REASON FOR INFLUX OF REFUGEES Senator MORSE. How many of them become refugees as a result of the Vietcong terrorism and how many of them become refugees as a result of American bombings, a scorched earth policy, napalm bombing, the poisoning of rice fields and other shocking actions of conducting the war? Mr. BELL. I am not sure we have precise figures on that, Senator, but there is no question that the vast majority of them are refugees from Vietcong terror and not from the incidental damage of our own military operations. Senator LAUSCHE. Mr. Chairman, at this point Senator MORSE. I am not yielding to the Senator from Ohio. He is going to get his turn in due course of time. REVENUES FROM IMPORT DUTIES Mr. Bell, what portion of the South Vietnamese budget comes from import duties? Mr. BELL. Import duties, sir? Senator MORSE. Yes. Mr. BELL. May I ask Mr. Poats to give you the precise figure on that? The total budget of the Vietnamese Government is 55 billion piasters in the present year. Of that about 21 or 22 billion piasters is Vietnamese Government revenues and of that 21 or 22 billion piasters a substantial part of their revenues are import duties. Senator MORSE. Will you supply the figures for the record in the interests of time? Mr. BELL. Be glad to. (The figures referred to follow :) VIETNAM BUDGET REVENUES DERIVED FROM IMPORT DUTIES AND Budget revenues in calendar year 1966 are estimated at 49.8 billion piasters. Revenues derived from all import duties are estimated at 13.9 billion piasters, of which 8.9 is attributable to U.S.-financed imports. An additional 27.7 billion piasters is estimated to accrue as counterpart from U.S. economic aid. Senator MORSE. And also, unless you have it at tongue's point would you also supply the figure as to how much of this income in their budget is attributed to imports under our aid program? Mr. BELL. Well, the counterpart, the local currency which is received by the Government of Vietnam in the form of an indirect grant under our commercial import program, is not included in the 21 or 22 billion piaster figure that I gave you. The United States is supplying that part of the Vietnamese Government budget-will amount in calendar year 1966 to about 24 billion piasters. Senator MORSE. Do they impose import duties on our aid? Mr. BELL. No, sir. The import duties are paid by the consumers in Vietnam, not by the U.S. Government. The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up. VIETCONG ATROCITIES Senator LAUSCHE. May I ask at this time there be supplied the fig ures showing the number of orphans and dead people that resulted from the guerrilla tortures of the Communists? So we will have both sides of the picture. Senator MORSE. When you supply those figures, we also-will you also supply in your 35,000 figure the number of those victims that were in black pajamas. (The information referred to follows:) ANNEX I DOCTRINAL BASES OF THE USE OF TERROR Terror has played an indispensable role in the operations of the Vietcong since Viet Minh days. Truong Chinh, one of the leading North Vietnamese theorists and third ranking man in the Politburo in Hanoi, described the Viet Minh operations in his book "The August Revolution" in these terms: "The general form of struggle was the armed demonstration, another special form used at this moment was the guerrilla wherever the topography of the country was favorable and yet another, the elimination of traitors in towns and country by picked detachments." In another book, "The Resistance To Win," he said: "Traitors to the nation, reactionaries, and enemies of the resistance must be immediately eliminated. We should punish those even in the ranks of the resistance who advocated wrong measures or committed harmful deeds." Who is a traitor? A Vietcong document captured in 1961 cited on page 49 of "A Threat to Peace" gave the working guerrillas a clear definition: "Step up extermination activities against traitors. All those refusing to have rice collected, to pay taxes or make money contributions to the Front can be considered as reactionaries and punished like other traitors." Hanoi continued to call for violence, especially directed against Government officials, as shown by an article entitled "The Role of Violence in the Revolution for the Liberation of the South" printed in North Vietnam's leading Communist organ, Hoc Tap, in July 1964. "The aim of the revolution to liberate our compatriots in South Vietnam is to defeat the aggression and frustrate the warmongering policies of the U.S. imperialists and their lackey. To that end it is necessary to smash the reactionaries administrative machinery and the imperialistic mercenaries' army. This revolution can and should be settled only by the use of revolutionary acts and the force of the masses to defeat the enemy force; it absolutely cannot be settled by laws and accords." An attack on Saigon's police headquarters, for example, was cited on August 18 by Liberation radio: "Our troops skillfully and valiantly shot to death the sentinels guarding the gate, rushed into the Saigon police headquarters, and blew it up. "Let us applaud the people's armed forces in the Saigon military zone for having scored this glorious achievement and for having dealt a heavy and accurate blow to the enemy. "This bomb explosion has also provided the Saigon compatriots with one more lesson and a rich experience with regard to the ability to use violence in both the political and military fields to topple the country-selling puppet clique and to seize power and put it in the people's hands." The bombing of the My Canh Restaurant on June 25 which caused numerous casualties among innocent Vietnamese bystanders was the subject of boasting in Communist radio broadcasts, which called it "a new glorious exploit * claimed "The South Vietnamese people and our compatriots are overjoyed at this feat * * ," and celebrated "this great victory scored by the Saigon armed forces 1. EXTRACTS FROM A TYPICAL DAY (MARCH 21, 1965) OF VIETCONG TERROR IN SOUTH VIETNAM The Vietcong entered a hamlet in Quang Tin Province and kidnaped 10 civilians. A Vietcong squad infiltrated a hamlet in Gia Dinh Province and kidnaped four civilians. The Vietcong entered a hamlet in Quang Tri Province and kidnaped two civilians. The Vietcong fired mortars into the office of the Hiep Hoa village council, wounding 22 civilians. The Vietcong entered Phuoc Thuan hamlet in Ba Xuyen Province, kidnaping the hamlet chief and wounding one civilian. The Vietcong attacked a land development center in Darlac Province kidnaping seven and killing two civilians. One Vietcong platoon entered a hamlet in Tuyen Duc Province and kidnaped three hamlet personnel and four civilians. 