people never once had reason to be dissatisfied. And what renders them more deserving of admiration than Alexander, or any king, is, that some of these acted in the office of dictator, which lasted only ten, or it might be twenty days; none, in a charge of longer duration than the consulship of a year; their levies obstructed by plebeian tribunes; often late in taking the field; recalled, before the time, on account of elections; amidst the very busiest efforts of the campaign, their year of office expired; sometimes the rashness, sometimes the perverseness of a colleague, proving an impediment or detriment; and finally succeeding to the unfortunate administration of a predecessor, with an army of raw or ill-disciplined men. But, on the other hand, kings, being not only free from every kind of impediment, but masters of circumstances and seasons, control all things in subserviency to their designs, themselves uncontrolled by any. So that Alexander, unconquered, would have encountered unconquered commanders; and would have had stakes of equal consequence pledged on the issue. Nay, the hazard had been greater on his side; because the Macedonians would have had but one Alexander, who was not only liable, but fond of exposing himself to casualties; the Romans would have had many equal to Alexander, both in renown, and in the greatness of their exploits; any one of whom might live or die according to his destiny, without any material consequence to the public.

19. It remains that the forces be compared together, with respect to their numbers, the quality of the men, and their supplies of auxiliaries. Now, in the general surveys of that age, there were rated two hundred and fifty thousand men ; so that, on every revolt of the Latin confederates, ten legions were enlisted almost entirely in the city levy. It often happened during those years, that four or five armies were employed at a time, in Etruria, in Umbria, the Gauls also being at war, in Samnium, in Lucania. Then as to all Latium, with the Sabines, and Volscians, the Equans, and all Campania; half of Umbria, Etruria, and the Picentians, the Marsians, Pelignians, Vestinians, and Apulians; to whom we may add, the whole coast of the lower sea, possessed by the Greeks, from Thurii to Neapolis and Cuma; and the Samnites from thence as far as Antium and Ostia: all these he would have found either powerful allies to the Romans, or

deprived of power by their arms. He would have crossed the sea with his veteran Macedonians, amounting to no more than thirty thousand infantry and four thousand horse, these mostly Thessalians. This was the whole of his strength. Had he brought with him Persians and Indians, and those other nations, it would be dragging after him an encumbrance rather than a support. Add to this, that the Romans, being at home, would have had recruits at hand: Alexander, waging war in a foreign country, would have found his army worn out with long service, as happened afterwards to Hannibal. As to arms, theirs were a buckler and long spears; those of the Romans, a shield, which covered the body more effectually, and a javelin, a much more forcible weapon than the spear, either in throwing or striking. The soldiers, on both sides, were used to steady combat, and to preserve their ranks. But the Macedonian phalanx was unapt for motion, and composed of similar parts throughout: the Roman line less compact, consisting of several various parts, was easily divided as occasion required, and as easily conjoined. Then what soldier is comparable to the Roman in the throwing up of works? who better calculated to endure fatigue? Alexander, if overcome in one battle, would have been overcome in war. The Roman, whom Claudium, whom Cannæ, did not crush, what line of battle could crush? In truth, even should events have been favourable to him at first, he would have often wished for the Persians, the Indians, and the effeminate tribes of Asia, as opponents; and would have acknowledged, that his wars had been waged with women, as we are told was said by Alexander, king of Epirus, after receiving his mortal wound, when comparing the wars waged in Asia by this very youth, with those in which himself had been engaged. Indeed, when I reflect that, in the first Punic war, a contest was maintained by the Romans with the Carthaginians, at sea, for twenty-four years, I can scarcely suppose that the life of Alexander would have been long enough for the finishing of one war [with either of those nations]. And perhaps, as both the Punic state was united to the Roman by ancient treaties, and as similar apprehensions might arm against a common foe those two nations the most potent of the time in arms and in men, he might have been overwhelmed in a Punic and a Roman war at once. The Romans have had experience of the boasted prowess of

the Macedonians in arms, not indeed under Alexander as their general, or when their power was at the height, but in the wars against Antiochus, Philip, and Perses; and not only not with any losses, but not even with any danger to themselves. Let not my assertion give offence, nor our civil wars be brought into mention; never were we worsted by an enemy's cavalry, never by their infantry, never in open fight, never on equal ground, much less when the ground was favourable. Our soldiers, heavy laden with arms, may reasonably fear a body of cavalry, or arrows; defiles of difficult passage, and places impassable to convoys. But they have defeated, and will defeat a thousand armies, more formidable than those of Alexander and the Macedonians, provided that the same love of peace and solicitude about domestic harmony, in which we now live, continue permanent.

