no continuity of personal existence (p. 185). And finally, the specific difference between man and the brute creation is denied (pp. 217, etc.) A series of such passages is also cited by Fabri, pp. 9, etc. who places at the head of his discussion, the striking saying of Hamann, A reason which acknowledges itself to be the daughter of the senses and of 'matter, lo, this is our religion; a philosophy which reveals to men their vocation to go on all fours, fosters our magnanimity; and a triumph of heathen blasphemy is the climax of our genius! This saying is corroborated by such works as Richard Schuricht's Extracts from the diary of a Materialist, Hamburg, Hoffm and Campe, 1860, in which selfishness is praised as the principle of all life, even of religious life, the ideal despised, the wretchedness of our condition acknowledged,' and even a Feuerbach treated as a standpoint already surpassed.

(23) On this subject see Fabri, pp. 63, 65, 70. (24) Fabri, p. 35.

(25) Hettinger, p. 264.

(26) Comp. Schubert Die Geschichte der Seele, 4th ed. 1850, I. Pt. pp. 444 and 465.

(27) Liebig, Chemische Briefe, 5th ed. 1865, Brief 25, p. 207 They (ie. the Dilettanti of Science, as Liebig always designates the materialists) assert that man's intellect is the product of his senses, that the brain produces thoughts by means of a change of matter, and is related to them as the liver is to the gall. As the gall perishes with the liver, so does the mind with the brain. If the conclusions of these people are divested of their borrowed tinsel and toys, they amount to this, that the legs are for walking, the brain for thinking, and that we must learn to think, as the child learns to walk, that we cannot walk without legs, and cannot think without a brain, that an injury to the organs of

of sufficient coolness for the existence of organized beings, has been computed at three hundred and fifty millions of years, and the period since the first appearance of organisms at one thousand two hundred and fifty millions. According to others, even these numbers are too low, and the period required for the history of the formation of our earth is not less than two thousand millions. These calculations, however, are all extremely fluctuating. It has been computed, for example, that the Mississippi carries down yearly about three thousand seven hundred million cubic feet of earth from its sources to its mouth; and hence Lyell infers that about 67,000 years were needed for the formation of its alluvial deposits of about 16,000 square miles; while another geologist demands 158,000 for the process. Compare Fabri, pp. 273-275. Others indeed find this theory extremely tedious.' Compare e.g. Perty, Anthropologische Vorträge, p. 40. Nor will it ever explain how the remains of the so-called pre-Adamite animals, instead of decaying under the influence of gradually operating forces, could have been in several places enclosed and preserved in great masses in the strata of the earth; nor whence came the so-called erratic blocks; nor how a great multitude of elephants were buried under fields of ice, in a state of perfect preservation in Siberia; nor how ferns and palms could be found in high north latitudes, unless sudden catastrophes are assumed. In opposition to the acceptance of the immense periods demanded by the schools of Lyell and Darwin to explain the changes which have taken place, Goppert of Breslau has shown by experiments that in Siedsitze, even in a few years, vegetables, etc., have become peat (compare Andr. Wagner in the Evang. Kirchenzeitung, 1862, pp. 120, etc.); and v. Leonhard and Ehrenberg, as well as the French geologist Daubreé, have called attention to the rapid changes effected by high temperatures; thus rendering the millions and billions of these computations superfluous. Compare the above named No. of Beweis des Glaubens, p. 31.

2 A

gives much interesting information, and an acute criticism of this so-called positivism of Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill. To this movement also perfectly applies the conclusion to which Naville is led by his moral indignation against Taine (der himmlische Vater, p. 217) viz, that "the glorification of success is the first and surest result of the moral indifference, which is the soul of these opinions." See also an excellent little work against Positivism," das Christenthum und der Positivismus, from the French of the author of La religion pure et sans tache, &c., Hamburg 1861.

