By these," he says, we gain the idea of his physical attributes; and if there be any thing in his works which seems to contradict those attributes, 'tis only seeming: for as men advance in the knowledge of nature, the difficulties vanish. It is not so," he says, "with regard to the moral attributes. There are so many phenomena which contradict these, and occasion difficulties never to be cleared up, that they hinder us from acquiring an adequate idea of the moral attributes." Now admitting all this to be true (for, generally, his Lordship's assertions are so extravagant, that they will not even admit a supposition of their truth, though it be only for argument's sake), what does it effect but this, the giving additional credit to revelation? The physical difficulties clear up as we advance in our knowledge of nature, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the moral difficulties never clear up, because they rise out of the whole system of God's moral dispensation; which is involved in clouds and darkness, impenetrable to mortal sight: and all the force of human wit alone will never be able to draw the veil. The assistance must come from another quarter. It must come, if it comes at all, from the author of the dispensation. Well; revelation hath drawn this veil, and so, removed the darkness which obstructed our attaining an adequate idea of the moral attributes. Shall we yet stand out? And, when we are brought hither upon his Lordship's own principles, still withhold our assent? Undoubtedly you must. Beware, says he, of a pretended revelation. Why so? "Because the

religion of nature is perfect and absolute: and therefore revelation can teach nothing but what religion hath already taught."* Strange! why, revelation teaches those moral attributes, which you, my Lord, own, natural religion does not teach-Here we stick.

you

Dic aliquem sodes, dic, Quintiliane, colorem:
Hæramus-

And here we are like to stick. His Lordship leaves us in a riddle. Will have the solution? It is foolish enough; as the solution of such kind of things generally is. But if the reader hath kept his good humour, which, I confess, is difficult amidst all these provocations of impiety, it is enough to make him laugh. I said before, that his Lordship borrowed all his reasoning against revelation, from such as Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubb, and Morgan. This solemn argument particularly, of the PERFECTION OF NATURAL RELIGION, and the superseded use of revelation, he delivers to us just as he found it in Tindal. Now Tindal, who pretended to hold, that natural religion taught both the moral attributes and a future state, had some pretence for saying that it was perfect and absolute. But what pretence has his Lordship to say it after him, who

* Vol. v. p. 544.

holds that natural religion taught neither one nor the other?

The truth

is, he refused no arms against REVELATION; and the too eager pursuit of this his old enemy through thick and thin has led him into many of these scrapes.

To see his Lordship use TINDAL'S ARGUMENTS against revelation, and for the perfection of natural religion, along with his owN PRINCIPLES of no moral attributes and no future state, must needs give the reader a very uncommon idea of his abilities: for the first of these principles makes one entire absurdity of all he borrows from Tindal against revelation; and the second takes away the very pretence for perfection in natural religion.

His Lordship's friend, Swift, has somewhere or other observed, that no subject in all literature but religion could have advanced TOLAND and ASGILL into the class of reputable authors. Another of his friends seems to think that no subject but religion could have sunk his Lordship so far below it: IF EVER LORD BOLINGBROKE TRIFLES, says Pope, IT But such is the fate of

WILL BE WHEN HE WRITES ON DIVINITY.

*

authors, when they choose to write upon subjects for which they were not qualified either by nature or grace. For it is with authors as with men: who can guess which vessel was made for honour, and which for dishonour? when sometimes, one and the same is made for both. Even this choice piece of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, his Lordship's sacred pages, is ready to be put to very different uses, according to the different tempers in which they have found his few admirers on the one side, and the public on the other; like the china utensil in the DUNCIAD, which one hero used for a p-pot, and another carried home for his headpiece.

*Pope's Works, vol. ix. Lett. xiv.

CONTINUATION OF BOOK II.

SECT. V.

HITHERTO We have shown the magistrate's care in propagating the belief of a God-of his providence over human affairs-and of the way in which that providence is chiefly dispensed; namely, by rewards and punishments in a future state. These things make the essence of religion, and compose the body of it.

His next care was for the SUPPORT of religion, so propagated. And this was done by UNITING it to the state, taking it under the civil protection, and giving it the rights and privileges of an ESTABLISHMENT. Accordingly we find that all states and people, in the ancient world, had an ESTABLISHED RELIGION; which was under the more immediate protection of the civil magistrate, in contradistinction to those which were only TOLERATED.

How close these two interests were united in the Egyptian policy, is well known to all acquainted with antiquity. Nor were the politest republics less solicitous for the common interests of the two societies, than that sage and powerful monarchy (the nurse of arts and virtue) as we shall see hereafter, in the conduct both of Rome and Athens, for the support and preservation of the established worship.

