Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is that program limited to Saigon or does it go out over the country?

Mr. BELL. It is limited to Saigon at the present, initial stage, but it is expected that there will be sets put into smaller communities and even eventually into villages.

The principal programing element for the countryside is expected to be, what we would call here, educational television, the kind of thing we have in the American rural areas and has been used so extensively on home economics, on agricultural practices, on education in the strict sense for children, and so on, in the villages.

CORRUPTION IN SAIGON GOVERNMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On another phase of this, it seems to me that I heard a radio news story either last night or the day before, saying that one high official in Vietnam said something to the effect. that he hoped that he would be one of the first of the top officials of Vietnam that didn't leave office up to his eyes in gold.

Secretary RUSK. Prime Minister Ky, I believe, made that statement, according to one of your colleagues in the other body.

I

This question of corruption is one which has been troublesome. think that on the one side, we cannot say that it has been completely dealt with and rooted out.

On the other side, I do not believe it is a major factor in the total effort there. We and the present Government in South Vietnam are working very hard and closely on that. I have had my own inspector general out there to help work out checks against possibilities of diversion of American aid. But in this war situation, we cannot guarantee perfection on this subject but we are working on it very hard, Senator.

NUMBER OF AID PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One other question: How many people are working in the AID program in South Vietnam now?

Mr. BELL. There are about 650 direct-hire Americans on board at the present time, Senator. That is going up through this present year to between 900 and a thousand.

In addition, there are another, perhaps 200 to 300 contract employees of AID contractors, such as the International Volunteer Services, IVS volunteers, and then there is a substantial number of Vietnamese and some people from other countries. We have

Senator HICKENLOOPER. How many are in Saigon and how many are out in the country?

Mr. BELL. About two-thirds/one-third-one-third in the country. There are some of the 900 or 1,000 who will be there by the end of this year, we think 400 will be living in our 4 regional headquarters and in each provincial capital and some of them in districts, towns, and villages.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. What are the 600 doing in Saigon?
Mr. BELL. Do you mean what will they be doing?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Yes.

Mr. BELL. Well, the headquarters of the Vietnamese Government is there, of course, and a great number of them will be working directly as

advisers to elements of the Vietnamese Government. We have a major logistics effort. This is the largest AID program in the world at the present time, and that means that we are responsible for the shipping and distribution and accounting and auditing and inspection related to a flow of commodities of very major dimensions.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you. I think my time is more than past and I don't want to trespass on somebody else's time. We will talk about this later.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Gore?

IS OUR INVOLVEMENT JUSTIFIED?

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, as the Chairman has said, your pending request is pertinent to the issue which troubles most of our citizenry, and this would seem an appropriate time to begin an examination of our undertaking in southeast Asia.

I suppose you and I, like most men, are victims of our past pronouncements. I would just like to say, as a preface to my question, that I draw a fine line between support and approval. I have not approved of our policy in southeast Asia from 1954 until now. I have supported and expect to support funds sufficient to give weapons, ammunition, materiel to our Armed Forces who are there, not at their choice but at the orders of their Government.

Whether you have been correct in advocating our escalated involvement there over the years, or whether I have been correct in disapproval is really beside the point now. We are committed and are likely to be there a long time.

With that brief preface, I would like to refer first to your own statement this morning on the bottom of page 4 and 5 when you say of the South Vietnamese people:

They must know that the struggle is worth their suffering and personal tragedies. I would like to reread that paragraph and apply it not to the South Vietnamese people but to the American people.

They must know that the long struggle is worth their suffering and personal tragedies. They must know that by this hard course their future will be better than their past.

I think when you apply that to the American people you come to the heart of one of the excruciating difficulties of our democratic society today. Many people do not believe, many Members of Congress do not believe, that the costs, the risk of a nuclear war, the dangers of a war with China or perhaps with both China and Russia, are worth the endeavor.

I would like to pause and, in fairness, give you a chance to comment on that.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you, Senator.

First I would like to say that, although I welcome the continuing examination of this very great matter of public policy by the Congress, I would point out that this is not a beginning. I know of no subject in the past 5 years-that is, since I have been directly and intimately involved-which has been discussed more frequently, in greater depth, month in and month out over a period of time, with the Congress than has Vietnam.

