truth. Why was Abraham favoured in fo tranfcendent a manner above all other men of his day? Why were Mofes and Aaron appointed to the high honours of legiflation and the priesthood? Why was one woman, rather than another, chofen to be the mother of the Meffiah? Why was Paul made so distinguished a veffel to bear, and inftrument to proclaim, the unfearchable riches of Chrift? These are but a few specimens of a fovereign providence, taken out of a store equally awful and inexhauftible. Who hath enjoined him his way? or who can fay, Thou haft wrought iniquity? 4. At the final judgment, which is the clofing fcene of providence, there will be, according to the fcripture account, wonderful monuments of fovereignty, intermixed with equity. Who of the faints will or can fay, that the reward does not, in point of ftrict equity, far exceed their fervice and obedience? While none shall have room to say that they are dealt by unjustly, behold fome, banished from blifs, with deep consciousness of guilt as a never dying worm, or unextinguishable flame; while others, washed from fouleft ftains, justified and fanElified in the name of the Lord Jefus, and by the Spirit of our God, are invited, in ftrains of fovereign. pleasure, and admitted to enjoy the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world. * 5. All miracles must be referred to this fublime attribute for their fource. For though the effects of fome miracles were punitive, and therefore were deferved, and justly felt by thofe on whom they were performed; as in the cafe of the Egyptians, Elimas 1 Cor. vi, 11. the the Sorcerer, &c. yet every miracle, which implies a temporary fufpenfion or inverfion of the common laws and mechanism of nature, requires, without exception, the hand of fovereignty for its production. To deny this is to deny the existence of miracles. 6. Every principle, act, and degree of holiness in a creature fallen from rectitude, must neceffarily claim the fame origin. The connection of moral and natural evil, as cause and effect, is as indiffoluble in the moral world, according to the original conftitution and courfe of things, as any caufe and effect can be connected in the natural world; and the fufpenfion of the effect in the former cafe requires as real a miracle, as any suspension in the latter does. This the fcriptures abundantly corroborate when they speak of regenerating and converting grace. 7. To this high attribute we must refer the promised refurrection of the body. This appeared to the heathen philofophers, who difputed with St. Paul at Athens, an incredible doctrine; nor is it any wonder, while they remained ignorant of the miraculous power of GOD. For what, fhort of a fovereign fupernatural act, can effect fo wonderful a change? and how was it poffible to know a future miracle, with any degree of certainty, but by divine revelation? 8. By a "moral agent," in the most general fenfe, I understand "a being capable of enjoying the chief good," which is JEHOVAH all-fufficient. This definition definition (which implies intellect, will, and freedom, § 2-4.) is applicable to God and all his rational creatures. A "perfect moral agent" is a being in the actual enjoyment of the chief good, and who enjoys every inferior good in a regular fubordination to that higher end. This applies not only to GoD, but alfo to holy angels and glorified faints; whereas the righteous while on earth, though actually enjoying the chief good, are not perfect moral agents, because their enjoyment of every other good is not always, if ever, in the regular fubordination above mentioned. An "accountable moral agent," or, which is the fame thing, the fubject of moral government, is "a being who poffeffes a capacity for enjoying the chief good, who has means both fuitable and fufficient "to keep him from finning, and who has a power of "abufing or not abufing those means." This definition is applicable to all accountable moral agents whatever, the fallen angels not excepted. That thefe have a natural capacity of enjoying the chief good, and have also a power of abusing means, needs little explanation. But fome may find it difficult to admit, that they have means to keep them from finning, and a power of not abufing thefe means. If, however, they are offenders as well as fufferers, they must needs have both means and power; the former, becaufe the abuse of fuch means conftitutes the very effence of fin; the latter, because the power of not finning is effential to liberty. An § 9. A "perfect accountable moral agent in the ftate of original probation, left to stand or fall according to mere equity," is a being who has the actual enjoyment of the chief good; suitable and fufficient means of acting rightly; with the power, or caufe of finning; and a power, or liberty of not finning.* 1. He is a being that not only has a capacity for enjoying, but has the actual enjoyment of the chief good. The want of this enjoyment in any being must be either because he loft it, or because he never had it; in this cafe it can not be the former, for that would involve the contradiction, that he is an offender before he tranfgreffes any law; not the latter, for then he has not what is perfective of his nature, as a moral agent, without his own fault, which is incompatible.-Again; 2. Such a moral agent is one who has a fuitableness and sufficiency of means for acting rightly, in order to preserve that enjoyment. If he has no fuch means, he is laid under a natural impoffibility of fecuring the ultimate end of his exiftence; that is, * The propriety of the above definitions relative to " moral agents," may be questioned by some readers who only reflect on the definitions commonly given; but all I demand is, that my future reasoning be judged according to my own definition, which is adopted not through the affectation of novelty, but the expediency of the case. It would have been easy to say, "A moral agent is a being who is capable of actions possessing a moral quality" but this, though true, would have contributed nothing to the removal of some difficulties I had in view; and of two inconveniences, I preferred a new explanation of old terms to the invention of new terms to suit my definitions. he could not act rightly, and thereby preferve his happiness, though his difpofition and will were ever fo upright; which is to fay, in fact, he is no moral agent. And the fame confequence follows if the means are not suitable in their nature, or fufficient to their end, for if unfuitable, they are the fame as no means; and if not fufficient to lead to the proposed end, fuppofing they are used aright, they poffefs not the effential nature of all means.-Moreover ; 3. Such a moral agent is one who has the power or caufe of finning. If he has no power or cause of deviating from rectitude, when poised in the balance of mere equity, he is not defectible; but defectibility is effential to every created nature, therefore he has the power of finning. Befide, the very idea of accountableness implies a poffibility of receding from the rule of right. And this power, in the most abfolute sense of the word, is truly his own. Grant him rational existence, and he has power to fin if permitted.-But 4. He has alfo a power or liberty of not finning. This must be allowed, elfe it would follow that the moral creature is under a phyfical neceffity of finning; which would deftroy his accountableness, and fubvert that freedom which, in equity, is effential to all free agents. (§ 3.)-The fact is, that this power or liberty confifts in a medium or neutrality between a phyfical impulfe to fin, and an efficient power of acting well. The former extreme, his being phyfically impelled to fin, is not only unworthy of GOD, but is in its own nature impoffible; for fin has no efficient caufe but a deficient one only, as will be explained in the fequel. Were the proper nature |