(30) Buchner. P. 217: Man has no absolute superiority to the brute, and his mental ascendancy is but a relative one. No single mental capacity belongs to man alone,'-not then self-consciousness and moral and religious convictions? The two latter, indeed, Buchner generally denies. P. 218: The mental process which takes place in animals (namely, the reflection accompanying their acts), is in its nature entirely identical with that which takes place in man.' P. 221: Finally, how far is the negro removed from the ape?' P. 222: Burmeister describes the Brazilian aborigines as animals in all their acts and instincts, and utterly without the higher intellectual powers, etc. In opposition to this degradation of man to a mere animal, comp. Rousseau's Emile, i. iv. p. 39; Quoi! je puis observer, connaitre les êtres et leurs rapports; je puis sentir ce que c'est qu'ordre, beauté, vertu; je puis contempler l'univers, m'élever à la main qui le gouverne ; je puis aimer le bien, le faire; et je me comparerais aux betes! Ame abjecte, c'est ta triste philosophie qui te rend semblable à elles: ou plutôt tu veux en vain t'avilir; ton génie dépose contre tes principes, ton cœur bienfaisant dément ta doctrine, et l'abus même de tes facultés prouve leur excellence en dépit de toi.

(31) Starting from the view that man is the object of all nature, and consequently also the central compre

speaking of the time as already come in which it is declared to be insufferable and absurd arrogance for man to esteem himself higher and better than the brutes, and that ignorance alone can seek to uphold the distinctions which justify his pretensions,' and goes on to oppose such notions by saying, 'The more intimately we become acquainted with the structure of animals, and especially of the rarer kinds of apes, the more convinced shall we be, that in spite of manifold and great coincidence between them and mankind, there yet exist even corporeal diversities quite as great as any which have, in other instances, induced the setting up of different genera and species. The series of beings so enthusiastically received and defended, is upon nearer acquaintance dissolved into separate members. and types, which, though they do indeed exhibit and develop among themselves a decided advance in organization, yet by no means fit into one another in immediate succession, but furnish instances of leaps and differences greater than there need exist between man and brute to separate them one from another by an impassable abyss. Compare also what, e.g., Heer says in his speech at the centenary festival of the Scientific Society of Zurich (Zwei Vorträge von Escher und Heer: Zürich, 1847), on the 'not gradual ascent,' but retrograde' formation of nature: The thoughts of God, then, are incorporated in creation at one time. directly, at another indirectly, both which modes of incarnation of divine ideas are to us equally incomprehensible.' To add to these a philosopher who at the same time takes his stand on the platform of accurate scientific research, we may here cite also Fechner, who in his article Die drei Motive, etc., pp. 237, etc., pronounces against Darwin's conclusions, in which the enormous mass of facts adduced do not furnish the slightest proof,' and 'whose numerous inductions make a mountain, in a certain sense, bring forth a mouse.' I shall hereafter have to return to Darwin.

which has any knowledge of God; among men there is no people so ungovernable and savage, as not to know that it must have a god, even if it does not know what one. Comp. also Nicolas, i. 154; and Hettinger, p. 359, Lect. iii. note 3, may also be referred to. I will here quote also the fine passage from Guizot's L'eglise et la Société Chrétiennes en 1861, p. 14: Dans tout les lieux, sous tous les climats, à toutes les epoques de l'histoire, à tous les degrés de la civilisation, l'homme porte un luice sentiment, j'aimerais mieux dire ce présentiment, que le monde qu'il voit, l'ordre an sein duquel il vit, les faits qui se succèdent régulièrement et constamment autour de lui ne sont pas tout; en vain il fait chaque jour, dans ce vaste ensemble, des découvertes et des conquêtes; en vain il observe et constate savamment les lois permanentes qui y président; sa pensée ne s'enferme point dans cet univers livré à sa science; ce spectacle ne suffit point à son âme; elle s'élance ailleurs; elle cherche, elle entreroit autre chose, elle aspire pour l'univers et pour elle-même à d'autres destinés et a un autre maitre :

Par delá tous ces cieux le dieu des cieux reside—

a dit Voltaire, et ce dieu qui est par delà tous les cieux ce n'est pas la nature personifiée, c'est le surnatural en personne. C'est a lui que les religions' s'adressent, c'est pour mettre Thomme en rapport avec lui qu'elles se fondent. Sans la foi instinctive des hommes an surnaturel, sans leur élan spontané et invincible vers le surnaturel, la religion ne serait pas.

(2) Joh. v. Müller's Werke, Cottasche, Ausg., Part 23, p. 5; and Jean Paul's Erinnerungen aus den schönsten Stunden für die letzten Works, 47, 125.

(3) These thoughts are especially current in mystic theology, and have of late been much introduced into sermons, and even frequently employed by apologetic writers Comp especially Hettingen p 374 ere, and