Obfervable in . 18. Some fuch wrong and unnatural Combinations of Ideas will be found to different Sets eftablish the irreconcilable Oppofition between different Sects of Philofophy and Religion; for we cannot imagine every one of their Followers to impofe wilfully on himself, and knowingly refufe Truth offer'd by plain Reafon. Intereft, tho' it does a great deal in the Cafe, yet cannot be thought to work whole Societies of Men to fo univerfal a Perverfness, as that every one of them to a Man fhould knowingly maintain Fafhood: Some at least must be allow'd to do what all pretend to, i. e. to purfue Truth fincerely; and therefore there must be fomething that blinds their Understandings, and makes them not fee the Falfhood of what they embrace for real Truth, That which thus captivates their Reasons, and leads Men of Sincerity blindfold from common Senfe, will, when examin'd, be found to be what we are speaking of: Some independent Ideas, of no Alliance to one another, are by Education, Custom, and the constant Din of their Party, fo coupled in their Minds, that they always appear there together; and they can no more feparate them in their Thoughts, than if they were but one Idea, and they operate as if they were fo. This gives Sense to Fargon, Demonftration to Abfurdities, and Confiftency to Nonfenfe, and is the Foundation of the greatest, I had almost faid of all the Errors in the World; or if it does not reach fo far, it is at least the most dangerous one, fince fo far as it obtains, it hinders Men from feeing and examining. When two things in themselves disjoin'd, appear to the Sight conftantly united; if the Eye fees these things riveted, which are loofe, where will you begin to rectify the Miftakes that follow in two Ideas, that they have been accuftom'd fo to join in their Minds, as to fubftitute one for the other, and, as I am apt to think, often without perceiving it themselves? This, whilft they are under the Deceit of it, makes them uncapable of Conviction, and they applaud themselves as zealous Champions for Truth, when indeed they are contending for Error; and the Confufion of two different Ideas, which a cuftomary Connection of them in their Minds hath to them made in effect but one, fills their Heads with falfe Views, and their Reasonings with falfe Confequences. Conclufion . 19. Having thus given an Account of the Original, Sorts and Extent of our Ideas, with feveral other Confiderations, about these (I know not whether I may fay) Inftruments or Materials of our Knowledg; the Method I at first propos'd to my felf, would now require, that I fhould immediately proceed to fhew what Ufe the Understanding makes of them, and what Knowledg we have by them. This was that which, in the first general View I had of this Subject, was all that I thought I fhould have to do: But upon a nearer Approach, I find that there is fo clofe a Conne&ion between Ideas and Words; and our abftra& Ideas, and general Words have fo conftant a Relation one to another, that it is impoffible to speak clearly and diftin&ly of our Knowledg, which all confifts in Propofitions, without confidering, first, the Nature, Ufe and Signification of Language; which therefore must be the Bufinefs of the next Book. BOOK. 181 §. 1. BOOK III. CHAP. I. Of Words or Language in General. OD having defign'd Man for a fociable Creature, made him Man fitted to not only with an inclination, and under a neceffity to have from articu fellowship with thofe of his own kind; but furnifh'd him late Sounds. alfo with Language, which was to be the great Inftrument and common Tie of Society. Man therefore had by Nature his Organs so fashion'd, as to be fit to frame articulate Sounds, which we call Words. But this was not enough to produce Language? for Parrots, and several other Birds, will be taught to make articulate Sounds diftinct enough, which yet, by no means, are capable of Language. deas. §. 2. Befides articulate Sounds therefore, it was farther neceffary, that he Tomake them fhould be able to use these Sounds as Signs of internal Conceptions; and to make Signs of Ithem stand as Marks for the Ideas within his own Mind, whereby they might be made known to others, and the Thoughts of Mens Minds be convey'd from one to another. §. 3. But neither was this fufficient to make Words fo ufeful as they ought to To make gebe. It is not enough for the perfection of Language, that Sounds can be neral Signs. made Signs of Ideas, unless thofe Signs can be fo made ufe of, as to comprehend Several particular Things: For the Multiplication of Words would have perplex'd their Ufe, had every particular thing need of a diftin&t Name to be fig nify'd by. To remedy this Inconvenience, Language had yet a farther Improvement in the ufe of general Terms, whereby one Word was made to mark a multitude of particular Exiftences: which advantageous ufe of Sounds was obtain'd only by the Difference of the Ideas they were made Signs of; thofe Names becoming general, which are made to ftand for general Ideas, and those remaining particular, where the Ideas they are us'd for are particular. mately de 4. Befides these Names which ftand for Ideas, there be other Words which To make geMen make use of, not to fignify any Idea, but the want or absence of fome Ideas neral Signs. fimple or complex, or all Ideas together; fuch as are Nihil in Latin, and in Englih, Ignorance and Barrenness. All which negative or privative Words, cannot be faid properly to belong to, or fignify no Ideas: for then they would be perfectly infignificant Sounds; but they relate to pofitive Ideas, and fignify their Absence. 