Coercive Cooperation: Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions

Copertina anteriore
Princeton University Press, 16 gen 1994 - 324 pagine
When Saddam Hussein's army invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States took the lead in organizing stringent economic sanctions against Iraq. Since unilateral sanctions rarely succeed, "coercive cooperation" was a necessity. This innovative study shows multilateral, or cooperative, sanctions are coercive not only in their pressure on their target but also in their origin: the sanctions themselves frequently result from coercive policies, with one interested state attempting to convince others to cooperate through persuasion, threats, and promises. To analyze this process, Lisa Martin uses a novel methodology combining game-theoretic models, statistical analysis, and case studies. She tests her hypotheses against ninety-nine cases of economic sanctions since 1945 and then against four detailed case studies - the U.S.-led pipeline embargo, high-technology sanctions against the Soviet Union, U.S. sanctions against Latin American nations for human rights violations, and British sanctions against Argentina during the Falklands War. Martin emphasizes that credible commitments gain international cooperation, and she concludes that the involvement of international institutions and the willingness of the main "sender" to bear heavy costs are the central factors influencing credibility.
 

Cosa dicono le persone - Scrivi una recensione

Nessuna recensione trovata nei soliti posti.

Indice

Introduction
3
The Study of Economic Sanctions
4
The Study of International Cooperation
7
Methodology
10
THEORY AND DATA
13
Model and Hypotheses
15
A Model of Economic Sanctions
16
Identifying Cooperation Problems
25
Conclusion
128
The Falkland Islands Conflict
131
The Falklands Crisis 1982
132
The Falklands and the European Community
138
The Case of Ireland
153
Responses of the United States Latin America and Others
159
Conclusion
166
Western TechnologyExport Controls
169

What Explains Cooperation?
31
Bandwagoning
40
Conclusion
43
Measuring Cooperation and Explanatory Variables
46
Explanatory Variables
54
Conclusion
59
Estimating Models of Cooperation
61
Regression Analysis
62
OrderedProbit Analysis
67
EventCount Analysis
74
The Effect of Declining Hegemony
86
Conclusion
90
CASE STUDIES
93
Human Rights in Latin America Explaining Unilateral US Sanctions
99
US HumanRights Policy 197376
101
The Carter Administration
106
Economic Sanctions and the Multilateral Development Banks
111
Attitudes and Responses to US HumanRights Sanctions
119
US Leadership or Resistance?
124
American European and Japanese Views on EastWest Technology Transfer
171
CoCom
185
Responding to the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan 1980
191
Responding to Dissident Trials 1978
198
Conclusion
202
The Polish Crisis and GasPipeline Sanctions
204
Martial Law in Poland and the Siberian Gas Pipeline
206
The Effect of Declining Hegemony
225
Siberian Gas and European Preferences
228
Why It Mattered
234
Conclusion
239
Conclusion
241
Additional Findings
247
Implications for Theories of International Cooperation and Economic Sanctions
248
Notes
253
Bibliography
277
Index
293
Copyright

Altre edizioni - Visualizza tutto

Parole e frasi comuni

Informazioni sull'autore (1994)

Lisa L. Martin is Associate Professor of Political Science at Harvard University.

Informazioni bibliografiche