not difficult to see what motives probably influenced him in thus breaking with the party whose principles he favored. The aristocrats were indeed glad to have Cicero on their side; but in the interest of patrician traditions they would never countenance the election of a 6 new man' to the consulship, which was the goal of the orator's ambition. It appeared necessary for him to win the favor of the people; in what way could he do this better than by praising the people's hero? he might at the same time also assure himself of that hero's favor.

The speech for the bill of Manilius, or On Pompey's Commission,' as it is more commonly called, shows rather the adroitness of the special pleader than the depth of a true statesman. It belongs to the deliberative class, though the part referring to Pompey is properly demonstrative. From whatever point it is viewed, it is a masterly effort. The orderly and effective arrangement of the matter is matched by the rich, yet forceful and pleasing, manner of expression.

Whether the objections to Manilius's proposal were valid or not, it was carried. By the end of 66 Pompey had forced Mithridates to take refuge in Dioscurias, a Greek city on the northeast side of the Euxine Sea, and had made terms with Tigranes. The king of Pontus raised another army; but becoming involved in disaffection and treachery, he put an end to his own life in the year 63. Part of his kingdom was annexed to the province of Bithynia; the rest, left for over a century under native princes, in 63 A. D. became a Roman province under the name of Pontus Polemoniacus.

2. OUTLINE OF THE SPEECH ON POMPEY'S COMMISSION.

Exordium.

INTRODUCTION.

Reasons for not having come forward previously as a public speaker. Your favor, my practice in speaking, and the happy nature of the theme, the singular merit of Gnaeus Pompey, make it a duty and a pleasure to speak on this occasion. CHAP. I.

Narratio.

A war, destructive to our revenues, fraught with danger to our allies, is being waged against us by two very powerful kings. The voice of all demands the appointment of a certain commander. II., first paragraph.

Partitio.

What ought to be done? Three points are to be considered: the character of the war, the greatness of the war, and the choice of a commander. II., second paragraph.

DISCUSSION.

Confirmatio. A. The character of the war. II., last paragraph.
The war is of a kind that involves :

1. The reputation of the Roman people, who have suffered at the hands of Mithridates more flagrant causes of grievance than those for which our ancestors inflicted summary vengeance. III., IV., V., first paragraph.

2. The safety of our allies, who are threatened by the enemy, and are pleading for the appointment of Pompey. v., last part. 3. Our most important revenues, which are imperilled, not simply by war, but by the mere rumor of war. VI.

4. The property of many Roman citizens engaged in business in Asia, whom expediency and humanity alike require us to pro

B. The greatness of the war: so urgent as to demand active measures, yet not so formidable that there need be apprehension regarding the final issue. VIII., first paragraph.

1. The efforts of Lucullus against the enemy were at first successful. VIII., second paragraph.

2. But reverses followed, and the war is now more urgent than

ever. IX.

C. The choice of a commander.

A. Affirmative argument: Pompey the best man. 1. He possesses all the requisite qualifications, namely: a. Mastery of the art of war. X.

b. Traits characteristic of a great general and of a great

man:

On the one hand, power of persistent effort, bravery, activity,
rapidity of movement, forethought. XI., XII.

On the other, incorruptibility, self-restraint, good-faith, cour-
tesy, talent, humaneness.
XIII., XIV.

c. Standing, witnessed by the general demand for his services, the influence of his name, the confidence reposed in him by our enemies. XV., XVI., first paragraph.

d. Good luck. XVI., latter part.

2. He is more favorably situated than any one else for prosecuting the war. XVII., first paragraph.

Refutatio. B. Refutation. Objections to the choice of Pompey considered.

1. Answer to particular objections:

a. To that of Hortensius, that absolute authority ought not to be vested in one person; met by reference to the success of the war against the pirates. Brief answer also to an objection raised against the lieutenancy of Gabinius. XVII., last part; XVIII., XIX.

b. To those of Catulus, based upon the risk of placing all hope in one person, and upon respect for precedent; shown to be without just grounds, by the citation of examples from the cases of others and of Pompey himself.

2. Answer to the objections in general:

XX., XXI.

a. The influence of opponents of high standing ought not to outweigh the true interests of the Roman people.

first paragraph.

XXII.,

b. This war demands a peculiar combination of military power and irreproachable character, such as only Pompey possesses. XXII., last part; XXIII., first part.

XXIII., last

c. The standing of the opponents of this measure is offset by that of the eminent men who favor it. paragraph.

Peroratio.

CONCLUSION.

The orator urges Manilius to stand firm, relying upon the support of the people; calls the gods to witness to the purity of his motives in advocating the measure; assures the people of his loyalty to the interests of the State and to their cwn wishes.

XXIV.

1.

iii. THE SPEECHES AGAINST CATILINE.

OCCASION AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF Delivery.

LUCIUS SERGIUS CATILINA was born about 108 B. C. He was descended from an old patrician family which had lost its prestige and was in straitened circumstances. From early youth he indulged in all forms of vice with seeming recklessness; yet he was a man of great courage, strong personal magnetism, and unusual abilities as a leader. During the reign of terror under Sulla he distinguished himself, as a partisan of the dictator, by the number of his victims and his remorseless cruelty. Nevertheless he gained the office of praetor for the year 68 B. C., and served as governor of Africa in 67. The following year he returned to Rome to present himself as a candidate for the consulship for 65; but he had scarcely entered the city when he was charged with provincial extortion, and thus disqualified for the proposed candidacy.

The consuls-elect for 65, P. Autronius Paetus and P. Cornelius Sulla, soon after their election (July, 66) were impeached for bribery, their office being conferred on L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus. Autronius, Catiline, and Cn. Calpurnius Piso now formed a plot to murder the new consuls on the day of their entry into office (Jan. 1, B. C. 65), and seize the authority. As the arrangements were then not complete, the execution of the project was deferred till the 5th of the

following February, and it was extended to compass the destruction of many of the leading men of the State. On the appointed day, however, Catiline gave the signal for attack before the armed helpers had assembled in sufficient numbers, and the plot miscarried. This is known as the first conspiracy of Catiline; the details of it are obscure and uncertain.

Nothing daunted, Catiline presented himself as a candidate for the consulship for the year 63, having meanwhile freed himself from the charges against him by wholesale bribery. He set before his associates a program which included the division of the offices of State among themselves, the cancellation of all debts, and the murdering of the wealthiest citizens, with the confiscation of their property. As he failed to receive an election,' he now rapidly furthered his preparations for a revolution by force of arms. He borrowed great sums of money on his own credit and that of his friends, collected military stores, and gave to C. Manlius, who had been an officer under Sulla, a commission to enroll and train an army. The centre of operations was the neighborhood of Faesulae (now Fiesole), a few miles north of the city of Florence. As Pompey was in the East, Italy contained no Roman army and no great general, and the time seemed favorable for a sudden stroke.

In the midst of these preparations, early in 63, Catiline offered himself as a candidate for the consulship for 62. His plan was, if elected, to put Cicero out of the way; then, as consul-elect, to enter into coalition with the consul Antonius, who to some extent at least was committed to his plans, and thus gain the supreme power. It happened that one of the conspirators, Q. Curius, had made a confidant of Fulvia, a high-born but dissolute woman, in regard to the projects of Catiline; she, becoming disturbed at the prospect of a revo

1 See p. 5.