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ciples of that philosophy by the avowed principles of a better, they content themselves with only saying, that "the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was delivered down to them from their ancestors." From this cold manner of evading the argument, by retiring under the opinion of their forefathers, I conclude, that these two great patriots were conscious that the real opinion of ancient philosophy would not support them: for nothing was more illogical than their reply, it being evidently, that authority of their ancestors, which Cæsar opposed with the principles of the Greek philosophy. Here then was a fair challenge to a philosophic inquiry: and can we believe, that Cicero and Cato would have been less favourably heard, while they defended the doctrine of a future state on the principles of Plato and Zeno, so agreeable to the opinions of their ancestors, than Cæsar was in overthrowing it on the system of Epicurus? Or was it of small importance to the state, that an opinion, which Tully, in the words below, tells us was established by their ancestors for the service of society, should be shown to be conformable to the conclusions of the most creditable philosophy? Yet, for all this, instead of attempting to prove Cæsar a bad philosopher, they content themselves with only showing him to be a bad citizen. We must needs conclude then, that these two learned men were sufficiently apprized, that the doctrine of their ancestors was unsupported by the real opinion of any Greek sect of philosophy; whose popular profession of it would have been to no purpose to have urged against Cæsar, and such of the senate as were instructed in these matters; because the practice of the double doctrine, and the part to which this point belonged, was a thing well known to them.

It may be true, that as to Cato, who was a rigid stoic, this observation on his conduct will conclude only against one sect; but it will conclude very strongly for Cato was so far from thinking that the principles of that philosophy should not be brought into the conclusions of state, where it could be done with any advantage, that he was even for having public measures regulated on the standard of their paradoxes; for which he is agreeably rallied by Cicero in his oration for Muræna. He could not then, we must think, have neglected so fair an opportunity of employing his beloved philosophy upon Cæsar's challenge, would it have served his purpose in any reasonable degree.

But though Cato's case only includes the stoics; yet Cicero's, who made use indifferently of the principles of any sect to confute the rest, includes them all. It will be said perhaps, that the reason why he declined replying on any philosophic principle, was because he thought the opinion of their ancestors the strongest argument of all; having so declared it, in a more evident point; the very being of a God itself: in

* See note I, at the end of this book.

QUOD, MAXIMUM EST MAJORUM NOSTRORUM SAPIENTIA, qui sacra, qui ceremonias,* &c. But it is to be observed, that this was spoken to the people, and recommended to them as an argument they might best confide in; and therefore urged with Tully's usual prudence, who always suited his arguments to his auditors; while the words under question were addressed to an audience of nobles, who had, at that time, as great an affectation to philosophise as Cicero himself. Hear what he says in his oration for Muræna: Et quoniam non est nobis hæc oratio habenda aut cum IMPERITA MULTITUDINE, aut in aliquo conventu agrestium, audaciùs paulo de STUDIIS HUMANITATIS quæ et MIHI et VOBIS NOTA ET JUCUNDA sunt, disputabo.†

SECT. III.

HAVING premised thus much, to clear the way, and abate men's prejudices against a new opinion, I come to a more particular inquiry concerning each of those SECTS which have been supposed to BELIEVE the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

The ancient Greek philosophy may be all ranged in the ELEATIC, the ITALIC, and the IONIC lines. The Eleatic line was wholly composed of atheists of different kinds; as the Democritic, the Pyrrhonian, the Epicurean, &c., so these come not into the account. All in the Italic line derive themselves from PYTHAGORAS, and swear in his name. All in the Ionic, till SOCRATES, busied themselves only in physics, and are therefore likewise excluded. He was the first who brought philosophy out of the clouds, to a clearer contemplation of HUMAN NATURE; and founded the Socratic school, whose subdivisions were the PLATONIC or OLD ACADEMY, the PERIPATETIC, the STOIC, the MIDDLE, and the NEW

ACADEMY.

As to Socrates, Cicero gives this character of him, that he was the first who called philosophy from heaven, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses, i. e. to teach public and private morals. But we must not suppose, that Cicero simply meant, as the words seem to imply, that Socrates was the first of the philosophers, who studied morals; this being evidently false; for the Pythagoric school had, for † Sect. 29.

Orat. pro Milone.

