ing be maintained. The situation in Indochina is only one of the many crises that confront us and the burden of sustaining freedom in the world must be equitably borne. At present, there appears to be, at best, scant hope of achieving the objectives of our policy in Indochina in the near future, with Cambodia the only exception to this conclusion. The present Government of Vietnam which is based on the sound principles of national independence, an end to corruption and internal amelioration, is immobilized largely by a squabbling plotting opposition. Its critics complain of the personality of the leader of that Government. In view of the numerous and varied personalities who have occupied the Presidency in Saigon during the past 2 or 3 years without tangible results, it seems more likely that the real question is one of dissatisfaction with the principles of the Diem government rather than the inadequacies of his personality. Should the Diem government be forced out of office, it is doubtful that under the pressure of time a more satisfactory substitute, subscribing to the same principles to which he does, will be found. Yet these principles must prevail in south Vietnam, if an alternative to the Communist Vietminh that is likely to be acceptable to the people of Vietnam is to exist. Any replacement of Diem at this time, if it occurs, will probably take the form of a military dictatorship based upon a coalition of the special interests, parties, and groups which now oppose the present Government. It is improbable that the substitute will be the kind of government which will be generally supported by the Vietnamese people any more than the pre-Diem governments were. Nor is it likely to be a government capable of sustaining a free and independent Vietnam eventually without foreign support. It was to develop that kind of Vietnam that the United States made available hundreds of millions of dollars of aid. In my view, only that kind of Vietnam can achieve the purpose of our policy in Indochina which, in the final analysis, is its freedom and the consequent enhancement of our own security. In the event that the Diem government falls, therefore, I believe that the United States should consider an immediate suspension of all aid to Vietnam and the French Union forces there, except that of a humanitarian nature, preliminary to a complete reappraisal of our present policies in Free Vietnam. Unless there is reasonable expectation of fulfilling our objectives the continued expenditure of the resources of the citizens of the United States is unwarranted and inexcusable. I further recommend that the appropriate committees of the Senate study the extent of the losses of United States military and other aid in Indochina through defeat, defections, and the operation of the Geneva accord. The purposes of such a study might well be not merely to establish the monetary value of the losses already sustained but to determine their adverse effect on our own security by their inadvertent contribution to international communism in Asia. Such an investigation might also yield more satisfactory criteria than apparently exist at present for determining to what countries, in what amounts, and under what conditions military and other aid can be effectively extended. In suggesting such a study, I do not intend to imply that such aid has no place in our policies with respect to Asia. It seems to me essential, however, that the limitations and dangers as well as the potentialities of assistance programs must be clearly understood. We must guard against extending aid by force of habit. In the light of my recent observations in southeast Asia, it seems to me that these commonsense precautions have not always prevailed in the conduct of our policy in that region. Unless they do, we are likely to find the door shut against our legitimate security, and our cultural and commercial interests in Asia. We will have arrived at this point despite the expenditure of billions of dollars, in good faith, for what we believed were decent, worthy, and mutually beneficial purposes. APPENDIXES APPENDIX I AGREEMENTS OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES IN VIET-NAM [IC/42/Rev. 2, 20 July 1954] CHAPTER I-PROVISIONAL MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE AND DEMILITARIZED ZONE Article 1 A provisional military demarcation line shall be fixed, on either side of which the forces of the two parties shall be regrouped after their withdrawal, the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam to the north of the line and the forces of the French Union to the south. The provisional military demarcation line is fixed as shown on the map attached (see Map No. 1). It is also agreed that a demilitarized zone shall be established on either side of the demarcation line, to a width of not more than 5 kms. from it, to act as a buffer zone and avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities. Article 2 The period within which the movement of all the forces of either party into its regrouping zone on either side of the provisional military demarcation line shall be completed shall not exceed three hundred (300) days from the date of the present Agreement's entry into force. Article 3 When the provisional military demarcation line coincides with a waterway, the waters of such waterway shall be open to civil navigation by both parties wherever one bank is controlled by one party and the other bank by the other party. The Joint Commission shall establish rules of navigation for the stretch of waterway in question. The merchant shipping and other civilian craft of each party shall have unrestricted access to the land under its military control. Article 4 The provisional military demarcation line between the two final regrouping zones is extended into the territorial waters by a line perpendicular to the general line of the coast. All coastal islands north of this boundary shall be evacuated by the armed forces of the French Union, and all islands south of it shall be evacuated by the forces of the People's Army of Viet-Nam. Article 5 To avoid any incidents which might result in the resumption of hostilities, all military forces, supplies and equipment shall be withdrawn from the demilitarized zone within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force. Article 6 No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to cross the provisional military demarcation line unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission. 