tion, you are so far a transcendentalist. For you there are sources of knowledge which transcend experience. The mind itself is the native source of à priori cognitions, beliefs, and judgments. These well up from the depths of the soul. "They leap ready-armed from the womb of reason, like Pallas from the head of Jupiter." True, these primary truths of reason are revealed in consciousness under experienced conditions. They appear in the concrete, and not in the abstract form; but we can separate them from what is contingent and empirical, and clearly discriminate them as necessary and universal. Now mind is spiritual, not material. It is essentially active, not inertly passive. It has an original spontaneity. It is invested with power and dignity. It is not determined by mere aversion or desire. It can obey the voice of conscience, or it can surrender itself to passion. It can choose between right and wrong, regardless of painful or pleasurable consequences. It is essentially self-moved and self-determined. It is no longer in bondage to nature; it is a living energy controlling nature. Now causation becomes to us a reality. Mind is the proper analagon of power, and supplies a type of real efficiency. Now creation is possible. Immortality is credible. The existence of God is an unquestionable truth. Philosophy and Faith may now go hand in hand; and on the platform of necessary and universal truth, which philosophic analysis has cleared, you may plant the Christian system of redeeming and remedial measures, even though they may be supernatural interpretations, and feel that all à priori improbabilities are counterbalances, and canceled by the analogies which are presented in the operations of the human mind on the material universe. When mind has become to you a real power, and, within its sphere, a real cause, governing, controlling, and modifying nature, effecting new collocations. and arrangements of material forces, and securing new results, then we have little difficulty in conceiving, and less in believing, that the Infinite Mind interposes continually, controlling and modifying nature to secure moral and spiritual ends, or, in other words, perforins a miracle. Thus the intimate relation between philosophy and religion becomes at once apparent, and the influence which a man's philosophic opinions must necessarily exert upon his theological system must be obvious to every reflecting mind, so that “ is a man's philosophy, so is his theology." as In a previous article (April, 1862) we endeavored to appreciate the amount of influence which the sensational philosophy of Locke has exerted upon the theology of Watson as developed in his management of the theistic argument. We now propose to estimate the influence which the ethical phase of that philosophy has exerted upon his views of the nature of man in its relations to the moral law, or, in other words, to discuss the MORAL Philosophy of the Institutes of Theology. MORAL PHILOSOPHY is the science of the Moral Law, and of the nature of man as the subject of Moral Law. As such it presents several fundamental questions for our consideration. 1. Is there that which is immutably right; the same to all created minds, and to the Uncreated? 2. Whence do we derive the idea of the right in human conduct? 3. What are the essential conditions of human accountability? and, 4. What is the ground of obligation to do right? A sharper analysis may perhaps resolve all these questions into one, Whence do we derive our ideas of right, duty, and accountability? Every man's answer to these questions will be largely determined by his philosophic opinions. He may profess to answer them simply as a theologian, but he will necessarily, though unconsciously, be influenced by his philosophy. He can never relegate himself from the laws of thought which are imposed upon his intelligence; nor can he totally divest himself of the principles and ideas which, as the outbirth of philosophic thought, have become inextricably interwoven with all systems of knowledge, and all theological opinions. If we are sensationalists with Locke, then we must be utilitarians with Paley. His moral philosophy is unquestionably the ethical phase of the empirical philosophy. Then there is for us no immutable morality. There are no original native practical principles imposed upon the mind as laws of conduct. Our idea of the right is contingent, and not necessary; relative, and not absolute. It is grounded on interest, or utility, or expediency. The distinction in the moral quality of actions is derived from experience of their good or evil influence upon society. And the pleasurable or painful consequences which may result to ourselves and to society are the strongest motives which govern human conduct.* This ethical phase of the sensational philosophy receives some modifications when taken up into a theological system. Then our ideas of right and wrong are derived solely from revelation. Then "the rule which determines the quality of moral actions must be presumed to be matter of [ORAL] revelation from God. Morality is right because God commands it. And "the only satisfactory answer which the question as to the source of moral obligation can receive is, it is based upon the will of God." This is usually designated "the theological system of morals." In justice to Watson, we are constrained to distinctly note that, in the Institutes, he nowhere formally adopts the definition of virtue proposed by Paley-"the doing good to mankind in obedience to the revealed will of God for the sake of eternal happiness." He also very casually and incidentally remarks, that the ideas of right and wrong "must have their foundation in the reality of things." It would be exceedingly interesting to be able to determine what Mr. Watson means by the "reality of things," or upon what authority his "must be " is based. Because he is careful to assert with marked emphasis that "morals can have no authority disjoined from Christianity," and that our ideas of fitness, beauty, general interest, or the natural authority of truth are all mere matters of opinion."