Does the southeast treaty, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization commit us to do what we are now doing in Vietnam?

Secretary RUSK. Yes, sir; I have no doubt that it does.

A protocol state has a right to call on the members of the organization for assistance. The obligations of that treaty are both joint and several. That is they are both collective and individual.

So that there seems to be no doubt that we are entitled to offer that assistance. But the underlying legal basis for the assistance is the right of individual and collective self-defense against an aggressor. There is clearly an aggression from the North here which has been persistent and since 1960 has been sharply increased.

The CHAIRMAN. You say we are entitled to do this.
Are we obligated to do this under the treaty?

Secretary RUSK. I would not want to get into the question of whether, if we were not interested in the commitments, policy and principle under the Southeast Asia Treaty, we have some legal way in order to avoid those commitments. I suppose that one could frame some argument which would make that case.

But it would seem to us that the policy, which was discussed and passed upon by the Executive and the Senate of that day, is that we are opposed to aggression against these countries in southeast Asia: both the members of the Organization and the protocol states.

OTHER ASPECTS OF COMMITMENT

In addition to that, we have bilateral assistance agreements to South Vietnam. We have had several actions of the Congress. We have had the annual aid appropriations in which the purposes of the aid have been fully set out before the Congress. We have had special resolutions such as the one of August 1964, and we have had the most important policy declarations by successive Presidents with respect to the protection of South Vietnam against Communist aggression.

QUESTION OF PAX AMERICANA

The CHAIRMAN. This question arose the other night in your "Meet the Press" appearance last Sunday night, particularly with regard to a question by the British correspondent. I think he suggested that it would be easier for all, for them to understand and for many people to understand this operation if it was put on the basis of straight out containing communism rather than the other way of protecting their right to self-determination.

What would you comment on that?

Secretary RUSK. Well, Mr. Chairman, the particular correspondent invited me to subscribe to the doctrine of Pax Americana.

The CHAIRMAN. Why?

Secretary RUSK. That is not our policy. We do not have worldwide commitments to all 117 countries with whom we have relations. We have some 42 allies, very specific commitments to those allies. Now, it is true that, in the appropriate way in the United Nations and elsewhere, we would presumably give sympathy and support to those who are victims of the kind of aggression which would have worldwide implications. But we are not putting ourselves in the position of the gendarmes of the universe. There has been a good deal of fighting within this postwar period in which we did not partici

pate. We are not trying to impose a Pax Americana on the world. We are trying to create a situation in which, in accordance with the charter, all nations, large and small, can live unmolested by their neighbors and have a chance to work out their own decisions in their own way. We support that policy in different ways at different times and under different circumstances. In the case of our specific allies. and those with whom we have specific commitments if they are subject to an attack from those who declare a policy of aggression as a systematic course in the world, we have on a number of occasions joined with them to meet those attacks.

OBJECTIVE IN VIETNAM

The CHAIRMAN. How do you foresee the end of this struggle? Do you think we are likely to be there, 5, 10, or 20 years?

What do you foresee as the outcome of this-even if we are successful in the military activities?

Secretary RUSK. Well, I would hate to try to cast myself in the role of a specific prophet in the development of this particular situation.

The CHAIRMAN. Maybe I will put it another way, what is our objective? Can you define our objective in terms of what we seek to achieve?

Secretary RUSK. To put it in its simplest terms, Mr. Chairman, we believe that the South Vietnamese are entitled to a chance to make their own decisions about their own affairs and their own future course of policy: that they are entitled to make these decisions without having them imposed on them by force from North Vietnam or elsewhere from the outside. We are perfectly prepared to rely upon the South Vietnamese themselves to make that judgment by elections, through their own Government, by whatever way is suitable for them to make that decision.

Now, we have indicated a good many points which have a bearing on this matter. We are not, for example, trying to acquire a new ally. If South Vietnam and the South Vietnamese people wish to pursue a nonalined course by their own option, that is an option which is open to them.

If they wish to join in the regional activities in the area, such as Mekong River development and projects of that sort, that is open to them. But we do believe they are entitled not to have these answers decided for them on the basis of military force organized from Hanoi through an aggression initiated from Hanoi, in the leadership of a front which was organized in Hanoi in 1960 for the purpose of taking over South Vietnam by force.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think they can be a completely free agent with our occupation of the land with 200,000 or 400,000 men?

Secretary RUSK. If the infiltration of men and arms from the north were not in the picture, these troops of ours could come home. We have said that repeatedly. They went in there, the combat troops went in there, because of infiltration of men and arms from the north. That is the simple and elementary basis for the presence of American combat forces.

The CHAIRMAN. My time is up.

Senator Morse?

STATEMENT BY SENATOR MORSE

Senator MORSE. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask the Secretary any questions this morning for the reason that I now state. I disagree with practically every major premise not only contained in his prepared statement but in his discussion in the last few minutes.

I completely disagree with his interpretation of the SEATO Treaty. I do not think the SEATO Treaty justifies in any way the unilateral American action in South Vietnam based on the SEATO Treaty. But what I do propose to do at the first executive session of this committee, Mr. Chairman, is to move that this committee proceed with hearings in depth on the Vietnam crisis. If the committee does not see fit to do that, I shall introduce a resolution with some cosponsors in the Senate calling for an investigation and hearing on our policy in Vietnam for the American people. They are entitled to it.

In such hearings I shall then proceed to ask questions of whoever the administration sends up. I think we have got to have the time to go into depth on this matter. We can't possibly do it within the procedures this morning.

