connected with the event of transgression than what he, himself maintains.

Mr. BENNET seems to object to any sentiment which makes "God's act the occasion of the creature's sin ;" but with what propriety it is difficult to guess. Does not this objection recoil upon himself? He maintains a "withholding of confirming grace;" and is not this the equitable occasion of transgression? And is not the greatest instance of benevolence that ever was conferred by the Almighty upon the world, an occasion of aggravated transgression? The gift of his Son, and the preaching of the gospel, is a full proof of it.

Aware, it seems, that the charge of making the creature self-sufficient would be brought against him, Mr. BENNET contends for "a derived dependent sufficiency for what was required of them as moral agents, if duly exercised and improved." Sufficiency and insufficiency are very equivocal terms. Properly, to be derived and dependent are characters of insufficiency; but in a comparative sense, what is insufficient for one thing may be said to be sufficient for another thing. To be sufficient as an efficient cause is one thing; but to be sufficient for moral agency is another. Were not this the fact, there could be but one moral agent in the universe; for it is abundantly demonstrable that there is but one cfficient positive What is really sufficient to constitute moral agency and accountableness, I have shewn elsewhere; in my notes on EDWARDS, and at the beginning of this work. To constitute sufficiency, in a proper sense, there should be the characters of underived and independent existence. When speaking of God's "infinity of moral excellence," our author adds, "The creature's inadequacy to this, therefore, is not strictly and properly to be view. ed as an essential defect of his nature; otherwise every work of God had been necessarily imperfect." But is not this inference an important truth, reflecting the highest honour on Jehovah? Compared with him, is not

cause.

every work of his necessarily imperfect? The truth is, there is a great difference between possessing a nature both essentially and comparatively defective; and possessing a nature defective as to due perfection. To possess the former, is to be the subject of imperfect existence, which some call "metaphysical evil," and others" passive power," and to possess the latter, is to be the subject of moral evil, or a defection from perfect virtue. And as it is the glory of Jehovah to be free from the former by absolute necessity, and as the removal of it from other beings is no object of choice; so it is his glory to continue or to restore the latter, namely due perfection of

nature.

Most cordially, however, do I agree with my respectable opponent, that creatures possessed of due perfection "were under no positive influence ab extra, either from the decretive will of God, or from the effective energy of his providence, impelling them to any sinful volitions." (p. 30.) But when he speaks of their conduct, including the goodness of it, as "self-determined," I am constrained to dissent, for the reasons before adduced in my answers to WHITBY and FLETCHER. And when he speaks of their having nothing in their nature but what might "with high probability have terminated in their adherence to virtue and happiness ;" it is but fair to ask, chose nature, or from what cause was it, then, that they went contrary to this "high probability," and actually failed" in their adherence to virtue and happiness?" We agree that it was not from God? was it then from chance? Mr. B. does not call in question "the eventual certainty of the creature's defection;" is chance then a cause of certainty? The truth is, that the absurdities and contradictions arising from a denial of the creature's passive power, both as to being and well-being, are endless. However, in the following statement we harmoniously accord, "that God's foreknowledge, simply considered, had not the least causal influence on

the

the declination of the creature's mind from a state of perfect rectitude." (p. 33.) And yet there was a causal influence somewhere-yea, it was in the creature himself-and it is capable of innumerable demonstrations, (those I mean which are called reductio ad absurdum) that nothing in a creature could have such causal influence but his passive power in connection with his free

will.

Before I conclude my Remarks on Mr. BENNET's "Thoughts," one thing more (which I have also hinted at in the Preface) may be noticed, vis. That there is a great distinction between the modus of sin's origination and the cause of it. This is probably one reason why the subject has been thought by many to be incapable of a satisfactory solution. But the difference is wide. and essential. The mode of sin's origin must be col. lected from revealed data and probable inference only; it is not the subject of demonstrative evidence, properly speaking. Where the scripture is silent, the argument, if we argue at all, must needs be, from the nature of the subject, only conjectural. And this, no doubt, is the chief reason why it is inferred by my respected opponent and others, that an investigation of the subject, and even a convincing proof of it, if possible, is of no great use. On this point there is no ground of difference. The comparative importance of such a discovery would be small, though the result of the most laborious and successful enquiry. For what is the knowledge of the manner and circumstances of a fact, compared with the knowledge of its cause; any further than as the former might assist the latter. But when a cause of such radical importance is discovered, it opens to us a a new scene, it exhibits to us wonderful truths as inseparably connected with it, truths of the greatest interest and the most beneficial nature, as I have endeavoured to shew in my "Conclusion." But what I wish may be particularly noticed is, that the cause or true origin of a fact may be capable of

the

the strictest demonstration, while the mode of the same fact may remain in much obscurity. And this I maintain is the case as to the fact of sin's origination. It would be easy to illustrate this remark as to other subjects. For instance, the manner of divine holy influence on the mind, and of providential sustentation of our being and well-being must be collected from sacred writ, and probable inference from revealed data, and after all the subject may remain in much obscurity; but the cause of these important facts is capable of demonstrative evidence. Hence our Lord's remark to Nicode mus, that the mode of the Spirit's operation on the mind may remain obscure, while the cause is decidedly divine influence. From the effects we may demonstrate the cause, though not the manner. Again, the modus of the world's formation must be gathered from revealed data and probable conjecture, and after all our conjectures, a veil of impenetrable difficulty may continue over it; and therefore to bestow much time and pains upon the investigation is not a mark of true wisdom, any further than as it contributes to discover the cause. And yet who, except Athiests and Sceptics, can question that the thue cause of the world's formation is capable of metaphysical demonstration? that is, the greatest certainty con ceivable, and of which mathematical evidence itself is but a branch. I hope my learned and respected opponent will consider my remarks with candour, and rest assured of my friendly regards.

The next author who has thought proper to attack my argument for the origin of moral evil being found exclusively in ourselves, and not at all in our Maker, was the Rev. WILLIAM PARRY, in what he denominates, Strictures on the Origin of Moral Evil, &c." This learned and respectable gentleman also has my grateful

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acknow

acknowledgements for professions of respect; but his manner of treating the subject is at least equally exceptionable with that of Mr. BENNET, and in some respects much more so. As the "Strictures" were not addressed to me, any more than to the public at large, they were open to observation from any person who should think proper to reply. This is now done by the Rev. THOMAS HILL, in his "Animadversions" lately published. While due candour and decorum are preserved in the discussion, I hope that religion and moral science will be advanced by it; and especially that the true ground of the acknowledged axioms-" All good is from God" and, "All moral evil is from ourselves”will become more familiar to the thoughtful and devout christian,

Another publication which has echoed the popular cry, that the subject is inscrutable, and not much calculated for the purposes of practical godliness, is the THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. The anonymous critic displays some candour, and gives conciliating expressions of respect, in his opposition to my sentiments, while reviewing Mr. BENNET'S "Remarks," Mr. PARRY'S "Strictures," and Mr. GILBERT's "Reply" to Mr. BENNET.* Observing in the first of these critiques some wrong statements of my views, I thought it but justice to myself and to what I deem to be important truth, to take some notice of them by writing to the Editor of that work, through the medium of the Publisher: and as representations equally unfair and injurious were repeated, I renewed my remonstrances. Some of these were candidly inserted, but the last letter was suppressed. As the material parts of the whole of them will not occupy much room, as they may cast some additional light on my real sentiments,

* In the Numbers for February, May, and June, 1803.

and