To apply

mined by the special reasons of the case. this criterion to its use in the present passage. The idea of trying with a view to tempt, that is, to persuade to something unlawful or criminal, would manifestly be absurd, if supposed to be the final end of the interrogator's present act. It follows, then, that the word, which expresses this act, cannot here have its secondary sense of to tempt; but simply its natural and proper one, of trying or proving.

If however the motive of the inquirer was merely to try or prove our Saviour, and that by a question, the reason of the thing requires we should suppose that it was first of all with a view to the kind of answer which would be returned to the question, and to the degree of ability, wisdom, or judgment, which should be displayed in that answer. And as to the further object contemplated by such a discovery; either it was an idle and frivolous curiosity, to ascertain the extent of his knowledge and capacity; or a captious desire to perplex him by a difficulty; or a serious and respectful wish to consult him, as a competent authority, on an important practical point. It seems to me that our Saviour's manner of receiving and entertaining the question, and the other considerations already suggested, refute the two first of these suppositions; and therefore establish the third. To consult, then, is the sense of the verb in the present instance; and, “A certain lawyer stood "up, consulting him, and saying;" would not be an inaccurate version of the passage. It is peculiar too to the verb in this instance, to be compounded with a preposition denoting intensity, along with which it occurs only thrice besides in the New Testament, and on each occasion with the same degree of

emphasis as at present". If there is a meaning in this addition, it implies a more than usual anxiety and earnestness in the interrogator, with regard to the end which he proposed by consulting Jesus— the satisfaction of his personal doubts on the point in question.

These conclusions appear to be confirmed by comparing Matt. xxii. 35. with Mark xii. 28. in the account relating to the parallel instance of the other question, "What sort of commandment was great "in the law?" St. Matthew expresses the act of the person who put that question, by the same verb which is here rendered to tempt; St. Mark says merely, that he asked or questioned our Saviour; but he also shews, that if he had it in view to try him, or to discover something else by the question, the object of the trial was becoming and innocent; the curiosity of the inquirer was neither frivolous nor captious. For he attributes the act of the inquirer to his admiration of the wisdom displayed a moment before, in our Saviour's reply to the Sadducees f.

With regard to the observation premised to the second question; if the original verb is to be rendered by to justify, and to justify be understood in its pro

e Matt. iv. 7; Luke iv. 12; 1 Cor. x. 9.

f Indeed, there is every reason to suppose, that St. Mark in his account of this conversation, has purposely explained and particularized the general statements of St. Matthew; in order to remove every possible misconstruction to which the latter, from their conciseness, were liable; and especially to do justice to the character and motives of the author of the question, which the use of such a term as repáčov, tempting-(unless explained) to describe them, might appear to have prejudged and compromised.

per acceptation of vindicating or excusing; then the fact of such vindication would imply the sense of its necessity; and its necessity, some fault or error, previously committed, which required apology, excuse, or defence. Now what fault had the individual been guilty of, except that of asking a question? and if there was any thing wrong in that, must it not have been an absurd mode of defending, excusing, or justifying himself for it, to ask another; that is, to repeat the offence of which he had already been guilty?

But the words which are rendered to justify himself, may also be rendered to make himself just, or righteous; and to make himself just or righteous, under the circumstances of the case, must be understood as equivalent to making himself perfect. The righteousness in question was that which was necessary to the inheritance of everlasting life; that is, it was the righteousness required by the law, in order to the attainment of the promises held out by the law: and the righteousness required by the law, with that view, could be nothing less than the perfect discharge of all the duties which it enjoined. The words premised to the second question, then, may denote the further motive of the inquirer in asking it, if notwithstanding the assurance already vouchsafed to him, in answer to his former question, he was still ignorant of something essential to its right apprehension, and still more to its just application

-a desire to make himself perfect in the knowledge of his duty, with a view to make himself perfect in the discharge of it also.

The truth appears to be this. The dialectical method of disputation, that is, the practice of seek

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ing information by asking questions and receiving answers, we know not only from the New Testament, which supplies a variety of instances of its, but also from the Talmudical or Rabbinical writings, to have been common among the Jews. The coincidence not merely between the sense, but even the terms of the question proposed to our Saviour on this occasion, "What shall I do, and inherit everlasting life?" and those of the same question as proposed on the next occasion, which St. Luke expresses in the very same words ", seems to imply both that the question itself was one of frequent debate and discussion;-a question on which the wisdom of the sages of the law was ordinarily exercised, or ordinarily liable to be exercised; (and that this was the reason, why each of the parties who proposed these questions respectively, applied for their solution to our Saviour in particular;) and also, that in the terms in which it is set forth, we see the form of the question, the status quæstionis or problema, as currently proposed for discussion under such circumstances: "What shall I do, and inherit everlast

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ing life?" or, "What shall I do, that I may in"herit everlasting life?" The same may be observed of the other question, "What kind of commandment "is great in the law?" or, "What kind of com"mandment is first of all ?"

The disposition to practise one's duty, when known, is naturally prior to the desire to know it; but the acquisition of the knowledge which must regulate the practice, is necessary to its application to

8 See particularly Luke ii. 46. Harm. P. i. 15. h Chap. xviii. 18.

the conduct. Suppose an individual moral agent sincerely desirous of ascertaining his duty, because sincerely desirous of practising it-to ask for information from a competent instructor; suppose him to receive the answer to his inquiry in a concise, authoritative rule of conduct, the observance of which will render him perfect; suppose this rule to be clear and intelligible in every point of its application, but one, and that a very important one: the same motive which prompted him to ask for information on such a subject in general, would necessarily induce him to ask for further satisfaction on this one point in particular; and that too with a view or purpose, which might well be characterised as "a desire to make himself perfect.'

It was not possible to mistake the import of the first precept, cited as necessary to perfection, either in the object of the love required, God; or in the measure or degree of the love due to him-with all the faculties both of soul and body: nor was it easy to mistake the import of the second, in the rate or proportion of the affection due to its object, our neighbour, whom it required every one to love as he loved himself. But with regard to the object of this love itself that is, with regard to what was meant by the neighbour, to whom this degree of affection was due the case might be very different-a difficulty might exist, very perplexing and distressing to a serious and well-disposed Jew, of which no Christian, with his better knowledge, and more enlightened estimate of the nature, particulars, and extent of his duty in the same respect, can form an adequate idea. In fixing upon this object, and consequently in defining the scope of the precept, reason,