16 Article 7 No person, military or civilian, shall be permitted to enter the demilitarized zone except persons concerned with the conduct of civil administration and relief and persons specifically authorized to enter by the Joint Commission. Article 8 Civil administration and relief in the demilitarized zone on either side of the. provisional military demarcation line shall be the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief of the two parties in their respective zones. The number of persons, military or civilian, from each side who are permitted to enter the demilitarized zone for the conduct of civil administration and relief shall be determined by the respective Commanders, but in no case shall the total number authorized by either side exceed at any one time a figure to be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission or by the Joint Commission. The number of civil police and the arms to be carried by them shall be determined by the Joint Commission. No one else shall carry arms unless specifically authorized to do so by the Joint Commission. Article 9 Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as limiting the complete freedom of movement, into, out of or within the demilitarized zone, of the Joint Commission, its joint groups, the International Commission to be set up as indicated below, its inspection teams and any other persons, supplies or equipment specifically authorized to enter the demilitarized zone by the Joint Commission. Freedom of movement shall be permitted across the territory under the military control of either side over any road or waterway which has to be taken between points within the demilitarized zone when such points are not connected by roads or waterways lying completely within the demilitarized zone. CHAPTER II-PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE GOVERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRESENT AGREEMENT Article 10 The Commanders of the Forces on each side, on the one side the Commanderin-Chief of the French Union forces in Indo-China and on the other side the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet-Nam, shall order and enforce the complete cessation of all hostilities in Viet-Nam by all armed forces under their control, including all units and personnel of the ground, naval and air forces. Article 11 In accordance with the principle of a simultaneous cease-fire throughout Indo-China, the cessation of hostilities shall be simultaneous throughout all parts of Viet-Nam, in all areas of hostilities and for all the forces of the two parties. Taking into account the time effectively required to transmit the ceasefire order down to the lowest échelons of the combatant forces on both sides, the two parties are agreed that the cease-fire shall take effect completely and simultaneously for the different sectors of the country as follows: Northern Viet-Nam at 8.00 a. m. (local time) on 27 July 1954 It is agreed that Pekin mean time shall be taken as local time. From such time as the cease-fire becomes effective in Northern Viet-Nam, both parties undertake not to engage in any large-scale offensive action in any part of the Indo-Chinese theatre of operations and not to commit the air forces based on Northern Viet-Nam outside that sector. The two parties also undertake to inform each other of their plans for movement from one regrouping zone to another within twenty-five (25) days of the present Agreement's entry into force. Article 12 All the operations and movements entailed in the cessation of hostilities and regrouping must proceed in a safe and orderly fashion: (a) Within a certain number of days after the cease-fire Agreement shall have become effective, the number to be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission, each party shall be responsible for removing and neutralizing mines (including river- and sea-mines), booby traps, explosives and any other dangerous substances placed by it. In the event of its being impossible to complete the work of removal and neutralization in time, the party concerned shall mark the spot by placing visible signs there. All demolitions, mine fields, wire entanglements and other hazards to the free movement of the personnel of the Joint Commission and its joint groups, known to be present after the withdrawal of the military forces, shall be reported to the Joint Commission by the Commanders of the opposing forces; (b) From the time of the cease-fire until regrouping is completed on either side of the demarcation line: (1) The forces of either party shall be provisionally withdrawn from the provisional assembly areas assigned to the other party. (2) When one party's forces withdraw by a route (road, rail, waterway, sea route) which passes through the territory of the other party (see Article 24), the latter party's forces must provisionally withdraw three kilometres on each side of such route, but in such a manner as to avoid interfering with the movements of the civil population. Article 13 From the time of the cease-fire until the completion of the movements from one regrouping zone into the other, civil and military transport aircraft shall follow air-corridors between the provisional assembly areas assigned to the French Union forces north of the demarcation line on the one hand and the Laotian frontier and the regrouping zone assigned to the French Union forces on the other hand. The position of the air-corridors, their width, the safety route for singleengined military aircraft transferred to the south and the search and rescue procedure for aircraft in distress shall be determined on the spot by the Trung Gia Military Commission. Article 14 Political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones, on either side of the provisional military demarcation line: (a) Pending the general elections which will bring about the unification of Viet-Nam, the conduct of civil administration in each regrouping zone shall be in the hands of the party whose forces are to be regrouped there in virtue of the present Agreement; (b) Any territory controlled by one party which is transferred to the other party by the regrouping plan shall continue to be administered by the former party until such date as all the troops who are to be transferred have completely left that territory so as to free the zone assigned to the party in question. From then on, such territory shall be regarded as transferred to the other party, who shall assume responsibility for it. Steps shall be taken to ensure that there is no break in the transfer of responsibilities. For this purpose, adequate notice shall be given by the withdrawing party to the other party, which shall make the necessary arrangements, in particular by sending administrative and police detachments to prepare for the assumption of administrative responsibility. The length of such notice shall be determined by the Trung Gia Military Commission. The transfer shall be effected in successive stages for the various territorial sectors. The transfer of the civil administration of Hanoi and Haiphong to the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam shall be completed within the respective time-limits laid down in Article 15 for military movements. (c) Each party undertakes to refrain from any reprisals or discrimination against persons or organizations on account of their activities during the hostilities and to guarantee their democratic liberties. (d) From the date of entry into force of the present Agreement until the movement of troops is completed, any civilians residing in a district controlled by one party who wish to go and live in the zone assigned to the other party shall be permitted and helped to do so by the authorities in that district. Article 15 The disengagement of the combatants, and the withdrawals and transfers of military forces, equipment and supplies shall take place in accordance with the following principles: |