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tion, Megara again joined the Achaeans, whereupon the Boeotians made an attack upon the city. When assistance was proffered to one State, and for reasons of political interest was transferred to an adversary or to a rebel, such act was esteemed a piece of deliberate treachery. During the decline of Sparta, the veteran Agesilaus hoped to resuscitate his country by expeditions to the East. He proceeded with his mercenaries to Egypt to assist the king, Tachos, in his revolt against Persia ; but in the absence of the king his cousin, Nectanebis, rose and caused himself to be proclaimed king of Egypt. Agesilaus abandoned Tachos, and joined the usurper, “making the interests of his
“ country,” as Plutarch says, “ the pretext for his extraordinary conduct, which we can hardly call anything
better than treachery." 2 Right to In certain cases of extreme necessity and vital State
interest, such as self-preservation, ancient States claimed the right to abandon alliances. Thus, Polybius is at pains to determine whether Aristaenus, in causing the Achaeans to renounce their alliance with Philip and join that of Rome, was a wise opportunist, or a traitor in the strict sense of the term. It is difficult, he says, to state exactly who is to be regarded, under certain circumstances, as a real traitor. Obviously not all those who, at a time of tranquillity, make compacts with sovereigns can be considered such off hand ; nor, again, those who
at a time of danger withdraw their country from existing Polybius on friendships and alliances, and transfer it to others. For and treachery. such individuals have frequently been the authors of
manifold advantages to their own States. The historian
1 Polyb. xx. 6.
2 Plut. Ages. 37: ούτω δή λαβών τους μισθοφόρους ο Αγησίλαος από του Τάχω μετέστη προς τον Νεκτάναβιν, ατόπου και άλλοκότου πράγματος παρακαλύμματι το συμφέροντα της πατρίδος χρησάμενος, έπει ταύτης γε της προφάσεως αφαιρεθείσης το δικαιότατον όνομα της πράξεως ήν προδοσία.
8 Polyb. xviii. 13: τίνα γαρ ώς αληθώς προδότην δει νομίζειν ου ράδιον απoφήνασθαι. δηλον γαρ ώς ούτε τους εξ ακεραίου συντιθε
gives an example in connection with the circumstances under consideration. If Aristaenus, he argues, had not
, at this time opportunely caused the Achaeans to give up their alliance with Philip and unite themselves to Rome, it is clear that the entire league would have suffered utter destruction. But, as it was, this man and this policy were avowedly the means not only of procuring at the time the safety of individual Achaeans, but also the aggrandizement of the confederacy as a whole. And consequently he was not regarded as a traitor, but, on the contrary, was universally honoured as a benefactor and saviour of the country. Hence, Polybius infers that such a principle of conduct would be perfectly legitimate in the case of all others who might be obliged to adapt their policy and measures to the necessities of the hour. Admitting the validity of this point of view, His criticism of he continues, Demosthenes, admirable as he is in many
Demosthenes. respects, might well be censured for having rashly and indiscriminately hurled a bitter accusation against the most illustrious of the Greeks. For he asserts that in Arcadia, Cercidas, Hieronymus, and Eucampidas were traitors to Greece for entering into alliance with Philip; in Messene, the sons of Philiades, Neon and Thraylochus; in Argos, Mystis, Teledamus, one Mnaseas; in Thessaly, Daochus and Cineas ; in Boeotia, Theogeiton and Timolas; and many more besides being put in the same category. And yet, insists Polybius, all these men, especially those of Arcadia and Messene, had obvious and weighty reasons to advance in vindication of their
μένους των ανδρών προς τινας, βασιλείς ή δυνάστας κοινωνίας πραγμάτων ευθέως προδότας νομιστέον, ούτε τους κατά τας περιστάσεις μετατιθέντας τας αυτών πατρίδας από των υποκειμένων προς ετέρας φιλίας και συμμαχίας, ουδε τούτους. πολλού γε δει. επείται
. γε πολλάκις οι τοιούτοι των μεγίστων αγαθών γεγόνασιν αίτιοι, ταϊς ιδίαις πατρίσιν.
1 Ιbid.: ο δ' αυτός αν είη λόγος και περί των άλλων, όσοι κατά τάς των καιρών περιτάσεις τα παραπλήσια τούτοις πολιτεύονται και πράττουσιν.
2 Cf. De corona, 43, 48, 295.
conduct. For it was by their bringing Philip into the Peloponnese and humbling the Lacedaemonians that these men, on the one hand, enabled all its inhabitants to breathe again and conceive the idea of liberty; and, on the other, by recovering their cities and territory, which the Lacedaemonians had captured from the Messenians, Megalopolitans, Tegeans, and Argives, notoriously raised the fortunes of their own countries. In return for this they were obliged to refrain from making war on Philip and the Macedonians. Now had they done all this for merely personal reasons or base selfseeking, or even from a purely party spirit, they would have well merited to be branded as traitors. But if, while being faithful in their duty to their countries, they yet differed in their judgments of politics, and did not consider their interests to be the same as those of Athens, then Demosthenes is scarcely justified in stigmatizing them, on that account, as traitors. “The man who measures everything by the interests of his own particular State, and imagines that all the Greeks ought to have their eyes fixed upon Athens, on the pain of being styled traitors, seems to me to be ill-informed, and to be labouring under a strange delusion,” __especially so as the course which events in Greece took at the time has testified to the wisdom, not of Demosthenes,
1 xviii. Ι4: ... καίτοι γε πάντων μεν των προειρημένων ανδρών πολύν εχόντων λόγον και φαινόμενον υπέρ των καθ' αυτούς δικαίων, πλείστον δε των εξ Αρκαδίας και Μεσσήνης.