9. 5. It may alfo lead us a little towards the Original of all our Notions and Words ultiKnowledg, if we remark how great a Dependance our Words have on common iv'd from fenfible Ideas; and how those, which are made use of to ftand for Actions and Notions quite remov'd from Senfe, have their Rife from thence, and from obvious fenfible Ideas. fuch as fignify fenfible Ideas are transfer'd to more abfrufe Significations, and made to stand for Ideas that come not under the cognizance of our Senfes; v. g. to Imagine, Apprehend, Comprehend, Adhere, Conceive, Inftil, Difguft, Disturbance, Tranquillity, &c. are all Words taken from the Operations of fenfible Things, and apply'd to certain Modes of Thinking. Spirit, in its primary fignification, is Breath; Angel, a Meffenger: And I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their Sources, we should find, in all Languages, the Names, which ftand for Things that fall not under our Senfes, to have had their firft rise from fenfible Ideas. By Diftribution. Words are fenfible Signs neceflary for Communica tion. Words are the fenible Signs of his Ideas who uses them. which we may give fome kind of guefs, what kind of Notions they were, and whence deriv'd, which fill'd their Minds who were the firft Beginners of Languages; and how Nature, even in the naming of things, unawares fuggefted to Men the Originals and Principles of all their Knowledg: whilft, to give Names that might make known to others any Operations they felt in themselves, or any other Ideas that came not under their Senfes, they were fain to borrow Words from ordinary known Ideas of Senfation, by that means to make others the more eafily to conceive thofe Operations they experimented in themselves, which made no outward fenfible Appearances: and then when they had got known and agreed Names, to fignify thofe internal Operations of their own Minds, they were fufficiently fornith'd to make known by Words all their other Ideas; fince they could confift of nothing, but either of outward fenfible Perceptions, or of the inward Operations of their Minds about them: we having, as has been prov'd, no Ideas at all, but what originally come either from fenfible Objecs without, or what we feel within our felves, from the inward Workings of our own Spirits, of which we are confcious to our felves within. §. 6. But to understand better the Ufe and Force of Language, as fubfervient to Inftruction and Knowledg, it will be convenient to confider, First, To what it is that Names, in the ufe of Language, are immediately apply'd. Secondly, Since all (except proper) Names are general, and fo ftand not particularly for this or that fingle thing, but for Sorts and Ranks of things; it will be neceffary to confider, in the next place, what the Sorts and Kinds, or, if you rather like the Latin Names, what the Species and Genera of Things are; wherein they confift, and how they come to be made. These being (as they ought) well look'd into, we fhall the better come to find the right Use of Words, the natural Advantages and Defects of Language, and the Remedies that ought to be ufed, to avoid the Inconveniences of Obfcurity or Uncertainty in the fignification of Words, without which it is impoffible to difcourfe with any Clearnefs, or Order, concerning Knowledg: which being converfant about Propofitions, and those most commonly univerfal ones, has greater connection with Words then perhaps is fufpeâed. These Confiderations therefore fhall be the matter of the following Chapters. M CHA P. II. Of the Signification of Words. 9. 1. AN, tho' he has great variety of Thoughts, and fuch, from which others, as well as himself, might receive Profit and Delight; yet they are all within his own Breaft, invifible, and hidden from others, nor can of themselves be made appear. The Comfort and Advantage of Society not being to be had without Communication of Thoughts, it was necessary that Man fhould find out fome external fenfible Signs, whereby those invifible Ideas, which his Thoughts are made up of, might be made known to others. For this purpose nothing was fo fit, either for Plenty or Quickness, as those articulate Sounds, which with fo much Eafe and Variety he found himself able to make. Thus we may conceive how Words, which were by nature fo well adap-.. ted to that purpose, come to be made ufe of by Men, as the Signs of their Ideas; not by any natural Connection that there is between particular articulate Sounds and certain Ideas, for then there would be but one Language amongst all Men ; but by a voluntary Impofition, whereby fuch a Word is made arbitrarily the Mark of fuch. an Idea. The Ufe then of Words is to be fenfible Marks of Ideas; and the Ideas they ftand for, are their proper and immediate Signifi cation.. §. 