chief. But what most decided Philip to take the part of the Romans was in all probability not so much the promises of the Romans as resentment against Antiochus, who had not only forsaken him in the late war, but had enriched himself at his expense, and was now short-sighted enough to favour a relative of the prince of Athamania, who put forward claims to the Macedonian throne. At a later period, as we shall see,2 Antiochus made other mistakes, which played into the hands of Flamininus and retained Philip in the Roman alliance. The consequence of Philip's policy was that, in the end, he gained hardly any of the advantages on which he had reckoned, that he became still more dependent on Roman supremacy, and that he had to suffer the most unworthy and humiliating treatment. CHAP. II. 192-189 B.C. Rome. The part to be taken by the Achaeans was determined The by that of the Etolians. If the latter ranged themselves Achaeans leagued on the side of Antiochus, the Achaeans were of necessity with compelled to join the Roman alliance. The opposition between the two confederations was so great that there was something unnatural even in their common alliance with Rome. The hereditary animosity between the two 'Diodorus, xxxviii. 15, Dindorf; Livy, xxxv. 31, 5. 2 See below, p. 116. Livy, xxxv. 31, 2: Minimum operæ legati Romanorum in Achæis adeundis consumpserunt, quos quia Nabidi infesti erant ad cetera quoque satis fidos censebant esse. Here Livy lets out the fact, that the continuance of the power of Nabis was looked upon by the Romans as a guarantee of the fidelity of the Achaeans. This is a confirmation of our views expressed above, page 76. BOOK B.C. nations contributed to a general discontent with the settlement of Flamininus: and as it was chiefly the Etolians 192-189 who fanned the flame of this discontent, the Achaean confederation was necessarily ranged on the side of the Romans. Flamininus reckoned so firmly upon it, that he ventured, plainly against the wishes and interests of the Achaeans, again to take the Spartan tyrant under his protection. Resent Etolians. The Etolians, from the very first, openly proclaimed ment of the that they were dissatisfied with the Roman settlement. They claimed for themselves, whether with justice or unjustly, the largest share in the victory over Macedonia; and in all the numerous negotiations they thought that they were entitled to have a weighty voice. They had advocated the complete annihilation of Philip's power, hoping that in the place of Macedonia they would become a leading power in Greece. It had been a bitter disappointment for them that the Romans rejected their proposals, affronted them intentionally, neglected them on every occasion, and finally threw to them only small fragments of the spoil which they greedily demanded. Resolution to invite As long as the Roman army was stationed in Greece, Antiochus. the Etolians gave vent to their resentment only in abusive language; but in the year 194 B.C., as soon as Demetrias, Chalcis, and Acrocorinthus were evacuated, and the Roman legions had returned to Italy, they began a busy agitation which tended to nothing less than the total overthrow of the new order of things. They had already entered into a correspondence with Antiochus, and held out the hope to him that he would find numerous and zealous adherents in Greece, if he would now undertake its real deliverance. It was at their advice that Nabis had commenced hostilities,' and when the conflict had been thus begun by 1 Livy, xxxv. 12, 7 : Tyranno Lacedæmonio Damocritus—ademptis maritimis civitatibus enervatam tyrannidem, dicere; inde militem, inde naves navalesque socios habuisse; inclusum suis prope muris Achæos videre dominantes in Peloponneso; nunquam habiturum recuperandi sua occasionem, si eam quæ tum esset prætermisisset; nullum exercitum Romanum in Græcia esse, nec propter Gythium aut maritimos alios Laconas dignam causam existimaturos Romanos, cur legiones rursus in Græciam transmittant. |