might rest our cause,; but that we find (so inconstant and perverse is irreligion) some modern apologists for atheism have abandoned the system of their predecessors, and chosen rather to give up an argument against the divine original of religion, than acknowledge the civil use of it; which with much frankness and confidence they have adventured to deny.

These therefore having endeavoured to cut away the very ground we stand upon, in proof of our proposition, it will be proper to examine their pretensions.

SECT. III.

THE three great advocates for this paradox are commonly reckoned Pomponatius, Cardan, and Bayle; who are put together, without distinction: whereas nothing is more certain than that, although Cardan and Bayle indeed defended it, Pomponatius was of a very different opinion: but Bayle had entered him into this service; and so great is Bayle's authority, that nobody perceived the delusion. It will be but justice then to give Pomponatius a fair hearing, and let him speak for himself. This learned Italian, a famous peripatetic of the fifteenth century, wrote a treatise* to prove that, on the principles of Aristotle, it could not be proved that the soul was immortal: but the doctrine of the mortality of the soul being generally thought to have very pernicious consequences, he conceived it lay upon him to say something to that objection. In his thirteenth chapter, therefore, he enumerates those consequences; and in the fourteenth gives distinct answers to each of them. That which supposeth his doctrine to affect society, is expressed in these words: “Obj. 2. in the second place, a man persuaded of the mortality of the soul ought in no case, even in the most urgent, to prefer death to life: and so, fortitude, which teaches us to despise death, and, when our country, or the public good requires, even to choose it, would be no more. Nor on such principles should we hazard life for a friend: on the contrary, we should commit any wickedness rather than undergo the loss of it: which is contrary to what Aristotle teacheth in his Ethics." His reply

* De Immortalitate Animæ, printed in 12mo, anno 1534. It is of him chiefly that the celebrated Melchior Canus seems to speak, in the following words: "Audivimus Italos quosdam, qui suis et Aristoteli et Averroï tantum temporis dant, quantum sacris literis ii, qui maxime sacra doctrina delectantur; tantum vero fidei, quantum Apostolis et Evangelistis ii qui maximè sunt in Christi doctrinam religiosi. Ex quo nata sunt in Italia pestifera illa dogmata de mortalitate animi, et divina circa res humanas improvidentia, si verum est quod dicitur."-Opera, lib. x. cap. 5. p. 446. Colon. 1605, 8vo.

Secundò, quia stante animi humani mortalitate, homo in nullo casu, quantumcunque urgentissimo, deberet eligere mortem: et sic removeretur fortitudo, quæ præcipit contemnere mortem, et quod pro patria et bono publico debemus mortem eligere: neque pro amico de

to this, in the following chapter, is, that "virtue requires we should die for our country or our friends; and that virtue is never so perfect as when it brings no dower with it." But then he subjoins, "Philosophers and the learned only know what pleasures the practice of virtue can procure; and what misery attends ignorance and vice:-but men not understanding the excellence of virtue, and deformity of vice, would commit any wickedness rather than submit to death: to bridle therefore their unruly appetites, they were taught to be influenced by the hope of reward and fear of punishment."*_This is enough to show what Pomponatius thought of the necessity of religion to the state. He gives up so much of the objection as urges the ill consequence of the doctrine of the mortality to mankind in general; but in so doing hath not betrayed the cause he undertook; which was to prove that the belief of the mortality of the soul would have no ill influence on the practice of a learned peripatetic: he pretends not that it would have no evil influence on the gross body of mankind to the prejudice of society. This appears from the nature and design of the treatise; written entirely on peripatetic principles, to explain a point in that philosophy: by the force of which explanation, whoever was persuaded of the mortality of the soul, must give his assent on those principles; principles only fitted to influence learned men. It was his business therefore to examine what effects this belief would have on such, and on such only. And this, it must be owned, he hath done with dexterity enough. But that this belief would be most pernicious to the body of mankind in general, he confesses with all ingenuity. And as his own words are the fullest proof that he thought with the rest of the world, concerning the influence of religion, and particularly of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, on society, I shall beg leave to transcribe them at large. "There are some men of so ingenuous and well framed a nature, that they are brought to the practice of virtue from the sole consideration of its dignity; and are kept from vice on the bare prospect of its baseness: but such excellent persons are very rare. Others there are of a somewhat less heroic turn of mind; and these, besides the dignity of virtue, and the baseness of vice, are worked upon by fame and honours, by infamy and disgrace, to shun evil and persevere in good: these are of the second class of men. Others again are kept in order by the hope of

beremus exponere animam nostram; imo quodcunque scelus et nefas perpetrare magis quam mortem subire: quod est contra Arist. 3 Ethic. et 9 ejusdem.-P. 99.

