Senator MORSE. Have you had any inspector general reports dealing with allegations of corruption in AID?

Mr. BELL. Ken Mansfield, the Inspector General of the Department of State he is not my inspector general, as you know, sir-was in my office yesterday, he is just about to go out to Vietnam again. He has been there frequently. We talked about our program, and his. We have on the spot in Saigon today some 18 auditors with more en route-we have at least 2, and I think it is going up to 4, members of our own inspection staff who are permanently stationed in Saigon. The AID inspection staff has investigated during the past year, as I recall, about 90 cases, and closed about half of them. I had a report on this from the chief of our own internal inspection service just the other day.

Senator MORSE. The Comptroller General of the United States from time to time has filed reports with you bearing upon problems of corruption in AID.

Mr. BELL. The Comptroller General has not been in South Vietnam for 2 or 3 years. I believe he is mounting a team now that will be going out shortly.

Senator MORSE. But he has been elsewhere where you have had your AID program and has filed reports with this committee.

Mr. BELL. Oh, yes. The GAO is constantly auditing our program all around the world; yes, sir.

Senator MORSE. I want to say, as you know one of my criticisms of your whole program is you haven't stamped out corruption to the degree the taxpayer is entitled to have you do it.

Mr. BELL. I can only respond that I agree with you that we should stamp it out in every way that we possibly can. We have, since I have been in the agency, stepped up and improved our auditing program, our inspection program, our end-use check program. I think the situation has been getting better, but I agree with you that there is still more diversion than I would like to see. There are still more cases of black market operations and that sort of thing than I would like to see and we are continuing to work on it.

Senator MORSE. Mr. Bell, in fairness to you and me, I read from galley 13 of the testimony in regard to this matter of corruption:

On the other side, I do not believe it is a major factor in the total effort there. We and the present Government in South Vietnam are working very hard and closely on that.

I want to say that is the testimony of Mr. Rusk according to this galley and not yours.

Mr. BELL. Yes.

Senator MORSE. I assume that you did not object to the statement of Mr. Rusk.

Mr. BELL. Of course not, Senator.

REFUGEE PROBLEM

Senator MORSE. In the recent issue of Look magazine Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts has an article dealing with the refugee problem in Vietnam, and in fairness to the Senator because I am going to comment on it, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have it incorporated at this point in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. (The article referred to follows:)

[From Look, Feb. 8, 1966]

A FRESH LOOK AT VIETNAM

(By Edward M. Kennedy, U.S. Senator from Massachusetts)

In a small village in Vietnam recently, I had the opportunity to speak with a village elder. This man had seen 30 years of continuous conflict, two sons had been lost in long-passed military engagements, and his crude farm implements lay useless behind his home. He was an exhausted man in an exhausted country. Without my asking, he related the needs of his village-but he was really speaking for Vietnam. "We just want to be free from the terror and weapons of soldiers," he said. "We want our children to read, we don't want them to be sick all their lives, and we want to grow our own food on our own land."

This simple statement of human needs, so pathetically stated, was a crushing description of Vietnam. The months of Senate hearings that I had conducted on Vietnam's refugee problems, while dramatic in airing the hurt of people caught in war, never produced such forceful testimony as did this man in the setting where we talked.

We have been involved in two conflicts in Vietnam. One has been the battle against the terror brought in the name of revolution by the Vietcong guerrillas and the forces from the North. The efforts of the South Vietnamese and of our own American forces in this confiict have been the object of American debate and, attention on an almost unprecedented scale. Our Government has taken a position in this endeavor that has been clear and firm. Regardless of individual views, most people both at home and abroad are well aware of this aspect of our policy in Vietnam.

The second conflict in Vietnam-the struggle for the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people themselves-has not been waged with the same ferocity. There has been no one firm humanitarian policy understood throughout our Nation or the world. The struggle in Vietnam has not been one that has produced a concern for the most important element in the Vietnam situation--the welfare of the Vietnamese people themselves.

Positive steps have been proposed by our President, who has made clear his commitment to the welfare of the Vietnamese people. In a major address last April, the President discussed the two faces of the conflict in Vietnam. He outlined a program for the economic and social betterment of all southeast Asia. Later, and more specifically, he established Project Vietnam; a program to encourage American civilian physicians to volunteer their services to Vietnam. In September of last year, he dispatched an eminent specialist on rehabilitation of the handicapped, Dr. Howard A. Rusk, to undertake a special study in that country. The President's concern has stimulated progress in this area.

Yet greater efforts must be undertaken if we are to win the support of these people, for without them and their identification with the democratic governments of the world, the lives of many Americans will have been given to no avail. In the voice of the village elder who described a nation's needs was the clear implication that he was indifferent as to who would supply those needs. Years of fear and deprivation had smothered the concern he may have had for his own personal freedoms. He wanted physical security, education, health and some form of social justice. While it can be said that we have actively sought to provide for his security, we have yet to fully meet his remaining requests. And it is significant that it is free societies that can best provide these things.

