nature of fin carefully confidered, we fhould never hear of the abfurdity, the blafphemous impiety, of GOD being the Author of fin. The latter extreme, (which is but too often taken for granted without examination) that a perfect moral agent in a state of original probation has of himself an efficient, or a fort of independent power of acting well, will be examined in our progrefs, (chap. iv.) and fhewn to be unfounded in truth, dishonourable to GOD, and the fource of much error. In the mean time I would briefly observe, that to fuppofe a created being poffeffed of fuch power to preferve himself, is the fame as to make an accountable agent indefectible; for wherein can its defectibility confift, but in its having no independent efficient power of preferving itself. If a being be created, it must be dependent; dependent in its effence, qualities, and operations; and if thus dependent, it has no efficient power to preferve itself.-On the contrary, if it has no deficient power of deviating from rectitude, it is not in the rank of moral agents. -Such is the awful prerogative of JEHOVAH, аs the moral Governor; and fuch the absolute dependence of a moral agent ! § 10. By "moral evil," or fin, I understand, "a deviation from perfect moral rectitude. To illuftrate this definition,-which is the fame with that of St. John, "fin is the tranfgreffion of the law," if by the term "law" we understand "perfect moral rectitude"-observe : 1. What I call "perfect moral rectitude" is the ftandard D 2 standard to which every moral agent ought to be conformed according to the constituted relation of things, which is the effect of the will of GOD, and agreeable to his holy Nature. Rectitude, therefore, differs from Equity, only as a ftandard of measure differs from actual measure, or as evennefs differs from a balance. The foundation of equity is rectitude; and that of rectitude is the fupreme Effence. 2. A continuation in a state of "perfect moral rectitude" depends upon univerfal conformity to the conftituted nature and relation of things. Thus, for inftance, man in his primæval ftate, ftood related to all the objects around him in the universe. Every capacity of mind and every organ of sense, had various objects suited to gratify and render happy its own nature. But any deliberate mistake in the choice or use of these innumerable good things, -as to time, place, degree, fubordination, or the like,formed a deviation from perfect moral rectitude, and conftituted man a finner. 3. A moral agent is capable of "deviation from rectitude," by reason of a cause of defectibility infeparable from a created nature, which may be called a metaphyfical tendency to failure. If otherwife, his actual defection would be impoffible. For how could he act amifs if he had no propenfity of any kind to the wrong act? And how could he have that propenfity, without fome kind of defect in the difpofition? A good act argues a good propenfity, and that a good difpofition; because good in every refpect proceeds from GoD: but not fo a deviation from rectitude. 4. The 4. The finfulness of an act confifts in the will fixing on an object of choice, which, though good in itself, is not suitable for the end proposed by the agent. Or, in other words, the badness of a moral act confifts in the agent propofing to himself a different end, in the ufe of any object, from that which GoD proposes. While the finfulness of a difpofition confifts in the tendency it has to make fuch a perverted choice. 5. Sin has not an efficient, but only a deficient cause. Whatever has a real pofitive entity is of GOD, as its efficient, and therefore is good; but fin is evil, and therefore its caufe is a deficient one. Confequently, fin cannot be the object of any divine decree; and yet, as a fhadow is known by the fabstance it refers to, and may give occafion and rise to positive acts, so may fin be known to infinite intelligence, in every poffible cafe, by the good to which it is opposed, and may give occafion and rife to pofitive acts in the divine decrees and opera tions. § 11. LIBERTY is a term which is made use of in very various, and often in a vague fenfe. But, not to enumerate the different kinds of Liberty, I shall confine myself to that alone, which is appropriate and effential to moral agents. By this "liberty," therefore, I understand "a power to choose, out of divers things, whatever appears eligible; and, in all inftances of refponfibility, to act according to volition." A power to choose only one thing, is no moral power, no true freedom; for liberty, in the fenfe D 3 fense here used, neceffarily implies, where the intellect is finite, a poffibility of erring; whereas, if there be but one thing to choose, or one conclufion to make, there can be no room for mistake or deviation. Nor can any one be free in his choice, but he who chooses what appears to him eligible; to choose otherwife is not to exercise freedom, but to be led about as a blind beggar, by the hand of chance equally blind, or elfe by fuch a fixed natural neceffity, as is totally imcompatible with a moral state. § 12. "Neceffity," alfo, is a term that has been productive of many and great difputes. But is there any kind of neceffity to which a moral agent can be fubject? Yes: for 1. The human body is fubject to the common laws of nature, which operate by a physical neceffity. It is neceffarily fubject to the laws of gravitation, cohesion, fermentation, putrefaction and diffolution. It is neceffarily fubject to vibratory motions from objects feen, heard, fmelt, tafted and felt. It is moreover neceffarily fubject to the practicable free commands of the will, and all involuntary motions. 2. The human mind alfo is fubject to phyfical neceflity; for it is neceffarily fubject to that kind, degree, and perpetuity of existence which the will of GOD appoints. It is conftantly and neceffarily attracted, by the energy of its Maker, according to the general law of its conftitution, to the chief good, and the greatest apparent prefent good. It is under a neceffity of choofing one object or confequence out of two or more propofed. No condi tion, tion, no art or evasion, is capable of preventing this; and the effect must needs be accounted morally good or bad. It is under a neceffity of choofing out of the repofitory of its own knowledge or fenfation, which is but a very small ftock compared with the boundless variety of objects that are perceivable. It is proper, however, to remark, that this phyfical neceffity, relative to the human body and mind, is controulable by miraculous interpofition. There is no law of nature whatever, which is the result of pofitive will, but may be fufpended or altered if no decree to the contrary prohibit. This is plain to any one who perceives the important difference between a phyfical and a decretive neceffity, which are but too commonly confounded by fome modern philofophical Neceffitarians. — This leads to another remark: 3. Every moral agent is the fubject of an hypothetical neceffity of the event; that is, from one thing being laid down as a certain pofition, in an ideal fyftem, another thing will infallibly follow as an effect of it. For inftance, if I am formed a creature, it neceffarily follows, without exception, that I must be absolutely dependent on the Creator; if I am made accountable, a free use of means is the neceflary confequence of that pofition. If matter, motion, and gravitation be fuppofed; contrariety, clafhing, and corruption neceffarily follow in the material world. If a moral fyftem be fuppofed, every creature in it must necessarily partake, in fome D 4 |