2. VIETCONG TERRORISTS STRIKE PUBLIC FACILITIES The Vietcong bombed the My Canh Restaurant in Saigon on the evening of June 25, 1965. The result of the two explosions set off by the Vietcong was 42 persons killed, 27 of whom were Vietnamese, and 80 injured, 62 of whom were Vietnamese. A large proportion of the killed and injured were Vietnamese women and children. On August 10, the Vietcong exploded four mines, destroying a two classroom elementary school and information room and a first aid station at Long Phy village near Soc Trang. Three civil defense members were killed and two civilians injured. During 1962, 80,000 Vietnamese children were deprived of schools because of terrorist action: 636 schools were destroyed, 250 teachers were kidnaped and 30 teachers were killed. 3. COOPERATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT PUNISHED On August 24, U.S. troops entered a Montagnard village 15 miles east of Pleiku to discover that the Vietcong had just executed the aged village chief and the village chief's youngest son. The village chief's wife was still alive but the Vietcong had tortured her by carving flesh from her body and cutting her arms. The Vietcong had also shot the wives of two of the Montagnard soldiers from the village repeatedly in the fleshy parts of their legs trying to force the women to disclose who, among the villagers, supported the Government. 4. POPULATION CENTERS ARE FREQUENT VICTIMS OF VIETCONG ATROCITIES In early August, an American AID provincial representative in Binh Dinh Province told of a Vietnamese Army noncommissioned officer who went berserk and attempted to kill himself following a Vietcong attack on a refugee center. Some 60 children and older people were killed and injured, among whom were relatives of the NCO. Following the battle of Dong Xoai in June 1965, Mr. Leo Cherne of the International Rescue Committee visited the scene of the fighting. Mr. Cherne reported: "The Vietcong *** left behind about 1,500 of a total population of 3,000 who were dead or injured or maimed or orphaned. These are simple Vietnamese peasants. I learned that the Vietcong, before they withdrew, literally entered every single home, shack, habitation of any kind, and like locusts cleaned every last kernel of rice, every piece of dried fish or any other protein and every last container of Nuoc mam and cleaned out every last piaster." 5. AMERICAN CIVILIANS ARE VIETCONG TARGETS On March 29, 1965, Vietcong terrorists exploded a bomb at the American Embassy in Saigon. Two Americans were killed. (It is important to note that 19 Vietnamese were also killed and 131 Vietnamese were injured from the blast.) The Vietcong have threatened to execute Mr. Gustav Hertz, an AID American employee, who was captured while on a "Sunday stroll" in 1964 as retaliation should a Vietcong terrorist who was captured while aiding in the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in March be executed. It should be pointed out that Mr. Hertz, unlike the Vietcong terrorist who was engaged in an act of premeditated violence against unarmed civilians, was in Vietnam in a purely nonmilitary capacity and was engaged in work of a constructive nature for the Vietnamese people. (Source: Department of State.) The CHAIRMAN. Senator Carlson? ADDITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES Senator CARLSON. Mr. Bell, I notice in your statement this morning you are requesting this committee and the Congress to authorize the use of supporting assistance funds for administrative expenses. Mr. BELL. Yes, sir. Senator CARLSON. Would that not be an unusual request? Mr. BELL. It would, sir, and I apologize for not highlighting that. That was in my statement, as you suggest. We are asking for that only in relation to Vietnam, and only for the special reason that we are necessarily building up our mission staff and, therefore, the administrative support for that mission staff, to a very large amount. We are not exactly sure how much we are going to need, and we are not sure how long we are going to need it and, therefore, with the Budget Bureau's concurrence, we are asking for this special and unusual arrangement, so that we can handle the administrative costs of the expanded Vietnam program to the amount of $1,400,000, which is the present estimate, from supporting assistance funds. That is, I think, what underlies it, Senator. Senator CARLSON. Is this definitely tied down to Vietnam? Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; only for the costs in Vietnam and those in Washington to backstop the Vietnam effort directly. It is quite tightly related, thoroughly limited to that purpose. Senator CARLSON. Your supplemental request this morning also includes the Dominican Republic and other areas. Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; but this particular proposal does not. It would be limited to Vietnam. Senator CARLSON. I will say very frankly that I would be very cautious about voting for an open-end authorization for administrative expenses, but I assume you have made a case and made a study of it. Mr. BELL. Right. Senator CARLSON. I did read in the press this morning, or within the last few days, that plans are being made to hire thousands of Vietnamese and place them on the rolls, as, I assume, good missionaries for improving the political and economic situation. I just wondered if you had that in mind when you come up with this open-end authorization. Mr. BELL. No, sir; the people you refer to, I assume, are the teams of persons who will be hired by, and members of, the Vietnamese Government-not the U.S. Government-who will work in the village as part of the so-called rural construction or pacification effort. There will be a number of thousands of such persons but they will be like any other members of the Vietnamese Government establishment. They will not be our employees. Senator CARLSON. Not paid from U.S. funds? Mr. BELL. Well, we may support their training or otherwise supply materials for them but they will not be U.S. Government employees. They will be Government of Vietnam employees, provincial government employees. CONTINGENCY FUND Senator CARLSON. I noticed the President in his message to the Congress on the full-year authorization requested only $70 million in contingency funds. Now, if we grant this authority to use regular aid funds for administrative expenses, isn't it reasonable that that could take care of an increase in contingency funds? Mr. BELL. Well, the administrative expenses, Senator, are nowhere near the scale of these totals. Of the $315 million of additional sup |