2. The ufe Men have of thefe Marks, being either to record their own Thoughts for the affiftance of their own Memory, or as it were to bring out their Ideas, and lay them before the view of others; Words in their primary or immediate Signification ftand for nothing but the Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them, how imperfectly foever or carelefly thofe Ideas are collected from the things which they are fuppos'd to reprefent. When a Man speaks to another, it is that he may be understood; and the End of Speech is, that those Sounds, as Marks, may make known his Ideas to the Hearer. That then which Words are the Marks of, are the Ideas of the Speaker: nor can any one apply them, as Marks, immediately to any thing elle, but the Ideas that he himself hath For this would be to make them Signs of his own Conceptions, and yet apply them to other Ideas; which would be to make them Signs, and not Signs of his Ideas at the fame time; and fo in effect to have no Signification at all. Words being voluntary Signs, they cannot be voluntary Signs impos'd by him on things he knows not. That would be to make them Signs of nothing, Sounds without Signification. A Man cannot make his Words the Signs either of Qualities in things, or of Conceptions in the Mind of another, whereof he has none in his own. Till he has fome Ideas of his own, he cannot fuppofe them to correspond with the Conceptions of another Man; nor can he ufe any Signs for them for thus they would be the Signs of he knows not what, which is in truth to be the Signs of nothing. But when he reprefents to himself other Mens Ideas by fome of his own, if he confent to give them the fame Names that other Men do, 'tis ftill to his own Ideas; to Ideas that he has, and not to Ideas that he has not. §. 3. This is lo neceffary in the Ufe of Language, that in this refpect the Words are the Knowing and the Ignorant, the Learned and Unlearned, ufe the Words they fenfible Signs fpeak (with any meaning) all alike. They, in every Man's Mouth, ftand for the of his Ideas who uses Ideas he has, and which he would exprefs by them. A Child having taken no- them. tice of nothing in the Metal he hears call'd Gold, but the bright fhining yellow Colour, he applies the word Gold only to his own Idea of that Colour, and nothing else; and therefore calls the fame Colour in a Peacock's Tail, Gold. Another that hath better obferv'd, adds to fhining yellow great Weight: And then the Sound Gold, when he ufes it, itands for a complex Idea of a fh ning yellow and very weighty Substance. Another adds to thofe Qualities Fulibility: and then the word Gold to him fignifies a Body, bright, yellow fufible, and very heavy. Another adds Malleability: Each of thefe ufes equally the word Gold, when they have occafion to exprefs the Idea which they have apply'd it to: but it is evident, that each can apply it only to his own Idea; nor can he make it ftand as a Sign of fuch a complex Idea as he has not. §. 4. But tho' Words, as they are used by Men, can properly and imme- Words often diately fignity nothing but the Ideas that are in the Mind of the Speaker; yet ferd, First, Secretly rethey in their Thoughts give them a fecret reference to two other things. to the Ideas First, They fuppofe their Words to be Marks of the Ideas in the Minds alfo of oth r in other Mens Men, with whom they communitate: For elle they fhould talk in vain, and could Minds. not be understood, if the Sounds they apply'd to one Idea, were fuch as by the Hearer were apply'd to another; which is to fpeak two Languages. But in this, Men ftand not ufually to examine, whether the Idea they and those they difcourfe with have in their Minds, be the fame: but think it enough that they ufe the Word, as they imagine, in the common Acceptation of that Language; in which they suppose, that the Idea they make it a fign of, is precisely the fame, to which the understanding Men of that Country apply that Name. §. 5. Secondly, Because Men would not be thought to talk barely of their own Secondly, to Imaginations, but of things as really they are; therefore they often Juppofe their the Reality of things. Words to ftand alfo for the Reality of things. But this relating more particularly to Substances, and their Names, as perhaps the former does to simple Leas and Modes, we shall speak of these two different ways of applying words more at large, when we come to treat of the Names of mix'd Modes, and Subftances, in particular: Tho give me leave here to fay, that it is a perverting the ufe of Words, and brings unavoidable Obfcurity and Confufion into their Signification, whenever we make them ftand for any thing, but those Ideas we have in our own Minds. Ideas. . 