to maintain fuch a confequence, is to move, with unhallowed fteps, to the gloomy regions of Atheism. For, it feems impoffible that any creature should either prove, or believe, on juft grounds, the existence of a firft Caufe, without admitting, on the fame grounds, his own obligations to obey him.*

§ 2. But if man be the fubject of moral obligation, it is requifite he should be free from conftraint in his moral actions. We may justly fay, that man becomes morally obliged to any act, on condition that he is formed and permitted to a freely, according to his choice and pleasure. The limits of his freedom (call it power, ability, liberty, or what you pleafe) to act as he chooses, are the limits of his obligations to act; and vice versa. To fay that a man is not at liberty to act according to his volitions, is the fame as to fay he is not obliged fo to act. If a man is not at liberty, or has not power, to make himself an angel, to fly as a bird, or to perform any other impoffibilities, it is felf-evident that he is not obliged to perform them.

We should remark, however, that when any volition has for its object, in any given circumstance, what is contrary to reditude, whether that object be attainable or unattainable, phyfically confidered; freedom is abufed, and a breach of moral obliga. tion follows. For though we are not obliged to perform

The feparate and concurrent verdict of confcience, of reafon, and of revelation, in evidence of this point, being fo univerfally acknowledged to be decifive, renders a more particular difcuffion of it here unnecessary.

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form impoffibilities or improprieties, however these may be the objects of our choice; and though we have no freedom to act, phyfically, according to fome of our volitions; yet the choice itself is the act of a moral agent, and, if contrary to rectitude, wrong.

Of the existence of this liberty every thinking perfon has the evidence of confcioufnefs, and reiterated experience. From these refpectable fources, notwithstanding the efforts of scepticism to prove that liberty is an illufion, he is fatisfied and affured that he is free, unconftrainedly free, in all his moral actions. He finds that his accountableness to the fupreme Governor is not only the infeparable adjunct, but also the neceffary effect of liberty properly fo called. I fay, liberty properly fo called; for it must be carefully distinguished from fpontaneity, or the liberty of brutes, and therefore may be denominated human liberty.

§ 3. Nevertheless, in proportion as we afcribe to the Almighty Sovereign the character of wisdom, we muft exclude chance out of the world. The one is pure light, the other total darkness. Seeing, therefore, he is infinitely wife, every entity, whether being or action, must be the effect of defign. Befides, whatever takes place in time must be forefeen; and whatever has an efficient cause must be the effect of omnipotence; hence, the predetermination of all entity in human actions.

We obferve in the world around us, independent of the evidence formed by teftimony, numerous inftances of evil, natural and moral; and many glorious difplays are made of wisdom and benevo

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lence,

lence, power and grace, which could have no being without the prior existence of moral evil. This is abundantly clear from that illuftrious effect of divine benevolence, the gofpel difpenfation. -But is evil a neceffary inftrument to produce good? What, then, becomes of the divine holiness, that fhould employ fuch means; of the divine wisdom and power, that should require them; and of divine goodness and equity in fubjecting the creature to their influence? - Hence,

§ 4. To reconcile the existence of moral evil with the acknowledged perfections of Deity; the irreverfible divine decrees with human liberty; or, which amounts to the fame thing, to account for (o9Y TO nanov) the origin of evil, has been in every age, more or less, the "great crofs of theologues."ORIGEN affures us, that "if there be any thing in "human affairs, propofed to examination, which "our nature finds difficult to investigate and com"prehend, it is the origin of evil.”• And this, in effect, has been the language of most persons, that ever thought upon the fubject. As forming a fuitable part of introduction to my defign, I fhall present the reader with some extracts, which exhibit in a striking manner the difficulties of the fubject, and with what difpofition it should be studied.

Of all the paffages I ever met with, in human writings, calculated at once to check prefumption, and to direct the mind to the most profitable improvement of the humbling difficulty, the following, addreffed by Archbishop LEIGHTON to

* ORIG. contra CELSUM. Lib. iv.

the

the students in divinity, in the publick hall of the University of Edinburgh, has made the deepest impreffion on my mind: "One thing we may confidently affert, that all those things, which the great Creator produces in different periods of time, were perfectly known to him from eternity; "and every thing that happens, throughout the "feveral ages of the world, proceeds in the fame "order, and the fame precife manner, as the eter"nal mind at firft intended it fhould. All that

acknowledge God to be the author of this won“derful fabrick, and all the things in it, which "fucceed one another in their turns, cannot poffi

bly doubt, that he has brought, and continues "to bring them all about, according to that most "perfect pattern fubfifting in his eternal councils; " and those things which we call cafual, are all "unalterably fixed and determined to him. For, "according to that of the philofopher, Where there " is most wisdom, there is leaft chance; and there"fore, furely, where there is infinite wisdom, there " is nothing left to chance at all.

"These things we are warranted and fafe to believe; but what perverfeness, or rather mad"nefs, is it to endeavour to break into the facred "repofitories of heaven, and pretend to accom❝modate thofe fecrets of the divine kingdom to "the measures and methods of our weak capaci"ties! To fay the truth, I acknowledge that I "am aftonished, and greatly at a loss, when I hear "learned men, and profeffors of theology, talk

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+Ubi plus eft fapientiæ, ibi minus eft cafus.

❝ing

"ing prefumptuously about the order of the divine "decrees, and when I read fuch things in their "works. Paul confidering this awful fubject as an

immenfe fea, was aftonished at it, and viewing the " vaft abyss, started back, and cryed out with a loud "voice, O! the depth, &c. Nor is there much "more fobriety or moderation in the many notions "that are entertained, and the difputes that are "commonly raised about reconciling thefe divine "decrees, with the liberty and free will of man.

"They always feemed to me to act a very "ridiculous part, who contend, that the effect of "the divine decree is abfolutely irreconcileable with "human liberty; because the natural and neceffary "liberty of a rational creature is to act or choose from a rational motive, or fpontaneously and of "purpose; but who fees not, that, on the fup

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pofition of the most abfolute decree, this liberty is "not taken away, but rather eftablished and con"firmed? For the decree is, that fuch an one "fhall make choice of, or do fome particular

thing freely. And, whoever pretends to deny, that whatever is done or chofen, whether good "or indifferent, is fo done or chofen, or, at least may be fo, espouses an abfurdity. But, in a "word, the great difficulty in all this difpute is, "that with regard to the origin of evil. Some "diftinguifh, and juftly, the fubftance of the "action, as you call it, or that which is phyfical "in the action, from the morality of it. This is "of fome weight; but whether it takes away the whole difficulty, I will not pretend to fay.

"Believe