ciprocal rights and obligations which it entails on the superior and inferior parties, respectively; that the ordinary notions of justice, propriety, equity, or the like, which we consider applicable to the general domestic relation of master and servant, are quite out of character and inappropriate to the particular relation of master and slave. It is very important then, to the right understanding of the parables, and to the perception of the truth and fitness, the justness and reasonableness, of many of their circumstances, to have the nature and constitution of this fundamental relation fully cleared up and explained. But as that could not be done, at present, without a variety of details, which would detain us too long, and however interesting to the classical reader, might not be equally so to the general one; I have reserved it for a separate discussion in the Appendix, at the end of the work. Notwithstanding the difference of signification between the modern term to express the relation of the inferior members of a household, and the ancient one; we owe so much deference, perhaps, to the distinction of modern and ancient usages, and to the force of prejudice, as to retain the word servant in speaking of that relation. Among other effects of the change in the domestic relations of private life, from the despotic and servile, to those of the master and servant, this is one, that the original name for the inferior relation, which did not carry with it formerly the particular notion of ignominy or reproach, could not now be rendered by the corresponding term slave, without involving that idea. Remembering then, only, that the original terms for the relation in question, in a given instance, are something which imply a much greater degree of authority and dominion on the one hand, and of subjection and dependence on the other, than can be conceived, under any circumstances, to hold good of the proper domestic relation of master and servant; we may continue henceforward to speak of the principal party in such relations, as the master, and of the subordinate parties, as the servants. CHAPTER VIII. On the distinction of the members, or component parts of the visible Church; and on the figurative or parabolic mode of denominating them respectively. THE visible church of Christ, from its first foundation to the present time, wheresoever it has existed, and in whatsoever detached communities, whether among the Hebrews first, or the Gentiles subsequently; considered in respect of the persons or congregation who compose it, and their mutual relations to each other, is every where divisible into Christ as the head, and professing believers as the members, of one and the same body, which is the church. And as the head of the visible church is every where one and the same, viz. Christ, so are the members every where capable of being distributed into two, but only two, comprehensive divisions, which shall include the whole, and at the same time discriminate them asunder-the ministers of religion on the one hand, and the laity or people on the other. And as the relation of the same members to the same head of the same society, as such, and vice versa, must be one and the same; so the common relation both of the ministry and of the laity to Christ, and of Christ to the ministry and the laity, respectively, is one and the same; of the former, considered as the members, and of the latter, considered as the head, of the same community and therefore this relation is capable of being expressed of the visible arch imply a much greater degree of authori nate parties, as the ser ше different fro .ation of Christ, church, to each div cular. It follows therefor enomination for the relation Christ, or conversely for that of Ch people, will not express the specific relat the ministers of religion to Christ, or of Chr the ministers of religion: though as both these l relations are a particular species of the others, term which is proper to express them may be a ticular species of the term which is most fit to scribe the other. Whatever positive differences there may be in th kinds or orders of the ministers themselves, the r lation of all the ministers of religion to Christ, i contradistinction to that of the people, will be o and the same. certain part of the church, they must all agree in As no part of the people, though a the possession of some characteristic property, which discriminates them all from the people, and identifies them all with each other. Such being the case, the term which expresses this circumstance of any one of their orders or kinds, will express it of the rest. In like manner, the proper relation of the people to Christ, considered as contradistinguished to that flow from the relative y each respectively. Hence, as acteristic relation of the ministers of u to Christ is the same in all, so the duty of relatio ministers of religion, as arising out of that relar that of in, is the same in all. The same thing is true of specific re proper duty of the people. st, or of And as the proper duty of the ministers of relis both thon as such, is the same in all, so the proper reward f the of the observance of that duty, or the proper punishm may bhent of its non-observance, is the same to all. And most fio of the proper reward of the performance of the proper duty of the people, or the proper punishment may be of its non-performance. Hence, the reward which selves may be seen to be promised, or the punishment to Ch which may appear to be denounced, in a special in, will stance, to the obedience or disobedience of the duty le, the incumbent upon either of them in their proper capaall a city, will be the instance in particular of the proper erty reward of obedience, or the proper punishment of Hid disobedience, which is promised or denounced to the ministers of religion as such, or to the people as such, in general. Case an Now the common relation of Christ, as the head of the church, to both the ministers of religion and the people, as its component parts or members, may justly and fitly be expressed by the common relation |