Inclusion of

future confederates.

and the township of Utica; and, again, in a further treaty between the same (241 B.C.), it was laid down that the allies of neither of the parties should be attacked by the other.2

In many cases, also, we find provision made for the inclusion into the alliance of future confederates of the contracting parties. For example, in the engagement entered into between Hannibal and Philip V. of Macedon (215 B.C.), the Carthaginians undertook to give Philip and his allies their own support, that of all their existing allies and subjects, and also of all such others in Italy as would hereafter become their allies.3 Similarly, the Macedonians engaged to support the Carthaginians, and their allied cities together with their future confederates in Italy. Where, however, no such specific provision was made, it was a controverted question whether the conditions of the treaty were applicable to any new allies. No doubt, in such uncertain circumstances considerations of utility and political interest would actuate States to adopt one view or the other, when manifestly in consonance with their particular aim for the time being. Polybius, who, on the whole, is representative, in questions of international law, of the most enlightened opinions current in his time (without, however, falling a prey to the high imaginings of philosophical idealists), held that future allies were bound by the conditions, on the ground that they contracted their union with open eyes, and threw in their fortunes or misfortunes with the States whose alliance they sought. Thus, in the

1 Polyb. iii. 24: ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίων συμμάχοις καὶ Καρχηδονίων καὶ Τυρίων καὶ Ἰτυκαίων δήμῳ καὶ τοῖς τούτων συμμάχοις.

2 Polyb. iii. 27: τὴν ἀσφάλειαν ὑπάρχειν παρ' ἑκατέρων τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις.

3

s Polyb. vii. 9 : . . . καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν γένωνται σύμμαχοι

9: vñò äv

ἐν τοῖς κατ' Ιταλίαν τόποις τούτοις.

4 Ibid.: καὶ πρὸς οὔστινας ἡμῖν ἂν γένηται φιλία καὶ συμμαχία ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ χώρᾳ.

disputes arising between Rome and Carthage after the first Punic war, the Romans alleged that in the treaty of 241 B.C. the clause stipulating that the allies of neither party should be attacked by the other' did not apply merely to the then existing allies, as the Carthaginians interpreted it; for in that case a provision would have been inserted to prohibit each party from making new alliances, or to exclude subsequent allies from the operation of the treaty; and since neither of these provisions was made, it was obvious that not only the then existing allies, but also all subsequent ones, were entitled to the enjoyment of mutual security. Polybius remarks that this contention was quite reasonable,—ὁ δὴ καὶ πάντως ἂν εἰκὸς εἶναι dógelev for it is improbable, on the one hand, that they would have concluded a treaty depriving themselves of the power to establish such alliances as appeared to be to their advantage, and, on the other, it is equally unlikely that, had they entered into alliances of this kind, they would have denied support to their confederates. At all events, the clause that neither shall enlist soldiers in, or impose contributions on, the provinces or allies of the other, and all alike shall be secure of attack from the other side,' was justly regarded as referring also to subsequent allies.

Sometimes it was agreed that the allies of each of the Prohibitive contracting parties should not be taken into alliance stipulations as

1 Polyb. iii. 29: καὶ μὴν ἐν ταῖς περὶ Σικελίας συνθήκαις ἢ ἔγγραπτον, καθάπερ κἀκεῖνοι φασίν, ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ἀμφοτέρων συμμάχοις τὴν παρ' ἑκατέρων ἀσφάλειαν, οὐκ αὐτοῖς μόνον τοῖς τότε συμμαχοῦσι, καθάπερ ἐποιοῦντο τὴν ἐκδοχὴν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι· προσέκειτο γὰρ ἂν ἤτοι τὸ μὴ προσλαμβάνειν ἑτέρους συμμάχους παρὰ τοὺς ὑπάρχοντας, ἢ τὸ μὴ παραλαμβάνεσθαι τοὺς ὕστερον προσληφθέντας τούτων τῶν συνθηκῶν. ὅτε δὲ τούτων οὐδέτερον ἐγράφη, προφανὲς ἦν ὅτι πᾶσι τοῖς ἑκατέρων συμμάχοις, καὶ τοῖς οὖσι τότε καὶ τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα προσληφθησομένοις, τὴν παρ ̓ ἀμφοῖν ἀσφάλειαν ἀεὶ δέον ἦν ὑπάρχειν.

2 Ibid.

3 Polyb. iii. 27.-On this question of subsequent allies, Grotius is not fully decided, though he appears to incline to the negative opinion.

to allies.

Other

obligations

with the other. Thus, in the above-mentioned treaty of 241 B.C. there was a stipulation to the effect that neither signatory should make any compact of friendship with the allies of the other,μηδὲ προσλαμβάνειν εἰς φιλίαν τοὺς ἀλλήλων συμμάχους.

1

2

As to the more obvious obligations of confederates, of confederates, they were bound expressly or impliedly to render adequate assistance in war; very often a certain contingent of men, or vessels, or arms was prescribed in each case. Polybius, discussing the Roman constitution at the epoch of Cannae, 216 B.C., and speaking of the functions and powers of the consuls, says that it was within their competence to impose on the allies such levies as they thought proper,—καὶ γὰρ ἐπιτάττειν τοῖς συμμαχιοῖς τὸ δοκοῦν . . . And, again, when later the enrolment and composition of the Roman army are under his consideration, he remarks that the consuls made a requisition to the magistrates of the allied cities in Italy, declaring what allied troops were to serve, the number required, and the time and place at which the men selected should appear. Of course, the contingents or contributions expected were not fixed in an arbitrary manner, but were proportioned to the size and capabilities of the respective States.

