regular form of future denial, the second person singular probably began to be used as a form of prohibition. As the future could be used in positive commands in an imperative sense, as in távτws dè TOUTO Spáσes, but by all means do this, ARIST. Nub. 1352, it could also take the simple οὐ in prohibitions, as in χειρὶ οὐ ψαύσεις ποτέ, you shall not touch me with your hand, or do not touch me, EUR. Med. 1320. The dramatists soon introduced the new form with ou μn into such prohibitions, generally with the future indicative, but occasionally with the more primitive subjunctive. Thus où μǹ κaтaBoa had the sense of do not come down, derived from you shall not come down, as ov Yavous (above) from meaning you shall not touch came to mean do not touch. One of the strongest objections to the older views of the forms with où μý is that they generally require a distinct explanation of this prohibitory construction. Elmsley's theory of a question with two negatives, explaining où μǹ KaтаBoa; as will you NOT NOT come down? hence do not come down, was stated in the Quarterly Review for June, 1812, and in his note to EUR. Med. 1120 (1151 Dind.). Many who do not adopt Elmsley's theory in full still accept the interrogative form, and these sentences are now generally printed as questions. Long before Elmsley, the famous "Canon Davesianus " had proscribed all sigmatic aorist subjunctives with οὐ μή as well as with ὅπως μή. This edict removed nearly or quite all the troublesome subjunctives that would have opposed Elmsley's view, and left only the future indicative in his doubly-negatived questions, which of course required an indicative. This again set up an artificial distinction in form between the prohibitory construction allowing only the future indicative, and the other construction allowing both subjunctive and future indicative.

But it has been more and more evident in later years that this distinction in form between the two constructions cannot be maintained. It was seen by Brunck, before Elmsley's interrogative theory appeared, that it would be absurd to distinguish sentences like TaûTA οὐ μή ποτ' ἐς τὴν Σκῦρον ἐκπλεύσῃς ἔχων, you shall never sail away to Scyros with these arms, SOPH. Phil. 381, from ov μǹ kataßńσeɩ, you shall not come down, ARIST. Vesp. 397. He therefore wrote ẻκπλeúσes in the former, with the note "soloece vulgo legitur ékπλeúσŋs.” But ἐκπλεύσεις proved to be even a greater solecism than ἐκπλεύσῃς

""

was thought to be, for the only classic future of λéw is the middle πλεύσομαι οι πλευσοῦμαι, and ἐκπλεύσει will not suit the verse. So EKTλevσŋs had to be restored. Again, while almost all the sentences containing a prohibition with où un, followed by a positive command with aλá or dé, could admit Elmsley's punctuation and interpretation, as οὐ μὴ λαλήσεις ἀλλ ̓ ἀκολουθήσεις ἐμοί; ARIST. Nub. 505, explained as won't you not talk nonsense and follow me? another passage of the Clouds resisted both of these and also the prescribed form. In 296 the Mss. have οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς μηδὲ ποιήσῃς ἅπερ οἱ τρυγοδαίμονες οὗτοι· ἀλλ ̓ εὐφήμει. Brunck emended this without hesitation to οὐ μὴ σκώψεις μηδὲ ποιήσεις, with the note “soloece vulgo σκώψῃς . . . Tonons." But there was no place for Elmsley's interrogative mark, which could not stand after the imperative, and could not be inserted after ouro without implying that the other sentences (like Clouds 505 above) were wrongly punctuated. The emendation σκώψεις was as unfortunate as ἐκπλεύσεις, as the future of σκώπτω is σκώψομαι, not σκώψω, so that a further emendation to σκώψει was needed. In this battered condition, and with no interrogative mark to help the interpretation, the passage usually appears, even in the latest editions. So long as it is proposed to explain these prohibitions and the ordinary denials with où μn on entirely different theories, with nothing common to the two constructions, it may not seem unreasonable to force a few examples like Nub. 296 and 367 into conformity with the general usage. But on any theory which makes no distinction in construction between the prohibitions and the other negative expressions of denial or refusal (for example, between où un ἐκπλεύσῃς, you shall not sail away, and οὐ μὴ καταβήσει, do not come down, i.e. you shall not come down), there is no more reason for objecting to οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς than to οὐ μὴ ἐκπλεύσῃς. An occasional subjunctive, like οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς or οὐ μὴ ληρήσῃς, is indeed no more than we should naturally expect in a construction which had its origin in the subjunctive. In such expressions, further, the analogy of the equivalent μὴ σκώψῃς and μὴ ληρήσῃς would tend to make the aorist subjunctive unobjectionable and perfectly natural. A reference to the list of passages quoted on page 66 will show the inconsistencies into which every one must fall who attempts to explain the prohibitions and the clauses of denial on different theories. We cannot separate οὐ μὴ σκώψῃς from οὐ μὴ ἐκπλεύσης in construction, nor the latter

from οὐ μὴ πάθῃς, nor this again from οὐ μή τις ὑβρίσῃ, on any consistent principle of interpretation.1

One class of sentences have been claimed as decisive witnesses in favor of the interrogative theory. They are represented by où lâσσov οἴσεις, μηδ' ἀπιστήσεις ἐμοί; will you not more quickly extend it (your hand), and not distrust me? SOPH. Tr. 1183. These are undoubted questions, but there is no construction with ou un in them. They consist of one question with ou, implying an affirmative answer, will you not extend your hand? and another with μý, implying a negative answer, and you will not distrust me, will you? The compound of the two has the general sense expressed in the first translation

above.

