the pagans, that the GOOD could not punish, but that the JUST would; whose office it was to execute vengeance on the wicked. And, at the same time, holding an EVIL PRINCIPLE, they called this just, the MIDDLE; whose office is thus described in the dialogue against Marcion-To those who conform themselves to the GOOD, the MIDDLE PRINCIPLE gives peace; but to those who obey the EVIL, the MIDDLE inflicts tribulation and anguish. Η οὖν μέση ἀρχὴ ὑπηκόουσι τῷ ἀγάθῳ ἄνεσιν διδώσῃ, ὑπηκόουσι δὲ τῷ πονηρῷ θλίψιν δίδωσι. Thus did these heretics divest the first Cause, or the GOOD, of his attribute of justice; and gave it to the middle principle, because they were not able to sever it from anger. Upon the whole, as Lactantius, himself a philosopher, was admirably well versed in all the pagan systems, he could not but understand a principle, which all the philosophers held; nor could he mistake a consequence, which they all drew from it. And as St Jerome has dignified this tract de Ira Dei, with the title of PULCHERRIMUM OPUS, we must needs conclude that the method Lactantius took to support a future judgment was strictly conformable to THE OLD POSTURE OF DEFENCE, and approved by the orthodox of that time. 1. But it may be objected, perhaps, that this principle, of God's not being angry, only concluded against a future state of punishments, and not of rewards: many of the philosophers holding the affection of grace and favour; though they all denied that of anger; as Lactantius expressly assures us: ita omnes philosophi de ira consentiunt, de gratia discrepant. To this I reply, (1.) That, when the sanction of punishment is taken off, the strongest influence of a future state is destroyed. For while the ancients made the rewards of Elysium only temporary, Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos, &c. they made the punishments of Tartarus eternal; Sedet, æternumque sedebit Infelix Theseus. This, Plato teaches in several places of his works.* And Celsus is so far from rejecting it, that he ranks it in the number of those doctrines which should never be abandoned, but maintained to the very last.† It is true that several passages of antiquity may be objected to what * Οἱ δ ̓ ἂν δόξωσιν ἀνιάτως ἔχειν, διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων, ἢ ἱεροσυλίας πολλὰς καὶ μεγάλα;, ἢ φόνους ἀδίκους καὶ παρανόμους πολλοὺς ἐξειργασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τυγχάνει ὄντα τοιαῦτα, τούτους δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοῖρα ῥίπτει εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν οὔποτε ἐκβαίνουσιν.— Phaedo, p. 113.—"Αλλοι δὲ ὀνίανται οἱ τούτους ὁρῶντες διὰ τὰς ἁμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνη ρότατα καὶ φοβερώτατα πάθη πάσχοντας τὸν ἀεὶ χρόνον.—Gorgias, p. 525. † Τοῦτο μέν γε ὀρθῶς νομίζουσιν, ὡς οἱ μὲν εὖ βιώσαντες εὐδαιμονήσουσιν, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι πάμπαν κακοῖς συνίζονται· καὶ τούτου δὲ τοῦ δόγματος μήθ' οὗτοι, μήτ' ἄλλος ἀνθρώπων μηδείς ποτε άKOSTY, TOTsivovrss.-Apud Orig. cont. Cels. lib. viii. " is here said against the eternity of rewards; particularly this of Cicero; "omnibus qui patriam conservârint, adjuverint, auxerint, certum esse in cœlo ac definitum locum, ubi beati EVO SEMPITERNO fruantur." But we are to know, that the ancients distinguished the souls of men into three species: the HUMAN, the HEROIC, and the DEMONIC. The two last, when they left the body, were indeed believed to enjoy eternal happiness, for their public services on earth; not in Elysium, but in heaven; where they became a kind of demi-gods. But all, of the first, which included the great body of mankind, were understood to have their designation in purgatory, Tartarus, or Elysium; the first and last of which abodes were temporary; and the second only eternal. Now those who had greatly served their country, in the manner Tully there mentions, were supposed to have souls of the heroic or demonic kind. † (2.) But secondly, in every sense of a future state as a moral designation, rewards and punishments necessarily imply each other: so that where one is wanting, the other cannot possibly subsist. This was too visible not to be seen by the ancient philosophers: Lactantius thus argues with them, on common principles. "If God be not provoked at impious and wicked men, neither is he pleased with the good and just. For contrary objects must either excite contrary affections or no affections at all. So that he who loves good men, must at the same time hate the ill; and he who hates not ill men, cannot love the good: because both to love good men proceedeth from an abhorrence of ill; and to hate ill men from a tenderness to the good." And so concludes that the denying God's attribute of anger, which removes the punishments of a future state, overturns the state itself. "Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est." In all this (as we say) he does not in the least misrepresent the common conclusions of philosophy. Plutarch delivering the sentiments of learned antiquity on this head, expressly makes the denial of future misery, to infer