*Soli enim philosophi et studiosi, ut dicit Arist., 6 Ethic., sciunt quantam delectationem generent virtutes, et quantam miseriam ignorantia et vitia.Sed quod homines non cognoscentes excellentiam virtutis et fœditatem vitii, omne scelus perpetrarent, priusquam mori: quare ad refrænandum diras hominum cupiditates, data est spes præmii et timor punitionis. -P. 119.

some real benefit, or the dread of corporal punishment; wherefore that such may follow virtue, the politician hath contrived to allure them by dignities, possessions, and things of the like nature; inflicting mulcts, degradations, mutilations, and capital punishments, to deter them from wickedness. There are yet others of so intractable and perverse a spirit, that nothing even of this can move them, as daily experience shows; for these, therefore, it was, that the politician invented the doctrine of a future state; where eternal rewards are reserved for the virtuous, and eternal punishments, which have the more powerful influence of the two, for the wicked. For the greater part of those who live well, do so, rather for fear of the punishment, than out of appetite to the reward: for misery is better known to man, than that immeasurable good which religion promiseth: and therefore as this last contrivance may be directed to promote the welfare of men of all conditions and degrees, the legislator, intent on public good, and seeing a general propensity to evil, established the doctrine of the IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. Little solicitous for truth, in all this, but intent only on utility, that he might draw mankind to virtue. Nor is he to be blamed; for as the physician deceives his patient in order to restore his health, so the lawgiver invents apologues to form the manners of his people. Indeed were all of that noble turn of mind with those enumerated under the first class, then would they all, even on the supposition of the soul's mortality, exactly perform their mutual duties to one another. But as there are, upon the matter, none of this disposition, he must, of necessity, have recourse to arts,* more fitted to the general disposition."

Aliqui sunt homines ingenui, et bene institutæ naturæ, adeo quod ad virtutem inducuntur ex sola virtutis nobilitate, et a vitio retrahuntur ex sola ejus fœditate: et hi optimè dispositi sunt, licet perpauci sunt. Aliqui vero sunt minus bene dispositi; et hi præter nobilitatem virtutis, et fœditatem vitii, ex præmiis, laudibus, et honoribus; ex pœnis, vituperiis, et infamia, studiosa operantur, et vitia fugiunt: et hi in secundo gradu sunt. Aliqui vero propter spem alicujus boni, et timore pœnæ corporalis studiosi efficiuntur: quare, ut tales virtutem consequantur, statuunt politici vel aurum, vel dignitatem, vel aliquid tale; ut vitia vero fugiant, statuunt vel in pecunia, vel in honore, vel in corpore, seu mutilando membrum, seu occidendo puniri. Quidam vero ex ferocitate et perversitate naturæ, nullo horum moventur, ut quotidiana docet experientia; ideo posuerunt virtuosis in alia vita præmia æterna, vitiosis vero æterna damna, quæ maxime terrerent: majorque pars hominum, si bonum operatur, magis ex metu æterni damni quam spe æterni boni operatur bonum, cum damna sunt magis nobis cognita, quam illa bona æterna: et quoniam hoc ultimum ingenium omnibus hominibus potest prodesse, cujuscunque gradûs sint, respiciens legislator pronitatem viarum ad malum, intendens communi bono, sanxit animam esse immortalem, non curans de veritate, sed tantum de probitate, ut inducat homines ad virtutem. Neque accusandus est politicus; sicut namque medicus multa fingit, ut ægro sanitatem restituat; sic politicus apologos format, ut cives rectificet.-Si omnes homines essent in illo primo gradu enumerato, stante etiam animorum mortalitate, studiosi fierent; sed quasi nulli sunt illius dispositionis; quare aliis ingeniis incedere necesse fuit.-Pp. 123, 124, 125.

