It is objected, That "the general will to be happy, and not to be miferable, though it be voluntary, is not free," and therefore not praise-worthy; from whence it is inferred, that no freedom is praifeworthy but what is independent of all neceflity. Confequently, fuch is the defperate ftate of the caufe, he denies that angels are at all rewardable, and the damned fpirits further punishable! As if the whereness of a moral action conftituted its nature! But is there no goodness in the fteady inclination of Angels to holinefs and God, or badness in the fixed averfion of Devils? Nothing praife-worthy in the ardent love of the one, or blame-worthy in the conftant hatred of the other? Thefe, however, are implied parts of the fyftem opposed, and which are adopted for the fake of avoiding the confequence that an action may be at once free, neceffary, and praife-worthy. But the union of thefe being evidently in the bleffed GOD, in holy Angels, and Jefus Chrift, another figment must be invented of a freedom peculiar to a lapfed fiate! It must be earnestly contended for, as abfolutely requifite, elfe GOD would be unjust in requiring compliance with his calls and invitations to duty; and yet muft be done away as an imperfection!

Once more: it is argued, that fince the requifite freedom is neither an act nor an habit, but " a faculty of power," a divine determinating operation takes away liberty to choose, which is inadmiffible. But, leaving our author in the full enjoyment of his own definition, it is granted by him that an "habit doth facilitate and incline to action;" if therefore divine

grace

grace form the temper and habit of the mind, which inclines to a good action, an event or action may be made certain, or neceffarily future, without infringing this "faculty of power." And this is what we plead for, not that grace has for its immediate object the act or power of willing, fo much as the perfon in his difpofition and habits. Make the tree good and the fruit will be good; but an evil tree cannot bring forth good fruit.

§ 29. It remains only to fhew, in a more direct manner, that this operation of grace which determines the will is not inconfiftent with equity, which is the only objection, virtually, that Arminians can make in their oppofition to it. In addition therefore to what has been faid in reply to particular arguments and objections, we obferve:

1. That from the nature of the will itself, which is the power of the mind by which we choose, and its true liberty, it appears, the influence of grace in determining the will is not unjuft, or unworthy of the íupreme Governor. If the will be the power we have of choofing the greatest apparent good, as all must allow it is; and if that apparent good which is chofen be the real good, while the coincidence of appearance and reality arifes from the graciously relified ftate of the mind; is there any infringement of the will in its operation when making fuch a choice, more than if the mind were left to choose the appearance only of good to the rejection of the reality, through its unrectified temper? Can the purity of our liberty and choice be more effectually

fecured

fecured by the impurity of the mind and heart? Can the will and its liberty be more perfect by the prefence of an acknowledged imperfection? Is the liberty lefs real because the object preferred is good, and certainly foreseen by omniscience?

2. The futility of the fyftem opposed, and the equitableness of that now defended, may appear from the nature of that operation which is in question, in reference to the will; it being a fovereign act of GOD rectifying the moral state of the creature, which is a confideration altogether different from an injury offered to the will, which is a natural faculty.

3. We appeal to the nature of equity, which is violated only when the creature has more than his due of fuffering. But as this operation confifts in nothing worse than rectifying the moral state of the fubject, what conceivable injury is done it? Our fyftem does indeed represent the fubject as destitute of all merit, and independent worthinefs; because none is really due to him, whether viewed as a finner or a mere creature. Why our author fhould afcribe praise to men for choofing what is good, and yet deny praife to angels for making the fame choice, it may well puzzle those heavenly intelligences to underftand; except it be to favour the monftrous, extravagant, rebellious doctrine of human merit, and to rob GoD of part at least of that praife which is due to his glorious majesty.

4. We appeal to the nature of divine fovereignty, which has unlimited power over the creature for its welfare, in its being, difpofition, and actions. Yet no one who understands the subject can hesitate

respecting

refpecting the perfectly harmonious agreement of fuch divine fovereignty and equity. To confirm faints or angels in purity and happiness, and make them neceffarily inclined and determined to good, is an act of fovereignty; fince, I prefume, arrogance itself would tail in defending it as their due in equity therefore, to determine and confirm a moral agent in the choice of good is not inconfiftent with equity.

5. We appeal to the just consequences which would flow from the denial of our propofition. It would tend to restrain omnipotent benevolence from rendering men, while in the prefent ftate, better than they are without their previous confent; GOD muft not presume to make the work of his hands more amiable, more inclined to virtue, to holinefs, and the fruition of himself; he muft wait for the favourable decifion of his enemy" the carnal mind, which is enmity against GoD, which is not fubject to his law, nor indeed can be."- A work must be wrought, a change must be effected, or man cannot be happy; for "without holiness no man shall see the Lord;" but man cannot be conformed to the law of GOD while in his carnal enmity, that is, cannot be holy, or qualified for heaven; if therefore God be reftrained from effecting this qualification, how is it to be done? The truth is, if GOD do it not, it cannot be done, nor can any foul of our fallen race entertain the fmallest degree of rational hope of eternal happiness. As we would avoid eternal mifery we must be "holy and without blame, pure in heart, and made meet

to be partakers of the future inheritance of the faints in light;" none but GOD can thus qualify us, and he has promised to do it in various ways; but this proud aliov, this formless phantom of felf-fovereignty, holds his hand, and charges him with injustice if he do it!

In brief, the fentiment I oppofe robs God of what he claims as his right and glory to fave us by his grace, not by works, left any man fhould boaft. It places man on the ground of felf-worthinefs, which is the fole prerogative of God. It afcribes to imperfect rebellious man that fovereignty over future events, and his own happiness in particular, which is denied to holy angels, and which belongs only to GoD, who "works in us both to will and to do what is praife-worthy of his own good pleasure." And finally, it implies that GoD cannot be just except man poffefs a power to be good, and to do good of himself a power which we have endeavoured to fhew to be incommunicable to any creature however exalted.

With abfolute election, particular redemption, fpecial grace, and the will determined by grace, ftands clofely connected,

$30. (V.) The perfeverance of faints; which Dr. WHITBY ftrenuously oppofes. We fhall take the ftate of the question, on his part, from the author himself. "We own, fays he, that they who are "preserved to falvation, are fo preferved by the power of God through faith; and that they "who are thus kept, are kept by Christ, he alone

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"being