It is the war that the hopes and aspirations of the people that must be escalated in Vietnam. In this land of 16 million people:

There are only 800 Vietnamese doctors, and 500 of these are in the armed forces, leaving 300 for the entire civilian population.

Only 28 hospitals have surgical facilities, but 17 of these facilities are idle for lack of physicians.

Eighty percent of the children of Vietnam suffer from worms.

The vast majority of people are illiterate, and what school system did once exist in the countryside has been nearly destroyed by war. Schoolteachers have been prime targets of terrorists. In 1965 alone, over 11,000

civil servants-a high proportion of them teachers were killed, abducted, or wounded by the Vietcong.

The nation's production of food, once sufficient to make Vietnam a rice basket for Asia, is so depleted that rice must now be imported to feed the populace.

Local government has been decimated; not one of the 16,000 villages—or their officials-has escaped assassination or terror. Clearly, whatever

social institutions once existed for the benefit of the Vietnamese are now crippled or totally ruined by war.

Before I went to Vietnam, the Senate Judiciary Special Subcommittee on Refugees and Escapees, which I chair, took testimony in over 4 months of hearings from some 40 witnesses on the problem of Vietnam refugees. Our subcommittee was concerned with what was being done for the homeless thousands: What provisions were being made for the estimated 100,000 orphans? Were we meeting the challenge of caring for the human fallout of war-the very people that the Vietcong claimed to champion? And in a larger sense, with Vietnam almost a land of refugees, was the United States beginning to engage in this more difficult battle for popular support?

The testimony given at these hearings indicated that our efforts in this area were not sufficient. The Saigon government, assisted by our AID officials, had only the barest beginnings of a program to meet the needs of the refugees, although they had forecast the presence of 100,000 refugees by July of 1965. Even when the estimate was proven wrong, and the refugee count was greater than 600,000 people, there was still no change in planning, no adequate program set up to handle this massive influx of South Vietnamese, according to a report by the General Accounting Office. And this occurred despite prior knowledge that the escalation of military activity would, and did, lead to a vast increase in displaced civilians.

Moreover, it was discouraging to hear the testimony of representatives of our own Government imply again and again that in Vietnam the problem of refugees is just that--a problem and a burden.

By now, there are aproximately 1 million such refugees in South Vietnam, or 6 percent of its population. It is as if the population of the six New England States were homeless in America. These are people whose villages have been overrun by the Vietcong, or who are fleeing to urban areas to escape the cross fire of the fighting or the effect of the bombs from our planes. For the most part, they are grouped around the major population centers on the coastline, but hundreds of smaller centers lie inland.

While in Vietnam, I saw for myself the indifference of the Saigon government to the plight of their own. Government officials assured me that the refugee situation was well in hand-yet I inspected one camp of over 600 people without a toilet. Construction was started on seven refugee camps in anticipation of my visit. Work stopped when my plans were temporarily altered. It began again when it was finally possible for me to go.

Many other aspects of my visits to these camps did not ring true. People applauded when our party entered a camp-thanks to minor officials moving through the refugee crowd as cheerleaders. Blankets were distributed in our presence, and repossessed when we left. The paint on buildings was still wet. and roads were freshly cleared and bulldozed. In essence, the behavior of these officials was more typical of people concealing a lack of effort than of men doing their best at a difficult task. To them, these refugees are a burden-but to me. they can be one of our strongest assets in Vietnam.

I recognize that historically it has always been difficult to attend to the concerns of the civilian population in the midst of war. And in Vietnam, the byproduct of escalation has been a refugee flow that would tax even the most resourceful officials. It is encouraging that last August, our AID officials established their own separate refugee program for Vietnam. And we know that the many voluntary agencies in the field have patiently continued their traditional work-despite hardships and personal dangers.

But now, perhaps, the opportunity presents itself for a greater devotion of our energies to the refugee problem. Now, more can be done to focus our attention on the Vietnamese people themselves.

I would suggest that, first, the U.S. Government must express an overall humanitarian policy in Vietnam that will rival, in resolve and resources, our military effort. This expression by our Government must be so forceful that there will be no danger of the Saigon government's misreading our desires.

The basis of this policy would recognize the potential of 1 million refugeesindeed, that of all the people of Vietnam-the potential to educate, train, and employ them in useful tasks. Experiences in other refugee situations in Asia illustrate what can be done to productively employ and train idle hands. Cottage industries established through private enterprise or voluntary agencies assist the handicapped or the young and old. Cooperative farms could be organized and built by the refugees themselves, as could resettlement villages, schools or water-conservation projects.

It logically follows that this policy direction would imply the need for more adequate facilities at refugee centers. These centers should be equipped for the activity rather than the storage of people.

Second, this strong expression of Government policy should be directed to the rebirth of democratic political action among these people to enhance their future role in their village's or nation's life. And within these settlements, people who before had at least exercised free choice in the selection of village leaders could experience greater forms of representation.

Depending upon the time that we would expect people to remain in such settlements, representative government could be fostered. Each refugee camp could elect a council to serve the refugees' interests in the camp itself. And on a national level, refugee representatives could be present in Saigon to assure that the immediate needs of this growing population are met.