In conclusion, we may sum up the result of the investigation as follows. The original construction of où un with the subjunctive was developed as a negative form of the independent subjunctive with μń, which had already become an expression of apprehension with desire to avert its object, even if it had not passed into the stage of a cautious assertion; in either case the real negative force of μn was in abeyance. The aorist subjunctive is the most common form here, the present being less frequent. This form of future denial next admitted the future indicative in the same sense as the subjunctive. The second person singular of this future with où μn was used by the dramatists as a prohibition, without abandoning the sense which the future can always have in both positive and negative commands. In these prohibitions the future indicative, in which they had their origin, is generally used; but the subjunctive occasionally occurs, being analogous to the ordinary aorist subjunctive with μn in prohibitions; e.g. μὴ σκώψῃς supporting οὐ μὴ σκώψης.

2

1 For a further discussion of the form of the sentences with où μh, in connection with that of clauses with ows and with the Canon Davesianus, see Transactions of the American Philological Association for 1869–70, pp. 46–55.

2 Since this paper was written, I have seen that Kvičala, in two articles on où uh in the Zeitschrift für die oesterreichischen Gymnasien for 1856, proposed an explanation of où un with the subjunctive, which at one important point came very near the view now presented. He states two (apparently theoretical) meanings which he supposes μǹ lávņs to have had at some period (zwei Bedeutungsentwickelungen): one, "Du wirst doch wol am Ende, trotzdem dass ich es abzuwehren suche, sterben "; the other, "Ich fürchte, dass du doch wol (trotz meiner Abwehr) sterben werdest." By prefixing où to μn Oávņs in these meanings, he

arrives at two meanings of où un with the subjunctive. The second of these comes so near the independent subjunctive with uh in Homer, that it is surprising that neither this nor the equally important μn in Plato is mentioned. But no use is made of the advantage here gained in explaining où μh with the future indicative, either in prohibitions or in denials. The prohibitions are made interrogative, où un dvoμevǹs éσei; being explained as "Nicht wahr?- du wirst doch nicht feindselig seyn?" The future of denial is explained simply as developed from the interrogative future, as a form of reply to this, by leaving out the interrogative element.

ON SOME DISPUTED POINTS IN THE CONSTRUCTION

IT

ΟF ἔδει, χρῆν, ETC. WITH THE INFINITIVE.

By W. W. GOODWIN.

T is a familiar fact that certain imperfects denoting obligation, propriety, or possibility, ἔδει, χρῆν οι ἐχρῆν, εἰκὸς ἦν, προσῆκεν, ¿v, and others of similar meaning, are used with the infinitive in an idiomatic sense, in which the whole expression becomes a form of potential indicative, referring to past or present time, and generally implying the opposite of the action or the negation of the infinitive. Thus, de σe cîv means you ought to have gone (but you did not go); edeɩ σe μn тоvто Tоlεiv, you ought not to be doing this (but you are) or you ought not to have done this (but you did it). These imperfects may be used also as ordinary past tenses with no potential force; as when ěda μéveɩv in Dem. xix. 124 means he had to stay (and did stay), or χρῆν Κανδαύλῃ γενέσθαι κακῶς in HD. i. 8 means Candaules was doomed to fall into trouble. The peculiar idiom by which the opposite of the infinitive is usually implied is common to Greek, Latin, and English; as in edeɩ σe toûtov piλeîv, hunc colere debebas, you ought to love him (but do not). So also is the use of the past tenses de, debebas, and ought (past tense of owe) to express present time. These combinations are practically equivalent to the verb of the infinitive in the potential indicative (with av), qualified by an adverb or other expression denoting obligation, propriety, or possibility, which expression would stand in the relation of an unreal condition to the verb with av. Thus, eikòs ĥv σe toûтo Taleîv means you would properly have suffered this (which you did not suffer), and is equivalent to τοῦτο ἂν ἔπαθες εἰκότως, or (in full) τοῦτο ἂν ἔπαθες εἰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἔπαθες. The implied unreal condition, however, comes into the expression by idiomatic usage, and is not inherent in the words themselves.

It is generally laid down as an absolute rule that in this idiom the opposite of the infinitive is always implied: see Krüger, § 53, 2, 7, where the usual formula is given, that with ἔδει τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι we must understand ἀλλ ̓ οὐ γίγνεται, with ἔδει ἂν τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι we must understand d' où dei. This principle was first formulated, I believe, by G. Hermann.

It covers nearly all the ordinary cases, and has