stripped of my inheritance, but also deprived of my franchise, and my sister wholly destitute, without a chance of ever obtaining a suitable establishment? It would not be right, men of the jury, either to refuse me redress, or to allow Aphobus to retain his plunder. With regard to myself, though you have no actual experience of my disposition towards you, it is fair to presume that I shall not be worse than my father. Of my opponent you have some experience; and you well know that, though he has inherited a large fortune, he has not only shown no liberality to the public, but even grasps at the property of his neighbour. Bear in mind this, with the other facts of the case, and give your votes according to justice. You have the clearest evidence to guide you, the evidence of witnesses, circumstances, probabilities, these men's own acknowledgment that they took possession of my estate. They say they have spent it; a falsehood; for they have it still. But let this warn you to be careful of my interests; seeing that, if I recover my rights by your assistance, I shall naturally be grateful to you for restoring them, and glad to serve the public offices; whereas the defendant, if you let him keep what belongs to me, will do nothing of the kind; for don't suppose that he will choose to contribute in respect of property, which he denies having received: no; he will rather conceal it, to justify the verdict in his favour.

THE ORATION AGAINST APHOBUS—III.

THE ARGUMENT.

PREVIOUS to the trial of the last case, Aphobus had called upon Demosthenes to give up Milyas, the foreman who managed the sword-cutlery business, to be examined by torture. Demosthenes refused to give him up, on the ground that he had been emancipated from servitude by his father on his death-bed, and therefore it was not lawful to examine him by torture. Knowing that the refusal would be made a topic of observation against him on the trial, he called Phanus, Philip, and Æsius, the brother of Aphobus, to prove that Aphobus had, on being interrogated before the arbitrator, admitted Milyas to be a freeman. Aphobus brought actions against Phanus and Philip for having given this testimony, which he alleged to be false. The cause against Phanus seems to have been tried first, and Demosthenes appeared in his own person to defend him, as he had a right to do; for the action for false testimony was consi

dered as a branch of the original cause, and might perhaps lead to a new trial. (See Vol. iii. Appendix IX. p. 394.) Demosthenes in his speech shows by positive evidence that the testimony of Phanus was true; that Aphobus had made the statement in question, and that Milyas was in fact a freedman. He shows the improbability of the charge, insists upon the good character of Phanus, and the absence of any motive to speak falsely. Supposing even that his evidence has been untrue, Demosthenes contends that he would not be liable to the present action; for the evidence was not material, or not sufficiently material, to the issue in the original cause. Aphobus had not been damnified by it; for Milyas could not have proved anything to his advantage, if he had been examined. The verdict was given against Aphobus, not for what Phanus had deposed to, nor for lack of what Milyas could have proved, but on account of the strong and direct testimony which fixed him with the receipt of the trust funds, and the neglect to administer them properly and render a just account. None of the witnesses who gave that testimony had he dared to sue; that alone proved the present proceeding to be unfounded and vexatious. In fact it was a desperate attempt to re-open and re-argue a cause which had been decided against Aphobus on the most irresistible evidence. Demosthenes touches upon the leading features of the original cause, in order to show how little bearing the testimony of Phanus had upon the merits of the question, and with a view also to create an impression in his own favour in the minds of the jury.

IF I had not remembered, men of the jury, that on a former trial between Aphobus and myself I convicted him easily of greater falsehoods than any which he has now uttered (so palpable were the wrongs he had done me), I should have no slight misgivings as to my own ability to expose the arts by which he misleads you. Now however, (with the favour of the Gods be it spoken), if you will only give me a fair and impartial hearing, I feel confident that you will form the same opinion of this man's impudence as the jury on the previous occasion. If indeed the case had required an artful speech, I should have distrusted my youth and shrunk from the contest: as it is, I shall simply have to lay before you a statement of the plaintiff's conduct towards From this you will have no difficulty in discovering which of us is the rogue.

us.

I know that he has commenced these proceedings, not with any expectation that he shall convict a witness of giving false testimony against him, but in the belief that the large amount of damages, which he was condemned to pay, will excite a prejudice against me, and a feeling of compassion

for himself. On this account he now labours to clear himself of the charges made against him at the former trial, on the merits of which he had not a word to say in his defence at the time. I beg to observe, men of the jury, that, if I had proceeded to execute the judgment without showing him any indulgence, I should have done no wrong in levying the damages which you had awarded, though it might perhaps have been urged, that I had acted with excessive rigour in depriving a relation of all his property. The truth however is the reverse. The plaintiff has conspired with his fellow-guardians to strip me of my whole patrimony, and even now, after having been clearly convicted by a jury of his country, he does not choose to do anything which is fair and reasonable. He has dispersed the whole of his effects, giving the house to Esius, and the farm to Onetor, with whom I have been compelled to go to law; he took the furniture out of the house himself, carried away the slaves, broke the wine vat, tore off the doors, and all but set fire to the house; then he went off to Megara, where he has settled and paid the alien's tax. Surely you have more reason to execrate the plaintiff for such behaviour, than to charge me with any undue severity.