After all this, it is surprising that Mr Bayle should so far mistake this book, as to imagine the author argues in it against the usefulness of religion to society: especially when we consider that Mr Bayle appears to have examined the book so nearly as to be able to confute a common error concerning it, namely, that it was wrote to prove the mortality of the soul: whereas he shows that it was wrote only to prove that, on the principles of Aristotle, neither that, nor the contrary, could be demonstrated. But let us hear him: "That which Pomponatius hath replied to the reasoning borrowed from hence, that the doctrine of the mortality of the soul would invite men to all sort of crimes, deserves to be considered."* And then he produces those arguments of Pomponatius, which we have given above, of the natural excellence of virtue, and deformity of vice; that happiness consists in the practice of the one, and misery in that of the other, &c. These he calls poor solutions: indeed poor enough, had it been, as Mr Bayle supposes, Pomponatius's design to prove that the doctrine of the mortality of the soul did not invite the generality of men to wickedness: for the account given by Pomponatius himself of the origin of the contrary doctrine, shows that, but for this, they would have run headlong into vice. But supposing the peripatetic's design to be, as indeed it was, to prove that the doctrine of the mortality would have no ill influence on the learned followers of Aristotle, then these arguments, which Mr Bayle calls poor ones, will be found to have their weight. But he goes on, and tells us, that Pomponatius brings a better argument from fact, where he takes notice of several, who denied the immortality of the soul, and yet lived as well as their believing neighbours. This is indeed a good argument to the purpose, for which it is employed by Pomponatius; but whether it be so to that, for which, Mr Bayle imagined, he employed it, shall be considered hereafter, when we come to meet with it again in this latter writer's apology for atheism. But Mr Bayle was so full of his own favourite question, that he did not give due attention to Pomponatius's; and having, as I observed above, refuted a vulgar error with regard to this famous tract, and imagining that the impiety, so generally charged on it, was solely founded in that error, he goes on insulting the enemies of Pomponatius in this manner: "If the charge of impiety, of which Pomponatius hath been accused, was only founded on his book of the immortality of the soul, we must needs say there was never any accusation more impertinent or a stronger instance of the iniquitous perversity of the persecutors of the philosophers." But Pomponatius will not be so easily set clear: for let him

* Ce que Pomponace a repondu à la raison empruntée de ce que le dogme de la mortalité de l'ame porteroit les hommes à toutes sortes de crimes, est digne de consideration.— Dict. Hist. et Crit. Art. Pomponace Rem. (H.)

Si l'on n'a fondé les impietés, dont on l'accuse, que sur son livre de l'immortalité de

think as he would concerning the soul, yet the account he gives of the origin of religion, as the contrivance of statesmen, here produced, from this very tract, De Immortalitate Animæ, is so highly impious, that his enemies will be hardly persuaded to give it a softer name than downright atheism. Nor is it impiety in general, of which we endeavour to acquit him, but only that species of it, which teaches that religion is useless to society. And this we think we have done; although it be by showing him to have run into the opposite extreme, which would insinuate it was the creature of politics.

Cardan comes next to be considered: and him nobody hath injured. He, too, is under Bayle's delusion, concerning Pomponatius: for, writing on the same subject,* he borrows the peripatetic's arguments to prove that religion was even pernicious to society. This was so bold a stroke that Mr Bayle, who generally follows him pretty closely, drops him here: nor do I know that he ever had a second, except it was the unhappy philosopher of Malmsbury; who, scorning to argue upon the matter, imperiously pronounced, that he who presumed to propagate religion in a society, without leave of the magistrate, was guilty of the crime of lese majesty, as introducing a power superior to the leviathan's. But it would be unpardonable to keep the reader much longer on this poor lunatic Italian, "in whom,” as Mr Bayle pleasantly observes, sense was, at best, but an appendix to his folly."† Besides, there is little in that tract, but what he stole from Pomponatius; the strength of which, to support Cardan's paradox, hath been considered already: or what Mr Bayle hath borrowed from him; the force of which shall be considered hereafter: but that little is so peculiarly his own, that as no other can claim the property, so no one hath hitherto usurped the use. Which yet, however, is remarkable; for there is no trash so worthless, but what some time or other finds a place in a freethinker's system. We will not l'ame, il n'y eut jamais d'accusation plus impertinente, que celle-là, ni qui soit une marque plus expresse de l'entêtement inique des persecuteurs des philosophes.

66

De Immortalitate Animorum liber, Lugd. ap. Gryph. 1545; et Opera omnia, fol. Lugduni, 1663, tom. ii. p. 458.

The charming picture he draws of himself, and which he excuses no otherwise than by laying the fault on his stars, will hardly prejudice any one in favour of his opinions. How far it resembles any other of the brotherhood, they best know who have examined the genius of modern infidelity. However, thus he speaks of his own amiable turn of mind: "In diem viventem, nugacem, religionis contemptorem, injuriæ illatæ memorem, invidum, tristem, insidiatorem, proditorem, magum, incantatorem, suorum osorem, turpi libidini deditum, solitarium, inamænum, austerum; sponte etiam divinantem, zelotypum, obscœnum, lascivum, maledicum, varium, ancipitem, impurum, calumniatorem,” &c. We have had many freethinkers, but few such free speakers. But though these sort of writers are not used to give us so direct a picture of themselves, yet it hath been observed, that they have unawares copied from their own tempers, in the ungracious drawings they have made of HUMAN NATURE and RELIGION.