6. Concerning Words alfo it is farther to be confider'd: Fift, That they words by u being immediately the Signs of Mens Ideas, and by that means the Inftruments readily excite whereby Men communicate their Conceptions, and exprefs to one another those Thoughts and Imaginations they have within their own Breafts; there comes by conftant Ufe to be fuch a Connection between certain Sounds, and the Ideas they ftand for, that the Names heard almost as readily excite certain Ideas, as if the Objects themselves, which are apt to produce them, did actually affect 1 affect the Senfes. Which is manifeftly fo in all obvious fenfible Qualities; and in all Subftances, that frequently and familiarly occur to us. Words often §. 7. Secondly, That tho' the proper and immediate Signification of Words ufed without are Ideas in the Mind of the Speaker, yet becaufe by familiar ufe from our CraSignification. dles we come to learn certain articulate Sounds very perfectly, and have them readily on our Tongues, and always at hand in our Memories, but yet are not always careful to examine, or fettle their Significations perfectly; it often happens that Men, even when they would apply themselves to an attentive Confideration, do set their thoughts more on Words than Things. Nay, because Words are many of them learn'd, before the Ideas are known for which they stand; therefore fome, not only Children, but Men, fpeak several words no otherwise than Parrots do, only because they have learn'd them, and have been accuftom'd to thofe Sounds. But fo far as Words are of ufe and fignification, so far is there a conftant Connection between the Sound and the Idea, and a Defignation that the one ftand for the other; without which Application of them they are nothing but fo much infignificant Noise. Their Signifi §. 8. Words by long and familiar use, as has been said, come to excite in Men certain Ideas fo conftantly and readily, that they are apt to fuppofe a natural Connection between them. But that they fignify only Mens peculiar Ideas, and that by a perfectly arbitrary Impofition, is evident, in that they often fail to excite in others (even that use the fame Language) the fame Ideas we take them to be the figns of: And every Man has fo inviolable a Liberty, to make Words stand for what Ideas he pleases, that no one hath the Power to make others have the fame Ideas in their Minds, that he has when they use the fame words that he docs. And therefore the great Auguftus himself, in the poffeffion of that Power which rul'd the World, acknowledged he could not make a new Latin Word: which was as much as to fay, that he could not arbitrarily appoint what Idea any Sound should be a sign of, in the Mouths and common Language of his Subjects. 'Tis true, common Use by a tacit Confent appropriates certain Sounds to certain Ideas in all Languages, which fo far limits the Signification of that Sound, that unless a Man applies it to the fame Idea, he does not speak properly And let me add, that unless a Man's Words excite the fame Ideas in the Hearer, which he makes them ftand for in speaking, he does not speak intelligibly. But whatever be the confequence of any Man's ufing of Words differently, either from their general Meaning, or the particular Senfe of the Perfon to whom he addrefles them, this is certain, their Signification, in his use of them, is limited to his Ideas, and they can be Signs of nothing else, The greatest §. 1. part of Words general. For every par to have a Name is imPolible. : A CHAP. III. Of General Terms. LL things that exift being particulars, it may perhaps be thought reafonable that Words, which ought to be conform'd to Things, fhould be fo too; I mean, in their Signification: but yet we find the quite contrary. The far greatest part of Words, that make all Languages, are general Terms; which has not been the Effect of Neglect or Chance, but of Reafon and Neceffity. §. 2. First, It is impoffible that every particular Thing should have a diftinct pecu ticular thing liar Name. For the Signification and Ufe of Words, depending on that Connection which the Mind makes between its Ideas and the Sounds it uses as Signs of them, it is neceffary, in the Application of Names to Things, that the Mind fhould have diftin&t Ideas of the Things, and retain also the particular Name that belongs to every one, with its peculiar Appropriation to that Idea. But it is beyond the Power of human Capacity to frame and retain diftin& Ideas of all the particular things we meet with every Bird and Beaft Men faw, every Tree and Plant that affected the Senfes, could not find a place in the most capacious Understanding. If it be look'd on as an inftance of a prodigious Memory, that fome Generals have been able to call every Soldier in their Army by his proper |