the denial of a future state. "Death is the final period of our being. But superstition says, no. She stretches out life beyond life itself. Her fears extend further than our existence. She has joined to the idea of death, that other inconsistent idea of eternal life in misery. For when all things come to an end, then, in the opinion of superstition, *Somn. Scip. cap. 3. Eusebius, speaking of the political gods of Egypt, supports what is here delivered of those heroic or demonic souls, ἄλλους δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπιγείους γενέσθαι, φασὶν, ὑπάρξαντας μὲν θνητούς, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν καὶ κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων εὐεργεσίαν τετευχότας τῆς ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ-Præp. Evang. lib. iii. cap. 3 Si Deus non irascitur impiis et injustis, nec pios utique justosque diligit: in rebus enim diversis, aut in utramque partem moveri necesse est, aut in neutram. Itaque qui bonos diligit, et malos odit; et qui malos non odit, nec bonos diligit: quia et diligere bonos, ex odio malorum venit; et malos odisse, ex bonorum caritate descendit. they begin to be endless. Then, I can't tell what, dark and dismal gates of Tartarus fly open: then, rivers of fire, with all the fountains of Styx, are broken up, &c.-Thus doth cursed superstition oppose the voice of God, which hath declared death to be 'the end of suffering." Death, says he, is the end of suffering, therefore the end of being. Only with the Tego górego of the rhetoricians he has here, in the most rhetorical of all his discourses, put the conclusion before the premises. (3.) But lastly, I shall show (under the next head, to which we are going) that the philosophers did not consider the attribute of grace and favour (which they allowed) to be a passion or affection; though they considered anger (which they allowed not) under that idea. 2. As the foregoing objection would insinuate that the universal principle of God's not being angry, doth not prove enough; so, the next pretends, that it proves too much: for, secondly, it may be objected, that this principle destroys God's providence here, as well as a future state of rewards and punishments hereafter; which providence several of the theistical philosophers, we know, did believe. This will require consideration. Lactantius says: "All the philosophers agree about the anger; but concerning the grace or favour they are of different opinions."† And taking it for granted, that they considered the grace or favour, which they held, as well as the anger, which they denied, to be a passion or affection, he argues against them as above: and adds, "therefore the error of those who take away both grace and anger is the most consistent." But methinks, the absurdity of the error here imputed, should have taught Lactantius, that the philosophers, who had rejected anger because it was a human passion, could never give their god favour or fondness, which is another human passion: for though they sometimes dogmatized like lunatics, they never syllogized like idiots; though their principles were often unnatural, their conclusions were rarely illogical. He should therefore have seen, that those, who held the gratia or benevolence of the divine nature, considered it not as a passion or affection, but as an efflux from its essence; § on which they built their notion of a general providence. So that when he says, concerning the grace or favour, they are of different opinions, we are to understand no more, than that some of them held a providence, and others denied it. Let us see then what kind of providence the theistical philosophers believed. The PERIPATETICS and STOICS went pretty much together in “Αδου τινὲς ἀνοίγονται πύλαι βαθεῖαι, καὶ ποταμοὶ πυρὸς ὁμοοῦ καὶ Στυγὸς ἀποῤῥωγὲς ἀναπετάννυνταιοὕτως ἡ κακοδαίμων δεισιδαιμονία καὶ θεῷ τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἐκπέφευγεν.—De Superst. Omnes philosophi de ira consentiunt, de gratia discrepant. Ergo constantior est error illorum, qui et iram simul, et gratiam tollunt. See the following quotation from Sallust the philosopher. this matter. It is commonly imputed to Aristotle, that he held no providence to be extended lower than the moon: but this is a calumny which Chalcidias raised of him. What Aristotle meant by the words, which gave a handle to it, was that a particular providence did not extend itself to individuals: for being a fatalist in natural things, and at the same time maintaining free-will in man, he thought, if providence were extended to individuals, it would either impose a necessity on human actions, or, as employed on mere contingencies, be itself frequently defeated; which would look like impotency: and not seeing any way to reconcile free-will and prescience, he cut the knot, and denied that providence extended its care over individuals. Zeno's notion of providence, seems to have been as loose, yet his fatalism was more uniform: and, indeed, better supported, for he denied free-will in man: which was the only difference in this matter between him and