20. Marcus Foslius Flaccinator and Lucius Plautius Venno were the next raised to the consulship. In this year ambassadors came from most of the states of the Samnites to procure a renewal of the treaty; and, after they had moved the compassion of the senate, by prostrating themselves before them, on being referred to the people, they found not their prayers so efficacious. The treaty therefore, being refused, after they had importuned them individually for several days, was obtained. The Teaneans likewise, and Canusians of Apulia, worn out by the devastations of their country, surrendered themselves to the consul, Lucius Plautius, and gave hostages. This year præfects first began to be created for Capua, and a code of laws was given to that nation, by Lucius Furius the prætor; both in compliance with their own request, as a remedy for the disorder of their affairs, occasioned by intestine dissensions. At Rome, two additional tribes were constituted, the Ufentine and Falerine. On the affairs of Apulia falling into decline, the Teatians of that country came to the new consuls, Caius Junius Bubulcus, and Quintus Æmilius Barbula, suing for an alliance; and engaging, that peace should be observed towards the Romans through every part of Apulia. By pledging themselves boldly for this, they obtained the grant of an alliance, not however on terms of equality, but of their submitting to the dominion of the Roman people. Apulia being entirely reduced, (for Junius had also gained possession of Forentum, a town of great strength,) the consuls ad

vanced into Lucania; there Nerulum was surprised and stormed by the sudden advance of the consul Æmilius. When fame had spread abroad among the allies, how firmly the affairs of Capua were settled by [the introduction of] the Roman institutions, the Antians, imitating the example, presented a complaint of their being without laws, and without magistrates; on which the patrons of the colony itself were appointed by the senate to form a body of laws for it. Thus not only the arms, but the laws, of Rome became extensively prevalent.

21. The consuls, Caius Junius Bubulcus and Quintus Æmilius Barbula, at the conclusion of the year, delivered over the legions, not to the consuls elected by themselves, who were Spurius Nautius and Marcus Popillius, but to a dictator, Lucius Æmilius. He, with Lucius Fulvius, master of the horse, having commenced to lay siege to Saticula, gave occasion to the Samnites of reviving hostilities. Hence a twofold alarm was occasioned to the Roman army. On one side, the Samnites having collected a numerous force to relieve their allies from the siege, pitched their camp at a small distance from that of the Romans: on the other side, the Saticulans, opening suddenly their gates, ran up with violent tumult to the posts of the enemy. Afterwards, each party, relying on support from the other, more than on its own strength, formed a regular attack, and pressed on the Romans. The dictator, on his part, though obliged to oppose two enemies at once, yet had his line secure on both sides; for he both chose a position not easily surrounded, and also formed two different fronts. However, he directed his greater efforts against those who had sallied from the town, and, without much resistance, drove them back within the walls. He then turned his whole force against the Samnites: there he found greater difficulty. But the victory, though long delayed, was neither doubtful nor alloyed by losses. The Samnites, being forced to fly into their camp, extinguished their fires at night, and marched away in silence; and renouncing all hopes of relieving Saticula, sat themselves down before Plistia, which was in alliance with the Romans, that they might, if possible, retort equal vexation on their enemy.

22. The year coming to a conclusion, the war was thenceforward conducted by a dictator, Quintius Fabius. The new

consuls, Lucius Papirius Cursor and Quintus Publilius Philo, both a fourth time, as the former had done, remained at Rome. Fabius came with a reinforcement to Saticula, to receive the army from Æmilius. For the Samnites had not continued before Plistia; but having sent for a new supply of men from home, and relying on their numbers, had encamped in the same spot as before; and, by provoking the Romans to battle, endeavoured to divert them from the siege. The dictator, so much the more intently, pushed forward his operations against the fortifications of the enemy; considering that only as war which was directed against the city, and showing an indifference with respect to the Samnites, except that he placed guards in proper places, to prevent any attempt on his camp. The more furiously did the Samnites ride up to the rampart, and allowed him no quiet. When the enemy were now come up close to the gates of the camp, Quintus Aulius Cerretanus, master of the horse, without consulting the dictator, sallied out furiously at the head of all the troops of cavalry, and drove back the enemy. In this desultory kind of fight, fortune worked up the strength of the combatants in such a manner, as to occasion an extraordinary loss on both sides, and the remarkable deaths of the commanders themselves. First, the general of the Samnites, indignant at being repulsed, and compelled to fly from a place to which he had advanced so confidently, by entreating and exhorting his horsemen, renewed the battle. As he was easily distinguished among the horsemen, while he urged on the fight, the Roman master of the horse galloped up against him, with his spear directed, so furiously, that, with one stroke, he tumbled him lifeless from his horse. The multitude, however, were not, as is generally the case, dismayed by the fall of their leader, but rather raised to fury. All who were within reach darted their weapons at Aulius, who incautiously pushed forward among the enemy's troops; but the chief share of the honour of revenging the death of the Samnite general they assigned to his brother; he, urged by rage and grief, dragged down the victorious master of the horse from his seat, and slew him. Nor were the Samnites far from obtaining his body also, as he had fallen among the enemies' troops: but the Romans instantly dismounted, and the Samnites were obliged to do the same; and lines being thus formed suddenly,