2 That is 338 B.C. after the battle of Chaeronaea. Polybius' argument is, of course, an ex post facto one ; and one may nevertheless urge, as is suggested by Shuckburgh, The Histories of Polybius, vol. ii. p. 213, note (to whose translation I am here and in other places indebted), that if Demosthenes' advice had been carried into effect, these States might have been liberated from Spartan tyranny without necessarily falling under the subjection of Macedon.
8 Cf. Polyb. xviii. 15.
4 Ιbid. xviii. Ι4: ο δε πάντα μετρών προς το της ιδίας πατρίδος συμφέρον, και πάντας ηγούμενος δείν τους Έλληνας αποβλέπειν προς 'Αθηναίους, ει δε μή, προδότας αποκαλών, ανογείν μοι δοκεί και πολύ παραπαίειν της αληθείας. ...
but of the men above mentioned ; for Athens, by her opposition to Philip, suffered the crushing defeat at Chaeronaea.
In ancient Italy there were institutions analogous to Confederations the Greek amphictyonies and religious associations. 1 and alliances Later we find confederacies 2 and unions founded as much for political reasons as for the practice of common worship. The conception of the underlying fides added greatly to the solemnity of the transactions in establishing these alliances, and to the recognition of their intrinsic force and binding character. 3 Not long after Alliance the expulsion of the kings, in 492 or 493 B.C., the between Rome Latin confederation (of whose earlier history little is league. known) consisting of thirty cities entered into a league with Romet on a basis of equality. Dionysius assimilates the treaty to a symmachy (oupuaxia), and isopolitical arrangement (icotoleteia) after the fashion of Hellenic practice. The record of this treaty, which existed at Rome on a brazen pillar down to the time of Cicero, contained the name of Spurius Cassius as the consul who concluded it, and hence it is sometimes termed the foedus Cassianum.' There were two reasons for the formation of this alliance; in the first place, the Roman patricians were desirous of securing the assistance of the Latins against their own plebeians, and, secondly, the contracting parties were anxious to protect their territories more effectively from the menacing encroachments of their flourishing neighbours in the south, the Aequians and the Volscians. The thirty cities of the Latin association were at no great distance from Rome, and are supposed to have
1 Cf. Varro, vi. 25: “Latinae feriae a Latinis populis quibus ex sacris carnem petere ius fuit cum Romanis.”—See Livy, v. 1; xli. 16.
? J. Beloch, Der italische Bund unter Roms Hegemonie (Leipzig, 1880).
3 On fides and its influence on international relationships, see vol. i. pp. 391 seg.
4 Cf. Livy, ii. 53; viii. 2, 4; Dion. Hal. vi. 21; viii. 70-77. 5 Cic. Pro Balbo, 23, 24.-Cf. Livy, ii. 23.
Terms of the convention.
been the following:1 Ardea, Aricia, Bovillae, Bubentum, Corniculum, Carventum, Circeii, Cora, Corbio, Corioli, Fortuna (or Foretii), Gabii, Lanuvium, Laurentum, Lavici, Lavinium, Nomentum, Norba, Pedum, Praeneste, Querquetulum, Satricum, Scaptia, Setia, Tellena, Tibur, Toleria, Tricrinum, Tusculum, and Velitrae. Between these cities and the Romans a perpetual alliance, as related by Dionysius, was established to the following effect:-2
'That there shall be peace between the Romans and all the Latin cities so long as the heavens and the earth shall remain in the same position.
“That they shall not make war nor cause war to be made against each other, nor permit each other's enemies to pass through their respective territories.
• That in case of attack they shall aid each other with all their might, and all plunder and booty captured by their allied forces shall be shared equally between them.
"That disputes arising out of private contracts between their respective citizens shall be determined within ten days by the tribunal of the city where the contracts in question were entered into.8
• That nothing shall be added to this compact, and nothing taken away without the mutual consent of the contracting parties.'
Lex loci contractus.
1 This list is based on Dion. Hal. v. 61 (Ed. Reiske), together with Niebuhr's emendations.
2 Dion. Hal. vi. 95.—Cf. Liv. ii. 33. The statement of Dionysius is as follows : "Ην δε τα γραφέντα εν ταις συνθήκαις τοιάδε: “Ρωμαίοις και ταϊς Λατίνων πόλεσιν άπάσαις ειρήνης προς αλλήλους έστω, μέχρις άν ουρανός τε και γη την αυτήν στάσιν έχωσι και μήτε αυτοί πολεμείτωσαν προς αλλήλους, μήτε άλλοθεν πολεμίους επαγέτωσαν, μήτε τους επιφέρουσι πόλεμον οδούς παρεχέτωσαν ασφαλείς» βοηθείτωσάν τε τους, πολεμουμένοις απάση δυνάμει, λαφύρων τε και λείας της εκ πολέμων κοινών το ίσον λαγχανέτωσαν μέρος εκάτεροι των τε ιδιωτικών συμβολαίων αι κρίσεις εν ημέραις γιγνέσθωσαν δέκα παρ' οίς αν γένηται το συμβόλαιον. ταϊς δε συνθήκαις ταύταις μηδεν εξέστω προσθείναι μηδε αφελείν απ' αυτών, και τι αν μη “Ρωμαίοις τε και Λατίνοις άπασι δοκη.
3 On the interchange of national rights, and the competence of courts with regard to contracts between subjects of different States, see vol. i. pp. 295 seq.