'The mischievous notion of design, leading as it does to numerous errors and false views.' 'The most distinguished investigators in the various branches of science have, during the last few years, zealously and unanimously declared themselves opposed to the philosophic notion of design, etc.' It is to Trendelenburg in his Logischen Untersuchungen, 2d edit., p. 2, that we are indebted for proving and again doing honour to the necessity of the notion of purpose; compare the section on design, Part ii. pp. 1, etc. The deductions following in the text are founded upon, and in part verbably agree with, these philosophic discussions. Fabri also, p. 135, refers to them, and Hett, pp. 178, etc., joins in this treatment of the subject. I cannot strongly enough commend this work to those who desire further information on this point. I quote here a few passages, p. 3: Thus the eye is prepared in the darkness of the womb, that at birth it may be opened to the light. The eye is formed in the secret laboratory of nature, but yet it corresponds with the light which originates at an infinite distance therefrom,' etc. P. 4: Light neither made nor evoked the eye, and yet the slumbering power of the optic nerve yearns for it.' There is every where manifested an agreement between these exactly corresponding opposites of the internal and external activity.' 'Purpose governs the whole, and watches over the execution of the parts.' P. 5: 'As purpose is displayed in the organ of vision, so is it, in like manner, repeated in the organs of the other senses. Then he reminds us (p. 8) how Cuvier proved the unity of the animal organism by the mutual relation of its several parts to a purpose. If we ascend to man, 'even here that which is lowest is in unison with that which is highest.' Pp. 11-12: In the lower is concealed an anticipation of the higher, and the whole is conceived by one thought. That which seems perfect in itself, and independently complete, serves in its turn as a member of some more comprehensive and important form of life." As purpose rises, it seizes

upon some already accomplished purpose as its instrument.' P. 14: That the whole is earlier than its parts, as Aristotle expresses it, is evident in the seed and its devolopment. The power of the whole operates before it exists, that it may become existent. P. 21: 'Consequently the efficient cause produces the whole from the parts, and inversely, design produces the parts out of the whole.' Pp. 24, etc.: Unconscious conformity to purpose is indeed the fact of formative nature, but nothing more than a fact. If it be thought that such an expression has solved the enigma, it might be asked whether it has not rather increased its difficulty, for how can profound conformity to purpose be thought of as blind and unconscious?' P. 25: That which is common does not cease to be a miracle, because it is common.' P. 26: The efficient cause, the reason's usual point of view shows itself impotent in the whole present case.' 'A predetermined harmony is exhibited. between light and the eye, between sound and the ear, between density and the mechanism of the organs of motion,' etc. P. 27: This pre-established harmony seems to point to a power encompassing the members, and in which is the thought of the Alpha and Omega.' Similarly does also Liebig express himself on the supremacy of the idea and of purpose, in the realm of organized beings, in his Chemischen Briefe, 5th edit. 1861, Letter xxiii., pp. 202, etc., where he designates materialistic views in general, as 'the opinions of Dilettantti who, from their excursions on the borders of natural science, have assumed the right of interpreting to the ignorant and credulous how the world and life originated,' etc. Compare also Fechner, Die drei Motive, etc., p. 117. I have somewhere read how the larva of the stag beetle, when about to enter its pupa state, constructs for itself a far larger dwelling place than its folded body can fill, so that there may be room enough for the horns which are about to be developed. What does the larva know of its future. horns?' etc.

(9) Strauss, i. 683; to which A. v. Humboldt, in his letters to Varnhagen (p. 117), replies: 'What displeases me in Strauss, is that scientific levity which makes him find no difficulty in deriving the organic from the inorganic, nay, in forming man from the primeval slime of the land of Chaldea. Such an evasion does even a Burmeister call to his assistance. Compare Fabri, p. 85, and Hettinger, p. 185.

