The speeches of Cortés, given by Mr. Prescott, are master-pieces of practical eloquence. Indeed, wherever Cortés was, there could be but one will. What authority was unable to do he did by finesse and persuasion. That irritable temper and that impatient intellect bore all vexations patiently, intent on one object, and ready for all obstacles which stood in its path.

Cortés was brave in almost every sense of the term. He combined the courage of the knight-errant and the martyr. His daring in battle, perhaps, was not greater than that exhibited by some of his officers, Alvarado, for example; but he excelled all in the power of endurance. His constancy of purpose had the obstinacy of sheer stupidity, and seems almost incompatible with his fiery valor. Famine, fatigue, pestilence, defeat, every extreme of mental and physical wretchedness, could present no arguments sufficiently strong to shake his purpose of conquest. What depressed his followers only called forth his courage in its most splendid light. When he himself had most cause for despondency, his serene courage not only mounted above his own miseries, but enabled him to use all the resources of his fertile mind in cheering his followers. Wounded, bleeding, wasted by famine, broken down by disease and despair, there was always one voice whose magical tones could make their hearts leap with their old courage, and send them again on their old enterprise of peril and death.

We cannot follow the genius of Cortés as it was developed in the events of the conquest, and attempt an abstract of what Mr. Prescott has performed with such fullness, richness, and power. Rarely has so splendid a theme been treated by an historian so fortunate at once in the possession of requisite materials and requisite capacity. Among the many characteristics of the work, that which will be most likely to strike and charm the general reader, is its picturesqueness of description, both as regards incidents and scenery. The freshness and vividness with which everything is presented is a continual stimulant to attention; and there is a nerve in the movement of the style which gives to the narrative a continual vitality. Among these descriptions we would particularize the account of the retreat from Mexico in the second volume, and the battles which preceded its final conquest and destruction in the third, as being especially pervaded by intense life. The critical reader, also, will not fail to perceive that the interest of particular passages is subservient to the general effect of the whole, and that the author has produced a work of art as well as a history. That quality of objectiveness, which we have mentioned as characterizing the mind of Mr. Prescott, and favorably distinguishing him

from many eminent historians, is especially obvious when we contrast the representations in "Ferdinand and Isabella" with those in the "Conquest of Mexico." The objects are different, and in each case they are presented in their own form, life, and character. We can conceive of the two histories as the production of separate minds. But few historians are thus capable of representing objects. in white light. To see anything through the medium of another mind is too often to see it caricatured. Objects to the egotist, whether he be called thinker or coxcomb, are commonly mirrors which more or less reflect himself. Nature, events, and persons, are considered as deriving their chief importance from their relation to him. This relation, and not their relation to each other, he is prone to call the philosophy of history.

Here, for the present, we must pause. We intended to include a review of Mr. Prescott's last history in this general survey of his works; but its subject is so interesting and important, and presents so many characters and topics for reflection and criticism, that we should be compelled either to pass it over with a superficial consideration, or to swell our article beyond those bounds which the patience of readers has fixed to the garrulity of critics. Few books published within the last twenty years have produced a stronger effect upon the public mind than the "History of the Conquest of Peru;" and as it exhibits, in many respects, the finest qualities of Mr. Prescott's historical method, and indicates in its style and general character the ripeness and maturity of his powers, we have concluded to postpone its consideration to our April number. We confess that such a course to many writers, whose popularity rushes up like a rocket, explodes at once into sparkles of momentary brilliancy, and then descends into darkness a mere worthless stick, would be sadly out of character with the objects of a review; but it is the great merit of Mr. Prescott's books that they never grow old, and we have no fear that the interest of the thinking classes in the "Conquest of Peru" will have abated at the period when we next appear before our readers.

ART. II.-Association Discussed, or the Socialism of the Tribune Examined; being a Controversy between the New-York Tribune and the Courier and Enquirer. By H. GREELY and H. J. RAYMOND. New-York: Harper & Brothers.

In reviewing the discussion, the title to which is placed at the head of this article, we shall affect no impartiality that we do not feel. With every disposition to concede talents and integrity to both parties in the controversy, still we have a decided opinion that, in the main, one is right and the other grossly wrong. Fourierism, or associationism, as it is often styled by its friends, we cannot help regarding as a mischievous thing, and with equal frankness would we say, in the outset, that its pernicious tendencies have been most conclusively shown in the course of the above entitled discussion. At the same time, there may be conceded to its advocate not only the intellectual merit of an able and adroit defense, but also integrity of purpose, and a sincere, though misdirected, devotion to what the party doubtless deems the truest interests of humanity. Our remarks will relate, in some degree, to the logical management of the controversy, but chiefly to the essential merits of the question itself, in its relation to morality and the highest well-being of our race.