The meaning and experience of this kind of activity cannot be minimized in a nation where the idea of a central government responding to individual and local needs is novel.

Third, to assist in these endeavors, it would be wise to recruit men of other nations who have a unique background and experience in the problems of refugees. The men who mastered the problems of refugees following World War II, those who worked in the deserts of the Middle East and more recently in the camps of north Africa have much to offer us. They could be called for this humanitarian purpose, to advise on refugee problems and to assist as intermediaries with the Central Government and our own Armed Forces.

Our renewed humanitarian commitment to the people of Vietnam would also provide for the presence of a refugee official at the highest policymaking level in our Saigon Embassy. This man, responsible only to the Ambassador and the President, would be involved in all decisions, whether military or civilian. He would also be a coordinator of the Government and voluntary-agency efforts. Such experts could enlighten both Government and people. Their presence could be the promise of great international efforts, not only in Vietnam, but in all of southeast Asia. For the educational and other programs needed in refugee camps are but a small measure of the needs throughout Vietnam and the neighboring states.

Finally, and most importantly, I do not believe it visionary to consider an international force to assist the developing areas of southeast Asia. The presence of men whose only concern is the health of the population, the education of children, the bringing of simple technologies to remote lands or the development of civilian administrators would be an important defense against future political instability and resultant aggression.

This force of dedicated people would be truly international. It would not be a unilateral American effort. It would enroll the citizens of every country in the free world—but especially the citizens of Asia. These volunteers would bring an emphasis on peace and stability to a part of the world that was known too much war. Their accepted presence in any Asian nation would be symbolic of that nation's desire to improve the conditions under which its people live, regardless of ideology.

Such an international effort could be internationally fostered. There are voluntary agencies established on a worldwide basis to oversee this work and assist in the effort. I recently had the opportunity to address the leaders of these agencies in Geneva about Vietnam. I was taken by their warm response to my suggestions of greater involvement by them and their nations in the civilian effort in Vietnam.

But even more appropriately, a way might be found to involve the one organization of international harmony-the United Nations. For it is this body that can best command the resources, talent, and good will among free nations for a concerted development effort.

The work of this force, involving thousands of men and women, would be available to all. Teams of health specialists attacking entire areas suffering

from recurrent outbreaks of disease, public-health specialists constructing sanitation and sewage systems, teams of agricultural specialists adapting their knowledge to the differing farm conditions, advising and constructing the necessary equipment and systems needed for efficient food production-all these efforts are within the realm of possibility. Entire school systems could be established; adequate communications with centers of safety and Government could be devised and strengthened in methods and procedures for administering to local needs.

Regardless of the conditions in Vietnam in the months ahead, such a proposal expressing our true concern for the people of southeast Asia should be aired before the nations of the world. For what cannot be fully accomplished in the military turmoil of Vietnam immediately can now be undertaken in the more secure nations in that part of the world.

We know that the developed nations in the past have displayed an amazing capability to undertake the infinitely complex tasks of war. Cannot the harnessing of equal energy for these peaceful purposes also be achieved?

To the extent that we leave Vietnam one day with more to mark our presence than destruction, we will have met our true commitment to the Vietnamese. And to the extent that we plan and act now to assure against a recurrence of a Vietnam elsewhere in southeast Asia, we will have met the challenge of the future in Asia.

Senator MORSE. I interpret that article of Senator Kennedy to imply, at least, that he did not find the South Vietnamese Government doing for the people of South Vietnam what he thought they ought to be doing. They didn't seem to indicate interest in the mass of people. He told a story, as I recall, and I paraphrase him, but I think accurately, of how blankets were distributed to the refugees while he was there, but he was advised that after he left they were all picked up again by the South Vietnamese Government.

Yet this morning you testify that you seem to think that there is a growing support of that Government.

What did you find when you were over there indicating that the Government was giving the assistance to the refugees that it ought to be giving?

Mr. BELL. Well, Senator, Senator Kennedy obviously can speak for himself. I happened to have discussed this matter with him just yesterday afternoon at some considerable length and I believe we see it very much the same way; namely, that the Government of Vietnam now, in contrast with the situation 6 months or a year ago, has indeed mounted a major program. Of their 1966 civil budget of about 20 million piasters, 1.3 billion piasters is for refugee work. This is a substantial share of the budget obviously, and is for the approximately 440,000 refugees out of the 15-16 million total population of South Vietnam. That is not a small figure.

Senator Kennedy and I are also in thorough agreement that this is not enough. This program does and will provide food and shelter, blankets, the minimum welfare arrangements, you might say, for the refugees. But it does not yet provide sufficiently for the education of the children in the refugee camps, for the vocational training of the adults, and for the resettlement of the refugees, either back to their own home villages when that becomes possible under the security situation, or in jobs in normal employment in new locations.

Senator MORSE. How many refugees are there?

Mr. BELL. There are about 400,000 in camps at the present time There were some 700,000 in all during the last year, and the differ ence-nearly 300,000-have either been resettled back in the village from which they came or have joined the urban population and found jobs and housing there.