I only want the record to show that I completely disagree with the administration's policies in Vietnam from the aspect of international law or treaty obligations and sound foreign policy, and I think that point of view is prairie firing across the country. This committee, in my opinion, has the clear duty to proceed at once with prolonged hearings in depth on the Vietnam crisis.

Therefore, I will defer my questions until such a hearing is held. The CHAIRMAN. The Senator from Iowa?

SIZE OF AID PROGRAM IN REGULAR BUDGET

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, perhaps I should ask this question of Mr. Bell, but do you recall whether or not the authorization bill of last year cut down the AID program below the budget request?

Mr. BELL. Yes, sir, it did to some extent, not very much, 7 percent overall, as I remember it, not very much of that applied to supporting

assistance.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Well then, why wasn't a sufficient amount requested in the budget last year?

Mr. BELL. We simply underestimated, Senator Hickenlooper. We prepared that budget, as you will recall, something over a year ago now, it was defended before the Congress last spring and in the early summer. At that time the escalation of military activity resulting from the entrance of North Vietnamese troops and the introduction of American troops was not clearly visible and its economic effects were uncertain.

During the summer and fall, particularly in October and November, it became apparent that the dimensions of the economic aspects of this struggle in South Vietnam had simply been grossly underestimated in our previous budget estimates.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Would there be any possibilities that that gross underestimation was partly due to the fact that it was announced that the budget would be kept under a hundred billion dollars last year?

Mr. BELL. Oh, no, sir, not at all. No one in Saigon or in Washington at any level of the executive branch had foreseen the dimension of the economic requirements that became clear in late last fall and that we have before you today.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to belabor this point too much, but I seem to recall that a number of Members of Congress made a statement last year that the budget wasn't asking for enough and they would have to come back for more after the first of the year. Mr. BELL. We did have, sir, in the original request, we had a proposal that the Congress, because we were clear that we could not be very precise about the requirements in Vietnam, we did have a proposal that the Congress authorize such sums that might be necessary in southeast Asia which would permit us to come back with just an appropriation request, but that was diverted in the process of the congressional procedures, during the spring and summer into a special $89 million contingency fund for southeast Asia which has all been used up and committed, and we are now, therefore, back asking for an additional authorization and appropriation as the Secretary indicated. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you.

DOLLARS GENERATED BY AMERICAN PRESENCE

Mr. Secretary, do you have an estimate as to how much in dollars is generated in the South Vietnamese economy by the spending of American forces there?

Do you have any estimate of that at the moment?

Mr. BELL. The two principal sources of such spending, Senator, are the spending of troops in their off-duty hours, and the expenditures by the Defense Department for construction of military bases. In both cases numerous steps have been undertaken in an effort to limit the impact of the spending on the Vietnamese economy. In the case of the troops, for example, there are careful attempts to encourage troops to put as much of their money into savings as they are able to

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I didn't mean to go into a lengthy history of this situation. I just asked if you had any estimate as to how much in dollars is generated into the South Vietnamese economy by our presence there.

Mr. BELL. The estimate is around $275 to $300 million, sir, in the coming year.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How much last year, do you have any idea?

Mr. BELL. Perhaps $100 million, sir. It is much larger in 1966 than in 1965.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I wonder if we could get an estimate, a better estimate then, perhaps, on that?

Mr. BELL. We will be glad to put the best estimate that we can into the record.

(The information referred to is classified and in the committee files.)

ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Mr. Secretary, how much in economic aid are other nations providing in Vietnam?

58-320-66-pt. 1-2

Secretary RUSK. We have not computed the exact dollar amount because a good deal of it is in terms of goods and services, but there are some 35 countries providing assistance to Vietnam, and I will be glad to furnish the details of that for the record. I think on the economic side, for example, we could look at Germany: they have provided directors, instructors, for vocational schools; they have provided experts in universities, for the medical school; they have provided ambulances, commodity credits of 15 million deutsche marks, for German products such as machine tools and fertilizer, a credit of another 50 million for development of the major industrial complex at Kien Hung and An Xuyen; and other credits of a similar sort which are fairly substantial. They recently contributed a 3,000ton hospital ship in Vietnam.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Have those credits been taken up and used or are they still in the offing from the standpoint of actual application?

Secretary RUSK. Some have been drawn on and some in the process of being used at the present time.

RURAL RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I notice there is a hundred million dollars being requested for the rural reconstruction program which would bring the total, I think, up to around $160 million plus.

Mr. BELL. That is right.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. For fiscal 1966. Does that include the building of REA plants and lines and projects like that in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. There are three rural electric co-op systems being established, sir. The funds for those are already committed from the previous funds available, and nothing would be added in that particular phase under the new request.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Where are those three located?

Mr. BELL. One is located in An Xuyen Province in the delta which is the area where the so-called Hoa Hao sect live and where the security is quite good.

The other two are north and northeast of Saigon, one quite close to Saigon. Again, each of these three were selected because they are areas of relative security.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you find the Vietcong tear them down as fast as you can get them up there?

Mr. BELL. No, sir; they have not. There hasn't been much construction under these projects yet. But there has been no direct action against these projects so far.

PLANNED TELEVISION PROGRAMING

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Are you planning a television network in South Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. There is not a network in the American sense. There is a television project which is underway to provide television services both for the cities of Vietnam and for the American troops who are there. Part of this is financed by the Defense Department, part is financed by our AID program.