Primus philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit.-Tuscul. Quæst. lib. v.-And again, Acad. lib. i. Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura invoìutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, evocavisse philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quæreret; cœlestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre.

a long time before, made morals its principal concern. He must therefore mean (as the quotation below partly implies) that HE was the first who called off philosophy from a contemplation of nature, to fix it ENTIRELY upon morals. Which was so true, that Socrates was not only the first, but the last of the philosophers who made this separation; having here no followers, unless we reckon Xenophon; who upbraids Plato, the immediate successor of his school, for forsaking his master's confined scheme, and imitating the common practice of the philosophers in their pursuit of general knowledge; he being, as the same Cicero observes, varius et multiplex et copiosus.

However, this, which Socrates attempted in philosophy, was a very extraordinary project: and, to support its credit, he brought in those principles of DOUBT AND UNCERTAINTY, which some of his pretended followers very much abused: for while he restrained those principles of doubt to natural things, whose study he rejected; they extended them to every thing that was the subject of philosophical inquiry. This we presume was Socrates's true character: who thus confining his searches, was the only one of all the ancient Greek philosophers (and it deserves our notice) who really believed the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. How it happened that he was so singularly right, will be considered hereafter, when we bring his case to illustrate, and to confirm, the general position here advanced.

From Socrates, as we said, came the middle and new academy, as well as the old, or Platonic. Arcesilaus was the founder of the middle; and Carneades of the new. Between the principles of these two there was no real difference, as Cicero tells us; and we may take his word; but both, I will venture to affirm, were as real sceptics, as the Pyrrhonians themselves: I mean in their principles of philosophising, though not in the professed conclusions each pretended to draw from those principles. For the academics as well as Pyrrhonians agreed in this, "That nothing could be known; and that, without interfering with any sentiments of their own, every thing was to be disputed." Hence the Pyrrhonians concluded, "that nothing was ever to be assented to, but the mind to be kept in an eternal suspense:" the academics, on the contrary, held, "that the PROBABLE, when found, was to be assented to: but, till then, they were to go on with the Pyrrhonians, questioning, disputing, and opposing every thing." And here lay the jest: they continued to do so, throughout the whole period of their existence, without ever finding the probable in any thing; except, in what was necessary to supply them with arms for disputing against every thing. It is true, this was a contradiction in their scheme: but scepticism is unavoidably destructive of itself. The mischief was, that their allowing the probable thus far, made many, both ancients and moderns, think them uniform in their conces

sions: in the mean time they gave good words, and talked perpetually of their verisimile and probabile, amidst a situation of absolute darkness and scepticism; like Sancho Pancha, of his island on the terra firma. This was Lucian's opinion of the academics; and no man knew them better; speaking of the happy island, in his true history, and telling us in what manner it was stocked with the several sects of Greek philosophy; when he comes to the academics he observes with much humour, that though they were in as good a disposition to come as any of the rest, they still kept aloof in the confines, and would never venture to set foot upon the island. For here truly they stuck; they were not yet satisfied whether it was an island or not.*

This I take to be the true key to the intrigues of the ACADEMY; of which famous sect many have been betrayed into a better opinion than it deserved. If any doubt of this; the account which Cicero himself gives of them, will satisfy him. He, who knew them best, and who in good earnest espoused only the more reasonable part of their conduct, tells us, that they held, nothing could be known, or so much as perceived: nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt Opinionibus et INSTITUTIS omnia teneri; nihil VERITATI relinqui: deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. Itaque Arcesilaus negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum:† that every thing was to be disputed; and that the probable was not a thing to engage their assents, or sway their judgments, but to enforce their reasonings.— Carneades vero multo uberiùs iisdem de rebus loquebatur: non quo aperiret sententiam suam (hic enim mos erat patrius academiæ ADVERSARI SEMPER OMNIBUS in disputando) sed,‡ &c.—Proprium sit academiæ judicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare quæ simillima veri videantur; conferre causas, et quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate, judicium audientium relinquere integrum et liberum: § that, though they pretended their end was to find the probable, yet, like the Pyrrhonians, they held their mind in an eternal suspense, and continued going on disputing against every thing, without ever finding the probable to determine their judgments. O academiam volaticam et sui similem, modo huc modo illuc, || says the man whose business it was to show only its fair side. And indeed how could it be otherwise, when, as he himself tells us, in the case of the same Arcesilaus, they endeavoured to prove, that the moment, or weight of evidence, on each side of the question, was exactly equal—Huic rationi, quod erat consentaneum, faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dies jam ple