Of the rapacity and wickedness of this man I shall presently give you a full account, though indeed you have heard a pretty good summary of it already. But I shall now proceed at once to prove the truth of that piece of evidence, which is the subject of inquiry, and upon which you will have to pronounce your judgment. I have one request to make to you, men of the jury, and that is a reasonable one; that you will give to both of us a fair hearing. It is for your own advantage to do so as well as mine; for, the more accurately you are informed of the facts, the more just and righteous will be your decision. I shall show that the plaintiff has confessed Milyas to be a freeman, and proved the same by his conduct; that he has declined the most infallible test, the examination by torture, for fear the truth should

1 I adopt the conjecture of Wolf, which seems to have occurred also to Reiske; and which is fortified by what follows about Esius (p. 149, orig.). Esius was the brother of Aphobus, and clearly a partisan in his cause. No one was more likely to have assisted him in making away with his property.

come out; that he is playing tricks, producing false witnesses, and misrepresenting the real facts of the case. All this I shall prove by such strong and cogent evidence, that you will all plainly see, that I am speaking the truth, and not a word the plaintiff has said is to be trusted. I shall commence with a statement of those particulars, which will best enable me to give you a clear insight into the case.

I commenced actions, men of the jury, against Demophon, Therippides, and the plaintiff, for breach of their trust as guardians, having been defrauded by them of all my property. On the trial of the cause against Aphobus, I proved clearly to the jury, as I shall prove to you, that he had conspired with his colleagues to deprive me of all the estate bequeathed to me. That I substantiated the charge not by means of false evidence, is manifest from this circumstance. A multitude of depositions having been read at the trial, some of the deponents stating that they delivered to the plaintiff certain of my effects, others that they were present when he received them, others again that they had made purchases from him and paid him the prices, not one of them has he sued for false testimony. The only witness against whom he has proceeded is this man, whose evidence he cannot show to have fixed him with the receipt of a single drachm. The amount of damages which I claimed was not computed from the defendant's deposition, in which there is no mention of money, but by casting up the sums deposed to by the other witnesses, whom Aphobus has not sued. It was upon hearing their statements, that the jury found a verdict against him for the whole amount demanded in the plaint. Why then did he pass them over, and sue the defendant alone? I will tell you. He well knew, that the witnesses who proved his receipt of money would only fix him with it the more strongly, as every item in the account was more closely investigated; which it would be on the trial for false testimony: for every charge, which occupied but a part of my former case in conjunction with other charges, would then be opened separately and form the subject of an entire speech. On the other hand, in suing a witness who deposed to his answer, he thought it would be in his own power to deny what he confessed before. Therefore he brings an action against the defendant, of the truth of whose testimony I shall endeavour

to convince you, not by a suggestion of probabilities, not by arguments concerted for the present occasion, but by reasoning which I am sure you will all think sound. Listen and judge for yourselves.

Being aware, men of the jury, that the whole contest at the trial would be about the deposition set out on the record,1 and that you would have to judge of its truth or falsehood, I considered the first step to be taken was to challenge the plaintiff to a test. What is it I do? I offered to deliver to him, to be examined by torture, a young slave who had learned to read and write, who was present when Aphobus made the admission in question, and took down the very statement deposed to by the witness. This youth had not been ordered by me to play any tricks, to write down some of the plaintiff's words and suppress others; he was there simply to make a true report of every word the plaintiff spoke. Now I ask, could there be a fairer opportunity of convicting us of falsehood, than putting my slave to the rack? Aphobus declined this test, because he knew better than any man living that my witness had spoken the truth. There are plenty of persons who can speak to this challenge, for it has not been made in secret, but in the centre of the market place before many bystanders. Call the witnesses.

[Witnesses.]

The plaintiff is so cunning and determined to affect ignorance of what is right, that, although he has preferred a charge of false testimony, upon which you are sworn to give your verdict, he declined to question the slave as to the truth of the deposition (the point about which he ought to have been most anxious), and now falsely asserts that he requires him to be delivered up for a different purpose. Is it not monstrous, that he should complain of my refusal to deliver to him a freeman (for such I shall clearly prove Milyas to be); and should not consider my witnesses hardly treated, when I offer to him a person, who is confessedly a slave, and he refuses to put their evidence to the test by examining him? He surely cannot contend, that the torture is for

1 A tablet hung up in court, containing a statement of the cause and issue to be tried; which thus may be compared to our nisi prius record, which is laid before the judge at the trial.