The Hidden Order of Corruption: An Institutional ApproachRoutledge, 23 mar 2016 - 316 pagine When corruption is exposed, unknown aspects are revealed which allow us to better understand its structures and informal norms. This book investigates the hidden order of corruption, looking at the invisible codes and mechanisms that govern and stabilize the links between corrupters and corruptees. Concentrating mainly on democratic regimes, this book uses a wide range of documentation, including media and judicial sources from Italy and other countries, to locate the internal equilibria and dynamics of corruption in a broad and comparative perspective. It also analyses the Transparency International Annual Reports and the daily survey of international news to present evidence on specific cases of corruption within an institutional theory framework. |
Sommario
The Governance Structures of Corrupt Exchanges | |
Corruption as a Normative System | |
Bureaucratic Corruption | |
Political Actors in the Governance of Corrupt Exchanges | |
The Entrepreneurial Management of Corrupt Exchanges | |
The Role of Middlemen | |
activities | |
Mafias as Enforcers in the Market | |
How Corruption May Become Endemic | |
companies from a country to engage in bribery when doing business abroad | |
Anticorruption Policy and the Disarticulation of Governance | |
Bibliography | |
Index | |
Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto
The Hidden Order of Corruption: An Institutional Approach Donatella Della Porta,Alberto Vannucci Anteprima limitata - 2012 |
The Hidden Order of Corruption: An Institutional Approach Donatella della Porta,Alberto Vannucci Anteprima limitata - 2016 |
Parole e frasi comuni
allocation anticorruption policies become behavior bidding bosses bribery bribes broker bureaucrats Camorra cartel Chapter clients collusive agreements companies competition context coordination Corriere della Sera corrupt agents corrupt deals corrupt exchanges corrupt transactions corruption networks corruptors Cosa Nostra costs of corruption criminal organizations decision-making decisions democratic economic electoral emerge enforcement entrepreneurs expected favors firms Forza Italia governance guarantee guarantors illegal deals illegal markets incentives increase individuals influence instance institutional interactions interest Italian Italy kleptocrat L'Espresso Lambsdorff Mafia Mafiosi manage mechanisms mediator middleman moral costs Ndrangheta norms officials organized crime paid partners payments police political actors political corruption political parties politicians Porta potential procedures profits property rights protection public administration public agents public contracts reciprocal reduce regulation relationships reputation risks role rules sanctions sector social social capital specific structures systemic corruption tender transaction costs Transparency International trust Vannucci votes