A considerable portion of the discussion on both sides will be found to have reference to certain questions of fairness or unfairness of argumentation. These arose out of the terms of the debate, and will be best understood by means of a brief outline of the history of the controversy, a sketch of which is given in the preface to the published work before us.

The Tribune-we say it without any intention to disparage, for it is only repeating its own boast-has been for several years known to the community as the leading advocate of some of the newest and most startling ideas which now generally pass under the name of reforms. In the prosecution of this course, it commenced, about six years ago, the publication of a series of papers in defense of the peculiar social doctrines of Charles Fourier. These were afterward collected into a volume, purporting to be chiefly from the pen of Albert Brisbane, with continuous and copious extracts from the writings of the first apostle himself. They are written with much ability, much consistency, and with a great deal of enthusiasm, having every appearance of sincerity and honest devotion to what the author doubtless regarded as the sacred cause of truth. They profess to present a thorough examination of the main sub

ject, and of all the collateral topics connected with it. Hence the writer goes very fully, not only into what may be called the economical department of the system, but also into a discussion of the family or household state, with all its alledged evils. He dwells at length upon the filial and paternal relations, the bearing of the association scheme upon religion, education, crime, punishment, and all related social or domestic institutions.

There certainly must be conceded to this writer, to whom the columns of the Tribune were so freely granted, the merit of boldly tracing out many of his positions to their logical consequences; although even he thinks that the age is not yet fully prepared for all the doctrines of Fourier. In the main, however, he does not shrink from presenting a full view of the system in almost all its bearings, and does not hesitate to avow, that it will necessarily come in direct collision with many cherished notions respecting the "isolated family state," paternal authority, the education of children, social institutions, and the position and doctrines of the church. This writer, too, it should be said, professes to be a warm patron of Christianity, and to have great respect for Christ. Few readers, however, can fail to perceive that this Christianity has nothing to do with the Bible-a book to which, as authority for his views of man, and human nature, and human relations, he never refers-but that it is only another name for the system professed to be revealed by Fourier himself. He reasons thus-and it is a syllogism which in some shape meets us in almost every chapterGod certainly intended a true social order for this world; this is not to be found in the present institutions of society, or in the present teachings of the church; but Fourier has discovered and proved a scheme the direct opposite of all these jarring developments; therefore Fourier's theory is the true interpretation of the gospel, it is true Christianity, it is the kingdom of heaven on earth.

This was regarded as a much better way of proving the identity of Fourierism and Christianity than any obsolete method of argument from texts or passages of the written word. Christ himself constantly appealed to what was written, and often chose this as the best mode of conveying his own instructions. Contemning, however, all such methods of arguing from texts, as utterly unphilosophical, the writer professed to go above them all directly to the "spirit of Christianity;" or, in other words, what Christianity ought to be when read by the higher light of the French prophet. In short, in some way, as John the Baptist was to Christ, so was Christ to Fourier.

We have dwelt the longer on this, in our introductory history, because this book did contain the best exposition ever made in this country of Fourier's doctrines. Because, too, of its first publication in the Tribune, and the fact that the other party was afterward referred to it as a work of authority, it has an important bearing upon some of the points subsequently presented in the controversy. After the completion of this series of papers, various articles appeared from time to time in the Tribune, advocating the same general views. These were occasionally noticed in the columns of the Courier and Enquirer, until it finally resulted in mutual propositions for the discussion which has occasioned the volume under review.

In the final agreement that followed, there was only one item in any way unusual, and which therefore it becomes important to notice. The reader will find it on the fourth page of the preface. It was a stipulation which never should have been demanded by one party or assented to by the other. Instead of a general examination of Fourierism, or associationism, as a well-settled system, grounded on certain fundamental principles, and having certain standard writings, the Tribune insisted that it should be "associationism as he understood it." Here certainly was presented a new and most unusual feature in the ethics of controversy. It, however, defeated itself by its own intrinsic absurdity. It could not be strictly carried out, because, in such case, it must at once, whenever rigidly and consistently applied, have put a stop to the discussion. A. debate of this kind must always be mainly carried on by way of deductions from admitted or proved facts. Of course, then, the party who shields himself under such a stipulation need not reply by disproving the opposing argument, or showing it to be unreasonable; he may simply deny that he accepts the inference, or that he thus understands it, and he is at once perfectly unassailable in this quarter. And so it must be of every other, and indeed in respect to the most general statement of the matter in dispute. He chooses to view associationism under a certain aspect; this embraces all its assumed good, and excludes all its inferential evils. He does not, of course, "understand” it to have bad tendencies, or he would not advocate it; for no man ever professedly favors that which he understands as being hostile to the true good of humanity.

It is argued, for example, that the theory of Fourier (even had not Fourier expressly avowed it) necessarily involves a mode of education which must tend to sunder the filial and parental rela tions. The disputant replies that this is not associationism as he