which is best to be done, (but we have already proved it best that there should be a divine providence extended to human affairs, because these are fit objects for such a providence, which we shall evince more clearly in our second argument,) or that there is not always an absolutely perfect Being; which is a contradiction in terms; for to say there is not always, supposes sometimes; but an absolutely perfect Being cannot cease to be absolutely perfect, for as much as he is not absolutely perfect till he is arrived beyond the capacity or possibility of admitting any imperfection. Thus then it is sufficiently clear from our first argument, to wit, the nature of God, that there is such a thing as Providence.

2. Proceed we to the second, which arises from the necessity of the thing; by which I mean, that the state of the whole universe and of mankind is one that does require such a providence to its preservation, especially in regularity and in order, as not being able to subsist without it. It is a thing so thoroughly believed, so perfectly assented to, and on such reasonable grounds in the Christian world at least, that God gave beginning and being to the world, that to go about to prove it, were rather to call it into question than confirm it, and to make that a controversial point, in which we already do unanimously agree.

Taking this for granted then, that God made the world, uniting and compounding all its parts into the agreeable form under which they now appear; we must acknowlege that he did either, on his first creation, set such laws and bounds to its motion as would continue the matter, from the beginning of the world till now, and to the end of it, in the posture in which he at first placed it; or else that he did not. If God did give it such immutable laws, we have what we desire; and if God, foreseeing, on his having framed the world, what hazards it would run being left to itself, did at that instant give such laws to its motion, as on all the excursions which the matter should be about to make, would be in readiness to regulate it, and keep it in its due order, this is the same case as if he had not imposed any such laws at all, but instead of them kept a constant and watchful eye over it, and did make use of his omnipotence on all occasions, to preserve that elegance and harmony

in the world which he had at first given it. So likewise, as to the inhabitants thereof, it is the same case: if God, when he created Adam, foreseeing to how many generations his offspring should be extended, did so at first determine the result of human affairs as that every one of the sons of Adam, in their successions, should live and be in such a condition as, all things considered, would be best for him to be in; it is, I say, the same case as if, on our coming into the world, God did now begin to make a special and particular provision for every one of us: so that supposing on the first creation, that God did lay down such and such inviolable laws, we have the providence which we plead for if God did not give such laws, but only created the world and its inhabitants, and having once set them in a good order left them to themselves; let us see whether or no, without any more doing on God's part, they would have so continued; if they could not, their state and condition does necessarily require the assistance of some higher power than their own, which must every moment watch over them and preserve them; for they would be as much unable to preserve themselves intire one moment as another, and therefore it will follow, that God's particular providence has not been wanting one moment to the world from its first beginning; and likewise that, should it be abstracted one moment, we must of necessity fall into ruin, disorder, and confusion.

But that the world were not able to subsist, and consequently none of its inhabitants, of themselves, being barely put into being, I think demonstrable enough from this reason.

Matter is a thing which every body knows to be merely and wholly passive, to be this thing or that, not from any principle in itself, or because it chooses or assumes rather one form than another, but because we will have it to be so by communicating such or such a degree of motion to it; and it remains only in such a form so long as we will, or so long as the cause remains that gave it that form.

Let us suppose that God created the world by his omnipotence, consisting only of matter, which is barely passive: the reason that it exists is God only; since it has no principle in itself whereby to act on itself, so as to preserve itself; it being merely passive in its own nature and therefore if we

suppose God neither on its first formation to make at once a long provision for it, by setting such laws and rules as shall be sufficient for its continuation, nor yet every moment by his providence still to continue and help it in being, it must of necessity fall asunder, that cause being removed which maintained it; and God must only have made it just for that time in which he made it, and no longer. Thus it is sufficiently plain not only from the nature of God, but from the necessity of the thing, that there is, and must be, such a thing as providence.

3. The third argument we were to produce in proof of this first proposition, was the testimony of God himself in holy Scripture; which might be an argument of sufficient strength and satisfaction, and the highest demonstration to every good Christian, though there were none other besides.

That Being whose goodness was so unbounded, and love so infinite as to give us a being, and to make us what we are, who were nothing, nor could have been any thing of ourselves; and who has also farther manifested his love to us in our redemption by his son Jesus Christ, when we were fallen from him, is likewise a Being of such veracity that he cannot impose falsehoods for truths on his creatures.

For proof then of this out of holy Scripture, we shall need to allege no other places than those of our Saviour in the 6th chapter of St. Matthew's gospel, where, exhorting us not to be overcareful and solicitous for worldly things, he tells us how that God provides for the fowls of the air, and the lillies of the field, for the grass which to day is, and to-morrow is cast into the fire; and in comparison between them and men, he does necessarily infer that God, who takes care of and concerns himself with the more inconsiderable parts of the creation, will much more provide for and take cognizance of us, for whom all things are made to be subservient; and who are the master-piece and top of God's creation in this lower world. And to what purpose is God called the great keeper of Israel, who neither slumbers nor sleeps,' but to indicate to us how much his providence is concerned in all human affairs?

Thus have we cleared our first proposition; to wit, that there is such a thing as providence, from the nature of God

himself, from the necessity of the thing, and from divine testimony.

We come now to the second, which is,

II. That the evil as well as the good which we receive in this life, if not by an immediate act, yet by causes so and so connected on purpose, or at least permissively, is derived to us by this providence which we have asserted, and that it may be sometimes in one way, sometimes another.

END OF VOL. IV.

PRINTED BY A. J. VALPY, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.