finitive in Greek, and, in course of time, came to be used by the poets even where the metre admitted the use of the present infinitive. No examples are found in prose which cannot be explained as regular uses of the perfect. The ease with which the perfect infinitive could be used in the last half of the pentameter led to such constant use that it at times actually constitutes a blemish; e.g. Tib. I. 8. 7-12: desine dissimulare: deus crudelius urit, quos uidet inuitos succubuisse sibi. quid fuco splendente genas ornare, quid ungues Ov. Her. IX. 71: detrahat Antaeus duro redimicula collo, In the fourteen distichs of this last poem, beginning with vs. 59, the pentasyllabic perfect infinitive occurs seven times in the last half of the pentameter. ΤΗ PLUTARCH ΠΕΡΙ ΕΥΘΥΜΙΑ Σ. BY HAROLD N. FOWLER. HIS treatise is in the form of a letter from Plutarch to Paccius, who had asked for an explanation of certain points in Plato's Timaeus, and also for "something about tranquillity of mind." Plutarch excuses himself, on the score of lack of time, from discussing the Timaeus, and says that what he offers on the subject of tranquillity is merely put together from the notes and quotations he happened to have at hand (ἀνελεξάμην περὶ εὐθυμίας ἐκ τῶν ὑπομνημάτων ὧν ἐμαυτῷ Tettoinμévos étúyxavov). In other words, this treatise is professedly made up of extracts from Plutarch's philosophical notebook. After a rather long introduction (§ 1), Plutarch attacks the Epicurean doctrine that he who wishes to attain tranquillity should withdraw himself from the world, and busy himself as little as possible with public and private affairs. This doctrine, he says, is like the advice given to the sick man, μέν ̓, ὦ ταλαίπωρ', ἀτρέμα σοῖς ἐν δεμνίοις, and to prove its worthlessness he brings forward the lack of tranquillity in women in spite of their domestic and retired life, and cites also the examples of Laertes and Achilles to show that retirement 1 Eur. Or. 258. One is frequently tempted to use the quotations with which the philosophical works of Plutarch and his contemporaries are garnished as convenient signs by the recurrence of which one may be guided in the search for the sources of philosophical doctrines. That such merely accidental signs must be used with caution is a matter of course, but this particular line is well adapted to serve as a warning. Among the writings which go under Plutarch's name, it occurs at least five times (here, Anim. an Corp. Aff. sint peior. III= 501 C, an Seni sit ger. Res P. IX=788 F, de Plac. Phil. IV, 12=901 A, adv. Colot. XXXII = 1126 A), and each time in very different surroundings, so that it is absurd to suppose that it is quoted from any previous philosopher, but it must be derived either directly from Euripides, or (which is far more probable) from a florilegium or book of quotations. does not bring tranquillity. Substantially the same doctrines which Plutarch here advocates are advanced by Seneca de Tranq. An. 1, who cites Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus (i.e. the Stoics in general) as authorities. Very similar, too, is the doctrine attributed to Athenodorus by Seneca de Tranq. An. III. The example of Achilles is also cited by Seneca de Tranq. An. II,2 and by Cicero, Tusc. III, viii, who refers to a discussion by Dionysius Heracleotes of the verses Corque meum penitus turgescit tristibus iris Cum decore atque omni me orbatum laude recordor. As these verses are in no way identical with those quoted by Plutarch (Il. I, 488 sqq. and XVIII, 104), it appears that Achilles was a stock example of lonely discontent. After quoting the verses of the Iliad, Plutarch goes on to say : ὅθεν οὐδὲ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται δεῖν ἡσυχάζειν, ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει χρῆσθαι πολιτευομένους καὶ πράσσοντας τὰ κοινὰ τοὺς φιλοτίμους καὶ φιλοδόξους, ὡς μᾶλλον ὑπ' ἀπραγμοσύνης ταράττεσθαι καὶ κακοῦσθαι πεφυκότας, ἂν ὧν ὀρέγονται μὴ τυγχάνωσιν. ἀλλ ̓ ἐκεῖνος μὲν ἄτοπος, οὐ τοὺς δυναμένους τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν προτρεπόμενος, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν μὴ δυναμένους. This agrees with Seneca ad Serenum de Otio III, 2: duae maxime et in hac re dissident sectae Epicureorum et Stoicorum, sed utraque ad otium diuersa uia mittit. Epicurus ait: "non accedet ad rem publicam sapiens nisi si quid interuenerit." Zenon ait: "accedet ad rem publicam nisi si quid impedierit." 3 The words ὅθεν οὐδὲ Ἐπίκουρος οἴεται show plainly enough that the attack upon the doctrine of absolute rest is not derived from an Epicurean source (as indeed it hardly could be), but there is no direct indication of the source from which it is 1 The doctrine of rest is attributed by Seneca de Tranq. An. XIII, to Democritus: hoc secutum puto Democritum ita coepisse "qui tranquille volet vivere, nec privatim agat multa nec publice,” ad supervacanea scilicet referentem. Cf. Laert. Diog. IX, c. vii, 12, § 45. Epicurus took this doctrine, like so many others, from Democritus. In opposing this doctrine, Seneca de Ben. IV, 13, is evidently opposing the Epicureans. 