But an established religion is the voice of nature; and not confined to certain ages, people, or religions. That great voyager and sensible observer of men and manners, J. Baptiste Tavernier, speaking of the kingdom of Tonquin, thus delivers himself concerning this universal policy, as he saw it practised, in his time, both in the east and west: "I come now to the political description of this kingdom, under which I comprehend the religion, which is, almost every where, in concert with the civil government, for the mutual support of one another.”*

That the magistrate established religion, united it to the state, and took it into his immediate protection for the sake of civil society, cannot be questioned; the advantages to government being so apparent.

Je viens à la description politique de ce royaume, dans laquelle je comprens la religion, qui est presque en tous lieux de concert avec le gouvernement civil pour l'appuy reciproque de l'un et de l'autre. Relation nouvelle du Royaume de Tonquin, chap. x. à la fin.

But the necessity of this union for procuring those advantages, as likewise the number and extent of them, are not so easily understood. Nor indeed can they be understood without a perfect knowledge of the nature of an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, and of those principles of equity, on which it ariseth. But as this master-piece of human policy hath been of late, though but of late, called in question, after having from the first institution of society, even to the present age, been universally practised by the magistrate, and as universally approved by philosophers and divines; and as our question is the conduct of lawgivers, and legitimate magistrates, whose institutions are to be defended on the rules of reason and equity; not of tyrants, who set themselves above both; it will not be improper to examine this matter to the bottom; especially as the inquiry is so necessary to a perfect knowledge of the civil advantages, resulting from an established religion.

We must at present then lay aside our ideas of the ancient modes of civil and religious societies: and search what they are in themselves, by nature; and thence deduce the institution in question.

I shall do this in as few words as possible; and refer those, who desire a fuller account of this matter, to a separate discourse, intitled, THE

ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

In the beginning of the first book, where we speak of the origin of civil society, the reader may remember we have shown the natural deficiency of its plan; and how the influence and sanction of religion only can supply that defect.

Religion then being proved necessary to society; that it should be so used and applied, and in the best way, and to most advantage, needs no proof. For it is as instinctive in our nature to improve, as to investigate and pursue good: and with regard to the improvement of this in question, there is special reason why it should be studied. For the experience of every place and age informs us, that the coactivity of civil laws and religion, is little enough to keep men from running into disorder and mutual violence.

But this improvement is the effect of art and contrivance. For all natural good, every thing constitutionally beneficial to man, needs man's industry to make it better. We receive it at the provident hand of heaven, rather with a capacity of being applied to our use, than immediately fitted for our service. We receive it indeed, in full measure, but rude and unprepared.

Now, concerning this technical improvement of moral good, it is in artificial bodies as in natural; two may be so essentially constituted, as to be greatly able to adorn and strengthen one another: but then, as in this case, a mere juxta-position of the parts is not sufficient: so neither

* See vol. vii. of the author's complete works.

is it in that: some union, some coalition, some artful insertion into each other will be necessary.

But then again, as in natural bodies, the artist is unable to set about the proper operation, till he hath acquired a competent knowledge of the nature of those bodies, which are the subject of his skill; so neither can we know in what manner religion may be best applied to the service of the state, till we have learned the real and essential natures both of a state and a religion. The obvious qualities of both sufficiently show, that they must needs have a good effect on each other, when properly applied; (as our artist, by his knowledge of the obvious qualities of two natural bodies, we suppose, may make the like conclusion) though we have not yet got sufficient acquaintance with them to make the proper application.

It behoves us therefore to gain a right knowledge of the nature both of a civil and of a religious society.

I. To begin with civil society: it was instituted either with the purpose of attaining all the good of every kind, it was even accidentally capable of producing; or only of some certain good, which the institutors had in view, unconcerned with, and unattentive to any other. To suppose its end to be the vague purpose of acquiring all possible accidental good, is, in politics, a mere solecism; as hath been sufficiently shown by the writers on this question.* And how untrue it is in fact, may be gathered from what hath been said in the beginning, of the origin of society. Civil society then, I suppose, will be allowed to have been instituted for the attainment of some certain end or ends, exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But again, amongst all those things, which are apt to obtrude, or have, in fact, obtruded upon men, as the ends of civil government, there is only this difference in their properties, as ends; that, one of them is attainable by civil society only, and all the rest are easily obtained without it. The thing then with that property or quality must needs be the genuine end of civil society. And this end is no other than SECURITY TO THE TEMPORAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF MAN. For this end (as we have shown) civil society was invented; and this, civil society alone is able to procure. The great, but spurious rival of this end, the SALVATION OF SOULS, or the security of man's future happiness, belongs therefore to the other division. For this not depending on outward accidents, or on the will or power of another, as the body and goods do, may be as well attained in a state of nature, as in civil society; and therefore,

See Locke's Defences of his Letters on Toleration. This appears to have been Aristotle's opinion:-φύσει μὲν οὖν διώρισται τὸ θῆλυ, καὶ τὸ δοῦλον· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποίει τοιοῦτον, οἷον χαλκοτύποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἓν πρὸς ἵν, &c.-Pol. lib. i. cap. 2.