§ The obligation to perform any duty does not therefore rest upon our perception of its reasonableness, its fitness, its inherent rightness, or its harmony with immutable and eternal justice, but solely on the will of God. "That which in truth binds the creature is not the nature of the command issued by "The distinction in the moral quality of actions. . . may in part be traced to its having been observed that certain actions are injurious to society, and that to abstain from them is essential to the wellbeing of society. Anger, revenge, cupidity have been deemed evils as the source of injuries of various kinds, and humanity, self-government, and integrity have been ranked as virtues; and thus both certain actions, and the principles from whence they spring, have from their effects on society been determined to be good or evil." "It has likewise been observed by every man that individual happiness, as truly as social order and interests are materially affected by particular acts, and by those feelings of the heart which give rise to them. . . and that whatever civilized men have agreed to call vice is inimical to health cf body, or peace of mind, or both."-INSTITUTES, vol. i, page 6. Theological Institutes, vol. i, p. 8. Ibid., vol. ii, p. 477. § Ibid., vol. ii, p. 473. God, [not its rightness or justice,] but the relation in which the creature stands to God."* That man has no original ideas of right and wrong-no intuitive cognitions of what is just and unjust—that the mind has within itself no standards of right, is a fundamental principle of Watson's philosophy, or, if you please, of his theology. The knowledge of right and wrong is derived solely from without. It may have been dimly and imperfectly suggested by experience and observation of the tendency of actions to promote or obstruct human happiness. But "the evidence of both history and tradition shows that so far from these rules, by which the moral quality of actions is determined, having originated from observation of what was injurious, and what beneficial to mankind, there has been among all nations a constant reference to a declared will of the supreme God." + "A direct communication of the Divine Will as made to the primogenitors of our race," and to that source alone all the ideas of right and wrong which have existed in any age, or among any people, are to be traced. "Whatever is found pure in morals in ancient or modern writers, may be traced to indirect revelation." Verbal instruction-tradition or Scripture— thus becomes the source of all our ideas of right and wrong, of duty, and of obligation. These fundamental principles of Mr. Watson's philosophy very naturally determine all his other views of the moral nature of man. Man is a moral agent because he is able to understand a command when given, and to obey or disobey that command. The only subjective ground, or condition of human responsibility, is the power of voluntary choice. The law which determines the quality of action is purely objective. Man is in no sense "a law unto himself." And if he have no knowledge of the verbal, extrinsic law he is irresponsible. Mr. Watson's definition of a moral agent may perhaps imply, but it does not affirm, that the law must be intelligently apprehended by the agent. "An action is rendered moral by two circumstances: that it is voluntary, and that it has respect to some rule which determines it to be good or evil." Here *Theological Institutes, vol. ii, page 477. Theological Institutes, vol. ii, page 470. Ibid., vol. i, page 7. § Ibid., vol. i, page 5. there is no recognition of conscience of reason sitting in judgment upon conduct, or affirming any obligation. The definition of moral good and evil given by Locke and adopted by Watson is the only one possible on this theory. "It is the conformity or disagreement of our voluntary actions to some law whereby good or evil is drawn upon us by the will, or power of the law-maker."* An attempt to construct a science of moral law upon à priori principles is therefore in Mr. Watson's opinion not only "futile," but also "mischievous" in its tendency. It is "futile" because the materials are, in reality, drawn from revelation, and "dishonestly placed to the account of human reason." It is of "mischievous tendency," because it "disjoins moral rules from Divine authority, and puts Christianity wholly out of sight."[!] And finally, moral philosophy has been clearly proved to be an utter impossibility. "As far as man's reason has applied itself to the discovery of truth, or duty, it has generally gone astray." "There was little agreement among the sages of antiquity even upon the first principles of morals." "Questions in morals do not, for the most part, lie level to the minds of the populace. The greater part of mankind want leisure and capacity for demonstration, nor can carry on a train of proofs which in that way they must always depend upon for conviction." "Their conclusions would have no authority, and place them under no obligation." And, indeed, man without a revelation "is without moral control, without principles of justice, except such as may be slowly elaborated from those relations which concern the grosser interest of life; without CONSCIENCE; without hope or fear in another life."** The doctrine of Watson may now be summed up in the following propositions : 1. The human mind has no original, native ideas of the right, the just, the good. Whatever ideas it may possess are derived, primarily, from direct revelation; secondarily, from tradition and instruction. † Ibid., vol. ii, pp. 472-473. 2. The obligation to choose the right does not rest on the * Theological Institutes, vol. i, page 5. Theological Institutes, vol. ii, page 470. Theological Institutes, vol. i, pp. 15-17. ** Theological Institutes, vol. ii, page 271. § Ibid., vol. i, page 17. |