As to treaties with the common enemy.

Further, allies were debarred from concluding treaties with the common enemy; but if such a treaty should be entered into, it was not to be made on such terms as would prevent the giving of due aid to the previously allied States. For example, in the treaty between Rome and Carthage, 279 B.C., there was a provision that if either the one party or the other contracted an alliance with Pyrrhus, they were both to do so on such conditions as not to preclude the one from affording

2 Diodor. xiv. 101.

3 $ Polyb. vi. 12.

1 Polyb. iii. 27. 4 Polyb. vi. 21 : ... οἱ τὰς ὑπάτους ἀρχὰς ἔχοντες παραγγέλλουσι τοῖς ἄρχουσι τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν συμμαχίδων πόλεων τῶν ἐκ τῆς Ἰταλίας, ἐξ ὧν ἂν βούλωνται συστρατεύειν τοὺς συμμάχους, διασαφοῦντες τὸ πλῆθος καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν καὶ τὸν τόπον εἰς ὃν δεήσει παρεῖναι τοὺς KEKρipéνOVS.-Cf. Liv. xxvi. 24.

assistance to the other, in case its territory should be attacked.1 Again, some sixty years later, Hannibal having obtained possession of Clastidium by the treachery of a certain Brundisian, to whom the Romans had entrusted it, found subsequently that some Celts who lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia, while pretending to have made terms with him, were despatching messages at the same time to the Romans, in the hope that they would thus secure themselves from the injury of both sides. Hannibal accordingly sent two thousand infantry along with the Celtic and Numidian cavalry with orders to lay waste their territory as a punishment for the breach of their obligations to him. Again, in the treaty between Hannibal and Philip V. of Macedon, it was agreed that they would be enemies to their respective enemies, excepting those with whom they were already in alliance; and Philip's ambassador specifically engaged to take the side of Carthage against Rome, whereas Hannibal undertook that, if he should eventually conquer Rome, he would insist on such terms as would prevent the Romans from making war on Philip. So that the seventh article was couched thus: If the Romans ever make war on you or on us, we will aid each other in such war, according to the need of either'; and the eighth article: 'So also if any other nation whatever does so, always excepting kings, cities, and tribes with whom we have sworn agreements and friendships.' 4

3

Rights of

But if allies were bound to share in the burdens of war, they were also allowed to partake of the benefits allies.

1 Polyb. iii. 25 : ἐὰν συμμαχίαν ποιῶνται πρὸς Πύρρον ἔγγραπτον ποιείσθωσαν ἀμφότεροι, ἵνα ἐξῇ βοηθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἐν τῇ τῶν πολεμουμένων χώρα.

2 Ibid. iii. 69 : ... καὶ πεπεισμένους τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ τὴν παρ' ἀμφοῖν ἀσφάλειαν αὑτοῖς ὑπάρξειν. . . .

...

s Polyb. vii. 9: ἐὰν δὲ αἴρωνται Ῥωμαῖοι πρὸς ὑμᾶς πόλεμον ἢ πρὸς ὑμᾶς, βοηθήσομεν ἀλλήλοις εἰς τὸν πόλεμον, καθὼς ἂν ἑκατέ ροις ή χρεία.

4 Ibid.: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐάν τινες ἄλλοι χωρὶς βασιλέων καὶ πόλεων καὶ ἐθνῶν, πρὸς ἃ ἡμῖν εἰσιν ὅρκοι καὶ φιλίαι.—Cf. Liv. xxvi. 24.

of a dives victoria.'1 " In the plunder of Sicily, for example, the Romans shared equally with their Italian allies. And at the conclusion of the fourth Samnite war, the Campanians received as their portion of the spoil a considerable part of the coast of the gulf of Salerno, which had previously been in the possession of the Samnites ;-this, at least, appears from Livy's statement that the Roman colonies of Salernum and Buxentum, established subsequent to the second Punic war, were settled on land which had belonged to Capua.2 In a conference between Julius Caesar and the German chief, Ariovistus, the former stated that it was the custom of the Roman people to desire not only that its allies and friends should lose none of their property, but that they should also be advanced in influence, dignity, and honour. And, as Cicero asserted, Rome made war, for the sake of her allies, on Antiochus, Philip, the Aetolians, the Carthaginians, though she had not herself been injured or provoked by them.* Hostilities against Antiochus and the Aetolians were commenced on behalf of the Rhodians, and Eumenes, king of Pergamus; against Philip, on account of the Athenians and others. The first Punic war (265-242 B.C.) was undertaken by Rome ostensibly to defend the people of Messana in Sicily; the second (218-202 B.C.) originated owing to Carthaginian aggressions on the Spanish city of Saguntum, which was an ally of Rome; in the third (146 B.C.), the Romans defended their ally Masinissa, king of Numidia.

1 Liv. xxxvii. 53: "neminem digniorem esse ex sociis vestris, qui bello a vobis parta possideat.”—xxxvii. 54: "est enim deum benignitate non gloriosa magis quam dives victoria vestra; . . . licet ergo vobis et praemiis belli ditare socios et non decedere instituto vestro.' 2 Liv. xxxiv. 45.

3 Caesar, De bell. gall. i. 43: "Populi Romani hanc esse consuetudinem, ut socios atque amicos non modo sui nihil deperdere, sed gratia, dignitate, honore auctiores velit esse..."

4 Cic. Pro leg. Manil. 6: “... si propter socios, nulla ipsi iniuria lacessiti, maiores nostri cum Antiocho, cum Philippo, cum Aetolis, cum Poenis bella gesserunt. . . ."