Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic SanctionsWhen Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States took the lead in organizing stringent economic sanctions against Iraq. Since unilateral sanctions rarely succeed, "coercive cooperation" was a necessity. This innovative study shows multilateral, or cooperative, sanctions are coercive not only in their pressure on their target but also in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one interested state attempting to convince others to cooperate through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She tests her hypotheses against ninety-nine cases of economic sanctions since 1945 and then against four detailed case studies - the U.S.-led pipeline embargo, high-technology sanctions against the Soviet Union, U.S. sanctions against Latin American nations for human rights violations, and British sanctions against Argentina during the Falklands War. Martin emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and she concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing credibility. |
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Indice
Introduction | 3 |
The Study of Economic Sanctions | 4 |
The Study of International Cooperation | 7 |
Methodology | 10 |
THEORY AND DATA | 13 |
Model and Hypotheses | 15 |
A Model of Economic Sanctions | 16 |
Identifying Cooperation Problems | 25 |
Conclusion | 128 |
The Falkland Islands Conflict | 131 |
The Falklands Crisis 1982 | 132 |
The Falklands and the European Community | 138 |
The Case of Ireland | 153 |
Responses of the United States Latin America and Others | 159 |
Conclusion | 166 |
Western TechnologyExport Controls | 169 |
What Explains Cooperation? | 31 |
Bandwagoning | 40 |
Conclusion | 43 |
Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables | 46 |
Explanatory Variables | 54 |
Conclusion | 59 |
Estimating Models of Cooperation | 61 |
Regression Analysis | 62 |
OrderedProbit Analysis | 67 |
EventCount Analysis | 74 |
The Effect of Declining Hegemony | 86 |
Conclusion | 90 |
CASE STUDIES | 93 |
Human Rights in Latin America Explaining Unilateral US Sanctions | 99 |
US HumanRights Policy 197376 | 101 |
The Carter Administration | 106 |
Economic Sanctions and the Multilateral Development Banks | 111 |
Attitudes and Responses to US HumanRights Sanctions | 119 |
US Leadership or Resistance? | 124 |
American European and Japanese Views on EastWest Technology Transfer | 171 |
CoCom | 185 |
Responding to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1980 | 191 |
Responding to Dissident Trials 1978 | 198 |
Conclusion | 202 |
The Polish Crisis and GasPipeline Sanctions | 204 |
Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Gas Pipeline | 206 |
The Effect of Declining Hegemony | 225 |
Siberian Gas and European Preferences | 228 |
Why It Mattered | 234 |
Conclusion | 239 |
Conclusion | 241 |
Additional Findings | 247 |
Implications for Theories of International Cooperation and Economic Sanctions | 248 |
Notes | 253 |
277 | |
293 | |
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Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin Anteprima limitata - 1993 |
Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions Lisa L. Martin Anteprima non disponibile - 1992 |
Parole e frasi comuni
action administration Afghanistan allies American analysis April Argentina argued assistance bandwagoning behavior bilateral Britain British called for sanctions Carter chapter Chile coadjustment CoCom coefficient coercion game COLDWAR Committee Congress COOP cooperation problems COSTD costs countries credibility decisions dependent variable domestic dominant strategy East-West economic sanctions effect Europe example expect explained export controls factors Falklands foreign foreign-policy grain embargo Hufbauer human human-rights hypotheses Ibid impact impose sanctions increase interests international cooperation international institutions Ireland Irish Latin America leading sender level of cooperation major sender measures military Minister NATO neoliberal nomic NONMAJ North European Service outcome payoff percent pipeline Player Poisson distribution Poland political potential sanctioners preferences probit probit model Reagan refused regression Reuters Reuters North European role sanc Schott significant Soviet Union statistical target threats tions trade U.S. government U.S. representatives U.S. sanctions U.S. Senate unilateral sanctions United West Germany Western