must put far from your minds; not to the execrable Oppianicus, a convicted criminal now in his grave. But if at this trial the stroke of some disaster lay my guiltless client low, then will he verily in his wretchedness if indeed he continue to live, which it will be hard for him to do often bitterly lament that the poison of Fabricus was ever detected. For had it not been exposed at the time it would have been to this most miserable man, not poison, but the antidote of his many sorrows; aye, and his mother might perchance have followed in his funeral procession, counterfeiting grief for the death of her son. But as it is what good will have been done, save that it will seem as if his life were preserved only for affliction out of the midst of deathful snares only that in death he might be robbed of the sepulchre of his fathers? Long enough has he been in trouble, gentlemen; years enough has he suffered from prejudice. None save her who gave him birth was ever so bitter against him but that we may believe his vengeance is now fully satisfied. Do you who are just towards all men, who tenderly sustain all those that are cruelly assailed, preserve A. Cluentius. Restore him to his townsmen unharmed; give him back to the friends, the neighbors, the guest-friends of whose zeal for him you are witnesses; lay him under an eternal obligation to yourselves and your children. To you, gentlemen, this appertains, to your dignity, your clemency; with justice do we require you to deliver at last from his distresses a most worthy and altogether guiltless man, and one who to very many people is most beloved and dear. Thus will you give all men to know that, while prejudice may find a place in public meetings, truth reigns supreme in courts of law.

W. PETERSON.

FRIENDSHIP 1

(De Amicitia, VI.-IX.)

Laelius. Friendship is nothing else than entire fellow-feeling as to all things, human and divine, with mutual good-will and affection; and I doubt whether anything better than this, wisdom alone excepted, has been given to man by the immortal gods. Some prefer riches to it; some, sound health; some, power; some, posts of honor; many, even sensual gratification. This last properly belongs to beasts; the others are precarious and uncertain, dependent not on our own choice so much as on the caprice of Fortune. Those, indeed, who regard virtue as the supreme good are entirely in the right; but it is virtue itself that produces and sustains friendship, nor without virtue can friendship by any possibility exist. In saying this, however, I would interpret virtue in accordance with our habits of speech and of life; not defining it, as some philosophers do, by high-sounding words, but numbering on the list of good men those who are commonly so regarded, the Pauli, the Catos, the Galli, the Scipios, the Phili. Mankind in general are content with these. Let us then leave out of the account such good men as are nowhere to be found. Among such good men as there really are, friendship has more advantages than I can easily name. In the first place, as Ennius

says:

"How can life be worth living, if devoid

Of the calm trust reposed by friend in friend?

1 This dialogue is part of the output of the years 45 and 44, which Cicero devoted almost exclusively to literature. The interlocutors are Laelius, the intimate friend of Scipio the younger, and his two sons-inlaw Fannus and Scaevola.

What sweeter joy than in the kindred soul,

Whose converse differs not from self-communion ? "

How could you have full enjoyment of prosperity, unless with one whose pleasure in it was equal to your own? Nor would it be easy to bear adversity, unless with the sympathy of one on whom it rested more heavily than on your own soul. Then, too, other objects of desire are, in general, adapted, each to some specific purpose, - wealth, that you may use it; power, that you may receive the homage of those around you; posts of honor, that you may obtain reputation ; sensual gratification, that you may live in pleasure; health, that you may be free from pain, and may have full exercise of your bodily powers and faculties. But friendship combines the largest number of utilities. Wherever you turn, it is at hand. No place shuts it out. It is never unseasonable, never annoying. Thus, as the proverb says, "You cannot put water or fire to more uses than friendship serves." I am not now speaking of the common and moderate type of friendship, which yet yields both pleasure and profit, but of true and perfect friendship, like that which existed in the few instances that are held in special remembrance. Such friendship at once enhances the lustre of prosperity, and by dividing and sharing adversity lessens its burden.

Moreover, while friendship comprises the greatest number and variety of beneficent offices, it certainly has this special prerogative, that it lights up a good hope for the time to come, and thus preserves the minds that it sustains from imbecility or prostration in misfortune. For he, indeed, who looks into the face of a friend beholds, as it were, a copy of himself. Thus the absent are present, and the poor are rich, and the

weak are strong, and what seems stranger still the dead are alive, such is the honor, the enduring remembrance, the longing love, with which the dying are followed by the living; so that the death of the dying seems happy, the life of the living full of praise. But if from the condition of human life you were to exclude all kindly union, no house, no city, could stand, nor, indeed, could the tillage of the field survive. If it is not perfectly understood what virtue there is in friendship and concord, it may be learned from dissension and discord. For what house is so stable, what state so firm, that it cannot be utterly overturned by hatred and strife? Hence it may be ascertained how much good there is in friendship. It is said that a certain philosopher1 of Agrigentum sang in Greek verse that it is friendship that draws together and discord that parts all things which subsist in harmony, and which have their various movements in nature and in the whole universe. The worth and power of friendship, too, all mortals understand, and attest by their approval in actual instances. Thus, if there comes into conspicuous notice an occasion on which a friend incurs or shares the perils of his friend, who can fail to extol the deed with the highest praise? What shouts filled the whole theatre at the performance of the new play of my guest and friend Marcus Pacuvius, when -the king not knowing which of the two was Orestes 2

- Pylades said that he was Orestes, while Orestes persisted in asserting that he was, as in fact he was, Orestes! The whole assembly rose in applause at this

1 Empedocles, born about 485 B. C.

2 The friendship of Orestes and Pylades was proverbial. On this occasion each insisted that he should be the one to suffer. The king referred to is Thoas, of the Tauric Chersonesus.

mere fictitious representation. What may we suppose that they would have done, had the same thing occurred in real life? In that case Nature herself displayed her power, when men recognized that as rightly done by another, which they would not have had the courage to do themselves. Thus far, to the utmost of my ability, as it seems to me, I have given you my sentiments concerning friendship. If there is more to be said, as I think that there is, endeavor to obtain it, if you see fit, of those who are wont to discuss such subjects.

Fannius. But we would rather have it from you. Although I have often consulted those philosophers also, and have listened to them not unwillingly, yet the thread of your discourse differs somewhat from that of theirs.

Scaevola. You would say so all the more, Fannius, had you been present in Scipio's garden at that discussion about the republic, and heard what an advocate of justice he showed himself in answer to the elaborate speech of Philus.

Fannius. It was indeed easy for the man preëminently just to defend justice.

Scaevola. As to friendship, then, is not its defence easy for him who has won the highest celebrity1 on the ground of friendship maintained with preeminent faithfulness, consistency, and probity?

Laelius. This is, indeed, the employing of force; for what matters the way in which you compel me? You at any rate do compel me; for it is both hard and unfair not to comply with the wishes of one's sonsin-law, especially in a case that merits favorable consideration.

1 He refers to the great friendship of Laelius and Scipio.