(10) Erdmann, in the above-named work, p. 19: 'It is now again asserted that the origin of organic nature in general may easily be explained by the operation of physical and chemical forces. There is no need of the eternal wisdom of a Creator; natural necessity is everything. In fact, even reason has its fanaticism, and while seeking to annihilate one superstition it may chance to create another; while exorcising phantoms, it may happen to honour an empty word as a living creative power.' Liebig in the above-cited work, p. 206: 'Never will chemistry succeed in exhibiting in her laboratory a cell, a muscular fibre, a nerve, in a word, one of those really organic parts of an organism which are endowed with vital properties, nor indeed an organism itself.' Perty, Anthrop Vortr. Compare also Schleiden, Das Alter des Menschengeschlechts, etc., 1863, p. 28: The former experiments of Ehrenberg, Schwann, Schulze, and others, confirmed in our own days by the extensive investigations of Pasteur, have proved that a so-called generatio originaria or æquivoca, i.e. a formation of specifically distinct germs from formless matter, without the co-operation of given organisms, does not occur in nature. On the other hand, the old saying of Harvey (?), "Everything that lives proceeds from an egg," has been completely corroborated, and is but expressed with greater physiological definiteness in the words, "Everything which has life (viz. plants and animals) proceeds from a cell." It is only for the first formation of an organism that it was felt necessary to embrace the view of a spontaneous cell-formation or

primitive generation,-a view, however, which at the same time extinguishes the conditions of its existence. But this view, though often met with, is purely imaginative. Exact natural science will rather confess not only her ignorance, but her impotence, to explain the origin of the first living organism from any of the natural forces with which she is acquainted. With the appearance of organic life, an entirely new principle was introduced into nature. Liebig also, in his work above quoted, declares himself opposed to the frivolous' notion of the generatio æquivoca, and in favour of the temporal commencement of organic life.' Exact natural science has proved that at a certain period the earth possessed a temperature at which organic life was impossible; even at 78° Reaumur the blood congeals. It has proved that organic life had a beginning upon earth.

(11) The words of Eckstein, Die Askesis der alten heidn., etc., Welt, 1862, p. 22, in Hettinger, p. 191.

(12) The philosophic Franz Hoffmann in an attack upon materialistic atomism, which will well repay perusal, (Introduction to vol. vii. of the works of Franz von Baaders, 1854, pp. xxiii.-xxx.) sums up his criticism in the following conclusion: Such a massive conglomerate of intrinsic contradictions could hardly have been heaped up by embracing any other view for the farther explanation or apparent explanation of phenomena, as is to be found in materialism. Here change is said to originate from the unchangeable, perishableness from the imperishable, motion from absolute rest, life from the dead, sense from the senseless, purpose from causes blindly acting, intelligence from the unintelligent, spirit from unspiritual.' Quoted also by Fabri, p. 67, and Hettinger, p. 171. Hoffman also opposes atomism, in the introduction to vol. iii. of the same work, 1852, pp. xiii.-xxiii., xxxvi.-xxxix., and vol. iv., 1853, p. 11, etc.

that it cannot be the production of chance, but must be the work of some unknown Being, who is almighty, and who excels men in the same degree as the universe does our finest works of art. Look you, Monge, call in the assistance of your friends, the mathematicians and philosophers, and see if they can find more cogent and convincing reasons. Whatever you may set up to oppose them, you will not weaken them." Nicolas i 75.

(15) Compare Perty, Anthropologische Vorträge, 1863, p. 39: "Many have spoken of ideas which change in the course of time, and with them the organisms which are their realization; but ideas presuppose such a producing principle. Some who accept no creative principle make the kosmos itself reasonable ; reasonable and alive, and yet unconscious!' Rousseau, Emile, i iv. vol. ii. pp. 36, etc.; Il ne dépend pas de moi de croire que la matière passive et morte a pu produire des êtres vivans et sentans, qu' une fatalité aveugle a pu produire des êtres intelligents, que ce qui ne pense point a pu produire des êtres qui pensent. Je crois donc que le monde est gouverné par une volonté puissante et sage; je le vois, ou plutôt je le sens et cela m'importe à savoir.

(16) Maistre, Abendst, v St. Petersburg, i. 116, in Hettinger, p. 127, notes.

(17) Johann v Müller in the midst of his great historical studies, wrote in 1782 from Cassel to his friend Karl Bonnet, from whom diversity of religious opinions had hitherto separated him. "You love me, my dear and honoured friend, but will you not love me still more, if I become more like you, if you learn that henceforth nothing will any longer separate us. Since I have been at Cassel, I have been reading the ancient authors in their chronological order, and making extracts from them when any remarkable facts struck me. I do not know why, two months ago, I took it into my head