Aristotle. Here we have a providence very consistent with a disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments; nay, almost destructive of it. But the PYTHAGOREANS and PLATONISTS will not be put off so: they held a particular providence, extending itself to individuals: a providence, which, according to ancient notions, could not be administered without the affections of love and anger. Here then lies the difficulty: these sects removed all passions from the Godhead, especially anger; and, on that account, rejected a future state of rewards and punishments; while yet they believed a providence, which was administered by the exercise of those very passions. For the true solution of this difficulty, we must have recourse to a prevailing principle of paganism, often before hinted at, for the clearing up many obscurities in antiquity: I mean, that of local tutelar deities. Pythagoras and Plato were deep in the theology which taug t, that the several regions of the earth were delivered over, by the Creator of the universe, to the vicegerency and government of inferior gods. This opinion was originally Egyptian; on whose authority these two philosophers received it; though it had been long the popular belief all over the pagan world. Hence, we see the writings of the Pythagoreans and Platonists so full of the DOCTRINE OF DEMONS: a doctrine, which even characterized the theology of those Now, these demons were ever supposed to have passions and affections. On these principles and opinions the Greeks formed the name of that mixed moral mode, SUPERSTITION: they called it didiμovía, which signifies the fear of demons or inferior gods. And these being supposed by the philosophers, to have passions; and a species, or at least one, of them (called, by the people, THE ENVIOUS DEMON) to be sects. * Cotta, in Cicero, explaining the doctrine of the stoics, says, non curat [Deus] singulos homines. Non mirum, ne civitates quidem. Non eas? Ne nationes quidem et gentes.N. D. iii. 39. more than ordinary capricious and cruel in the exercise of the passions, these notions gave birth to all the extravagant rites of atonement: the practice of which, as we say, they called didamovía; intimating, in the very term, the passion which gave birth to them: and by which alone the ancients understood a particular providence could be administered. And here it is worthy our observation, that Chalcidias gives this as the very reason why the peripatetics rejected a particular providence (he says indeed, though falsely, all providence below the moon) namely, because they held nothing of the administration of inferior deities. His words are these: "Aristotle holds, that the providence of God descends even to the region of the moon: but that, below that orb, things were neither governed by the decrees of God, nor upheld by the wisdom and aid of angels. Nor does he suppose any providential intervention of demons."† So closely united, in the opinion of this writer, whom Fabricius calls gnarissimus veteris philosophia, was the doctrine of a particular providence, and the doctrine of demons and subaltern deities. But when now the soul is disengaged from the body, it is no longer in their opinion, under the government of demons; nor consequently subject to the effects of the demonic passions. And what becomes of it then, we shall see hereafter. A remarkable passage in Apuleius, will explain and justify the solution here given: "God," saith this author, "cannot undergo any temporary exercise of his power or goodness: and therefore cannot be affected with indignation or anger; cannot be depressed with grief, or elated with joy. But, being free from all the passions of the mind, he neither sorrows nor exults; nor makes any instantaneous resolution to act, or to forbear acting. Every thing of this kind suits only the middle nature of the demons: for they are placed between gods and men; as well in the frame and composition of their minds, as in the situation of their abodes, having immortality in common with the former, and affections in common with the latter. For they are subject, like us, to be every way irritated and appeased; so as to be inflamed by anger, melted by compassion, allured by gifts, softened by prayers, exasperated by neglect, and soothed again by observance. In a word, to be affected by every thing that can make impression on the human mind."§ * See note Z, at the end of this book. Aristoteles Dei providentiam usque ad lunæ regionem progredi censet; infra vero neque providentiæ scitis regi, nec angelorum ope consultisque sustentari: nec vero dæmonum prospicientiam putat intervenire.-Com. in Platonis Timæum. Bibl. Lat. lib. iii. cap. 7. § - Debet Deus nullam perpeti vel operis vel amoris temporalem perfunctionem; et idcirco nec indignatione nec ira contingi, nullo angore contrahi, nullâ alacritate gestire : sed ab omnibus passionibus animi liber, nec dolere unquam, nec aliquando lætari, nec aliquid repentinum velle vel nolle. Sed et hæc cuncta, ut id genus cætera, dæmonum mediocritati congruunt. Sunt enim inter homines et deos, ut loco regionis, ita ingenio |