should give their fuffrage in favour of fentiments because maintained in fcripture?

The above statement implies, that if the orthodox doctrine of original fin be not true, the five points which are maintained in that discourse are essentially befriended. The critical confideration of that doctrine operated as the main spring to the Doctor's laborious researches, and produced one confiderable part of his celebrated performance; while the fuppofition of its falfehood emboldens the Arminian champion to infult Calvinifm as indefenfible. But as the Author on whom I animadvert has not, in the treatise before me, thought proper to attack that doctrine in form, however advantageous to his caufe the demolition of it might be; neither shall I, in replying to the fundamental principles of the Arminian system, attempt a profeffed defence of it.*

If by a fair investigation it will be found a truth, that Adam in a state of perfection had no power to do good without fovereign aid, our Author's triumph on discarding original fin, and God's decree," De

non dando auxilium neceffarium ad vitandum "peccatum," of not affording help necessary to avoid fin to Adam's pofterity, is premature and empty. If the state of Adam himself, before the fall, was fuch as to favour our doctrine of fovereign grace, much more is it inferible from that of his pofterity in every inftance of converfion and final happiness. § 4. Paffing

*The inquifitive reader will find this done, in a very masterly manner, by Prefident EDWARDS, in his book entitled, The great Chriftian Doctrine of Original Sin defended, &c. in reply to Dr. JOHN TAYLOR.

§ 4. Paffing by the Doctor's ungenerous endeavour to clafs the orthodox with the "Valentinians, "Marcionites, Bafilidians, Manichees, Prifcillianifts, and "other Hereticks," while he modeftly places himfelf with the Fathers who wrote against them, as equally deftitute of propriety, of candour, and of pertinency to the question in difpute, we shall proceed to a point of more radical importance. For what the primitive churches and Fathers did believe, is no standard to us of what we ought to believe. It is at beft but argumentum ad verecundiam, an argument fit only to overawe children, not argumentum ad veritatem, an appeal to the truth itfelf.

$ 5. Our pofition, then, is, that "a moral agent "in a state of probation, according to equity, how"ever perfect he may be, has no inherent power to

preferve himself in a courfe of obedience;" from which, if established, it will plainly follow, that great numbers of thofe objections formed by Arminian writers, and Dr. WHITBY in particular, against the doctrines of grace as held by the reformed, muft fall pointless to the ground, or elfe recoil apon themselves.

One might think that a clofe, impartial attention to one felf-evident principle, would foon lead us to

In answer to that part of Dr. WHITBY's elaborate Treatife which relates to the Judgment of the Antient Chriftian Church, or the fenfe of the chriftian writers of the first four centuries after Christ, and before AUSTIN, concerning Predeftination, Redemption, Original Sin, Free-will, Efficacious Grace, and The Perfe verance of the Saints; fee Dr. GILL's Caufe of God and Truth, Part IV. passim.

the conclufion we mean to establish; that is, "every creature is abfolutely, univerfally, and "neceffarily dependent on the Creator." Thus the great FENELON, who was no enemy to freedom: "I am a dependent being. Independency is the fupreme perfection. That which is by itself, must carry within itself the fource and spring of its own being; or, which is the fame thing, it must borrow or derive nothing from any other being different from itself. Suppofe a being which collects in itself all the perfections you can conceive, but which, at the fame time, has a borrowed and dependent existence, you will ftill find it to be less than another being, of which you have only the fingle idea of bare independency. For there is no comparison to be made betwixt a being that exists by itself, and a being which has nothing of its own, nothing but what it borrows; and which poffeffes itself, as it were, only upon truft. - The will, or capacity of willing, is doubtless a degree of existence, and of goodness, or perfection. But good will, or volition to good, and defire after it, is another degree of fuperior good. For one may abuse the faculty of willing, by willing that which is evil; as to deceive, hurt, or do injuftice: whereas good will is the good or right use of the will itself, which cannot but be good. There is nothing therefore fo precious in man, as this good will, benevolence, or volition to good. It is this which fets a value upon all his other faculties. We have already feen that my will does not exift by itself, fince it is fubject to lofe, and to receive degrees of good, or perfection. We

have

have seen, that it is a good inferior to good will; because it is better to will that which is good, than barely to have a will fufceptible both of good and evil. How is it poffible to believe that I, a weak, imperfect, borrowed, and dependent being, can bestow on myself the highest degree of perfection, while it is evident, that the inferior degree is derived to me from a first existence? Can I imagine that God gives me the leffer good, and that without him I give myself the greater? Where fhould I obtain that high degree of perfection, in order to bestow it on myself? Could I procure it from nothing, which is the whole of my own ftock? Shall I fay, that other fpirits equally imperfect with mine, communicate it unto me? But fince thofe limited and dependent beings cannot, any more than my felf, give to themselves any one thing; much lefs can they bestow any thing on another. Not being felf-exiftent, they have not of themselves any true power, either over me, over thofe things that are imperfect in me, or over themselves. It is neceffary therefore, without staying to look at them, to afcend higher, and find out a firft, all-prolific, allpowerful caufe, who is able to bestow on my foul that good volition which she has not in herself.

"Let us here add another reflection. That firft being is the cause of all the modifications of his creatures. The operation, to speak in the language of philofophers, follows the existence. A being in its own nature dependent, must be so in all its operations. That which is acceffory, is a confequence of the principal. The author of their effence, therefore, is

M 2

alfo

alfo the author of all the modifications or modes of existences in his creatures. Thus GOD is the real and immediate caufe of all the configurations, combinations, and motions of all the bodies in the univerfe. He hath fet one body in motion, and by means of that he gives motion to another. It is he who created all things, and whofe power ftill operates in all his works. Now volition is the modification of the will, just as motion is the modification of bodies. Shall we affirm, that GOD is the real, immediate, and entire cause of the motion of all bodies, and deny that he is equally the real and immediate caufe which actuates the will to what is good? Shall this modification, the most excellent of all, be the only one not wrought by GoD in his own work? Shall the work beftow this on itself, independently of its Author? Who can entertain fuch a thought? My volition to good, which I had not yesterday, and which I have to-day, is not therefore a thing which I beftow on myself. It came from him who gave me the faculty of willing, and even my very existence. As volition is a greater perfection than bare existence; fo to will that which is good, is a greater perfection than fimply to will. The confequent operation of power, when it proceeds to a virtuous act, is the greatest of all human perfections. Power is only a balance, a beam in equilibre betwixt virtue and vice, a mere fufpenfion betwixt good and evil. The progrefs or paffage to the act, is a determination to the fide of good, and confequently to that good which is fuperior. The power fufceptible of good

and