* Τοὺς δὲ ̓Ακαδημαϊκοὺς ἔλεγον ἐθέλειν μὲν ἐλθεῖν, ἐπέχειν δ' ἔτι, καὶ διασκέπτεσθαι· μὴ δὲ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο πῶς καταλαμβάνειν, εἰ καὶ νῆσος τις τοιαύτη ἐστίν. Ver. Hist. lib. ii. De Orat. lib. i. cap. 18.

Acad. Quæst. lib. i. cap. 12, 13.

$ De Divin. lib. ii, sub fin.

Ep. ad Att. lib. 13.

rosque deduceret: [diceret] ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur, faciliùs ab utraque parte adsentio sustineretur. This they held to be the case, even in the most important subjects, such as the SOUL. And in the most interesting questions concerning it, as whether it was in its nature MORTAL or IMMORTAL-Quod intelligi, quale sit vix potest: et quicquid est, mortale sit, an æternum? Nam utraque in parte multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur: nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit, occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum PARIA MOMENTA.

*

Thus it appears, that the sect was thoroughly sceptical:† and Sextus Empiricus, a master of this argument, says no less: who, though he denies the academics and Pyrrhonians to be exactly the same, as some ancients affirmed, because, though both agreed that truth was not to be found, yet the academics held there was a difference in those things which pretended to it (the mystery of which has been explained above) yet owns that Arcesilaus and Pyrrho had one common philosophy.‡ Origen, or the author of the fragment that goes under his name, seems to have transcribed the opinion of those whom Sextus hints at. "But another sect of philosophers," says he, "was called the academic, because they held their disputations in the academy. Pyrrho was the head and founder of these; from whom they were called Pyrrhonians. He first of all brought in the 'Axarannia, or incomprehensibility, as an instrument to enable them to dispute on both sides the question, without proving or deciding any thing."§

But now a difficulty arises which will require some explanation. We have represented the academy as entirely sceptical: we have represented Socrates a dogmatist; and yet on his sole authority, as we are assured by Tully, did this sect hold its principles of knowing nothing and disputing all things. The true solution seems to be this:

*See note K, at the end of this book.

See note L, at the end of this book.

† Φασὶ μέντοι τινες ὅτι ἡ ἀκαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία ἡ αὐτή ἐστι τῇ σκέψει. Ὁ μίν τι ̓Αρκε σίλαος, ὃν τῆς μέσης ἀκαδημίας, ἐλέγομεν εἶναι προστάτην καὶ ἀρχηγὸν, πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυῤῥωνείοις κοινωνεῖν λόγοις, ὡς μίαν εἶναι σχεδὸν τὴν κατ' αὐτὸν ἀγωγὴν καὶ τὴν ἡμετέραν. -Hypot. Pyrh. lib. i. cap. 33. Agellius, too, assures us, that the difference between the two sects amounted to just nothing. Vetus autem quæstio et a multis scriptoribus Græcis tractata est, in quid et quantum Pyrrhonios et academicos philosophos intersit. Utrique enim ZKENTIKOL, iÇıxtınoì, àæogntizoì, dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil affirmant, nihilque comprehendi putant-differre tamen inter esse-vel maxime propterea existimati sunt. Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendi, quasi comprehendunt, et nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt: Pyrrhonii ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur.-Lib. ii. cap. 5.

§ Αλλη δὲ αἵρεσις φιλοσόφων ἐκλήθη ἀκαδημαϊκὴ, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ ἀκαδημίᾳ τὰς διατριβὰς αὐτοὺς ποιεῖσθαι, ὧν ἄρξας ὁ Πύῤῥων, ἀφ' οὗ Πυῤῥώνιοι ἐκλήθησαν φιλόσοφοι, τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν ἁπάντων πρῶτος εἰσήγαγεν, ὡς ἐπιχειρεῖν μὲν εἰς ἑκάτερα, μὴ μίντοι ἀποφαίνεσθαι μηδίν.—Orig. Philosophica, περὶ ̓Ακαδημ.

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