2 R. Hirzel, Hermes XIV, p. 356, refers this passage in Seneca to Democritus Tepl evovμías, and compares Plato Phileb. p. 46, where Democritus is evidently referred to. See also Hirzel, Unters. zu Cic. Phil. Schriften, I, p. 145. See Usener, Epicurea, p. 95. Cf. Sen. de Tranq. An. XIII: ubi uero nullum officium sollemne nos citat, inhibendae actiones, which is to be referred to Democritus. derived. The last part, at least, of this chapter (II) seems to be carelessly copied from some previous writer. The chapter ends with the words: τῶν γὰρ καλῶν ἡ παράλειψις οὐχ ἧττον ἢ τῶν φαύλων ἡ πρᾶξις ἀνιαρόν ἐστι καὶ ταραχώδες, ὡς εἴρηται; but this has not been stated anywhere by Plutarch, so that it is evident that the words s εἴρηται, with what immediately precedes, must have been copied without due regard to the connection in which they now come to stand. The latter part of Chapter III is in substance the same as part of de Virt. et Vit. IV. de Tranq. εἶτα τῆς νόσου διαλυθείσης καὶ κρά- de Virt. et Vit. Οὐχ ὁρᾷς τοὺς νοσοῦντας, ὅτι τῶν βρωμάτων τὰ καθαριώτατα καὶ που λυτελέστερα δυσχεραίνουσι καὶ δι απτύουσι καὶ παραιτούνται προσφε ρόντων καὶ βιαζομένων· εἶτα τῆς κράσεως μεταβαλούσης, καὶ πνεύματος χρηστοῦ καὶ γλυκέος αἵματος ἐγγενομένου καὶ θερμότητος οἰκείας, ἀναστάντες ἄρτον λιτὸν ἐπὶ τυρῷ καὶ καρδάμῳ χαίρουσι καὶ ἀσμενίζουσιν ἔσθοντες; τοιαύτην ὁ λόγος ἐμποιεῖ τῇ ψυχῇ διάθεσιν· καὶ αὐτ τάρκης ἔσῃ, ἐὰν μάθῃς τί τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστι. There can be no doubt that these passages are derived from the same original, though it may be that they passed through some other hand before they were adopted by Plutarch. Perhaps they are to be ascribed to Chrysippus, whose habit of comparing the diseases of the mind with those of the body is well known. Galen. de Plac. Hipp. et Plat. V, 439 sq. quotes Chrysippus ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν ἠθικῷ· “ Διὸ κατὰ τρόπον προῆκται Ζήνωνι λόγος· ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς νόσος ὁμοιοτάτη ἐστὶ τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταστασία. λέγεται δὲ εἶναι σώματος νόσος ἡ ἀσυμμετρία τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχρού, ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ,” and again “ ἡ δὲ ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑγίεια εὐκρασία τις καὶ συμμετρία τῶν δ' εἰρημένων.” Chapter IV begins with a series of contrasts: Alexander's discon tent and Crates' happiness, Agamemnon's heaviness of spirit and Diogenes' jokes, Socrates happy in his prison and Phaethon in tears at being refused permission to drive the chariot of the sun. The treatise περὶ φυγῆς ends (607 F) with a similar set of contrasts: ̓Αναξαγόρας μὲν ἐν τῷ δεσμωτηρίῳ τὸν τοῦ κύκλου τετραγωνισμὸν ἔγραφε. Σωκράτης δὲ φάρμακον πίνων ἐφιλοσόφει, καὶ παρεκάλει φιλοσοφεῖν τοὺς συνήθεις, εὐδαιμονιζόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν. τὸν δὲ Φαέθοντα καὶ τὸν Τάνταλον εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀναβάντας οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς περιπεσεῖν διὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην. It is possible that the collocation of Socrates and Phaethon in these two passages is purely fortuitous, but it seems more probable that both passages are derived from the same source, where a large number of examples was put together, from which Plutarch and his contemporaries could take and leave what they pleased. This source may have been a mere collection of anecdotes arranged under ethical heads, or it may have been a philosophical treatise with copious illustratory stories. ως 1 The next part of this chapter opposes the doctrine that habit makes the best life agreeable: ὥσπερ οὖν τὸ ὑπόδημα τῷ ποδί συνδιαστρέφεται, καὶ οὐ τοὐναντίον, οὕτω τοὺς βίους αἱ διαθέσεις συνεξομοιοῦσιν αὑταῖς. οὐ γὰρ ἡ συνήθεια ποιεῖ τοῖς ἑλομένοις τὸν ἄριστον βίον ἡδὺν, ὡς τις εἶπεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν ἅμα τὸν αὐτὸν βίον ποιεῖ καὶ ἄριστον καὶ ἥδιστον. Hirzel (Hermes XIV, p. 366, f) thinks that ὥς τις εἶπεν refers to Democritus, and compares fr. 84 ed. Mullach πόνος ξυνεχής ἐλαφρότερος ἑωυτοῦ τῇ ξυνηθείῃ γίνεται and Sen. de Tranq. Χ, 1, 2, 4. If Chapter II (see above) refers directly to Democritus, it is probable that this passage does also. Then the words ἀλλὰ τὸ φρονεῖν ἥδιστον might be taken from some opponent of Democritus (Hirzel thinks Panaetius), but they agree remarkably well with Democr. fr. 5 (Democrat. Orell. n. 6), οὔτε σώμασι οὔτε χρήμασι εὐδαιμονέουσι ἄνθρωποι, ἀλλ ̓ ὀρθοσύνῃ καὶ πολυφροσύνῃ. Perhaps this entire passage is to be referred ultimately to Democritus, in which case ὥς τις εἶπεν may be merely a general expression for any one who dissents. The doctrine that habit is of great importance in calming 1 I. necessitas fortiter ferre docet, consuetudo facile. 2. nullo meliore nomine de nobis natura meruit, quam quod cum sciret quibus aerumnis nasceremur, calamitatum mollimentum consuetudinem inuenit, cito in familiaritatem grauissima adducens. 4. adsuescendum est itaque condicioni suae et quam minimum de illa querendum. |