More time has been spent on it than any single subject so far as our foreign policy is concerned. Nevertheless, discussion should continue, and with greater depth and with greater expanse.

Senator, it is tragic that in the year 1966 we should be called upon to use force to deal with armed aggression after all that has happened since 1945.

At the end of World War II this country demobilized so rapidly that by 1946 we were told by our military that we did not have a single division ready for combat nor a single air group ready for combat.

Our defense budget came down to within reach of $10 million, say, in 1947 and 1948.

We tried to get rid of the nuclear bomb for everybody, including the United States, in the Baruch proposals. As soon as the war was over we went into the commitment of large resources for binding up the wounds of war and helping the reconstruction of that war-torn world.

But then we found that there was such a thing as aggression in the world, that there were those who were prepared to use force contrary to the elementary purposes of the U.N. Charter, to upset the kind of world that was anticipated in the U.N. Charter. We have had a series of pressures by force in Iran, in Greece, in Berlin, and in Korea, and in other places.

One would suppose that it is too late in history for that kind of technique to be used any more. But, if it is used, then we have the most searching question to answer, and that is whether we shall get out of the way of those who are prepared to seize their neighbors by force, particularly those to whom we have commitments; whether we should let them succeed and come to the conclusion that force is profitable, that their brand of world revolution can succeed on the basis of militancy and armed action, and that there is, therefore, no reasonable prospect for the kind of world that we set as a goal in the U.N. Charter.

Now, in this process in this postwar period the American people have taken over 165,000 casualties in a combination of crises. Others have taken more. It is tragic that this problem could arise. It could end literally in 24 hours, Senator, if these people in Hanoi should come to the conclusion that they are not going to try to seize Vietnam and Laos by force. If they are determined to try to do so, then we and others have some very fundamental decisions to make, and in making them, it seems to me, sir, that we have to reflect upon how one builds a peace.

Do we build it by standing aside when aggression occurs, or do we build it by meeting our commitments?

Now, human beings can't be absolutely certain what the right answer to these things is to be. We who are older have the problem of deciding what it is we ought to forget. Those who are young have the problem of discovering the reality in those things they have had no chance to remember. So these are difficult questions, Senator, and we hope that we can find the right answer.

Senator GORE. I certainly concur that they are very difficult.
I yield temporarily to the Senator.

Senator MORSE. Just 15 seconds, Mr. Secretary, and Mr. Bell, I have to leave, and I want you to know why I am leaving. I would

like to hear you, I am scheduled to open the administration's case for the repeal of 14(b) in the morning and that is the only reason I have to leave this morning.

Secretary RUSK. Thank you very much.

Senator GORE. Let me repeat that I concur with your statement that these are very difficult questions and like you hope and pray that we may find the right answers.

My remarks and questions today are not in antagonism or criticism of either you or the President, but in pursuit of those right answers. Secretary RUSK. We understand, sir.

Senator GORE. Accepting the fact that we are there, rightly or wrongly, where are we, where do we go, what do we do, what are the risks, and where do we arrive these are questions which the committee will seek in the days and weeks ahead.

INFILTRATION DURING CESSATION OF BOMBING

I was not too favorably impressed in the last few days with the statements by administration leaders, including yourself this morning, that during the bombing pause infiltration had continued from the North. Has it not continued also from the South, and did you expect

Secretary RUSK. Senator, there is a fundamental difference.

Senator GORE (continuing). Did you honestly expect that because there was a cessation of bombing of North Vietnam that they would ipso facto stop all their military movements? The question I am trying to pose is: Is this a realistic approach or is this a propagandistic approach?

Secretary RUSK. No, Senator, I think it would be a great mistake to put those two forces on the same footing, and not just on the basis that we are on our side.

The North Vietnamese armed forces have no right whatever to move from North Vietnam into South Vietnam to seize South Vietnam. That is aggression. It is contrary to the military clauses of the 1954 agreement, contrary to the general principles of international law, contrary to general standards set forth in such documents as the U.N. Charter.

We have joined in supporting South Vietnam as a part of their right of individual and collective self-defense. I have related our activity to a treaty as far as the United States is concerned.

It has been approved also by legislation. The point is that there could be peace if North Vietnam would give up its illegal and aggressive effort to take over South Vietnam by force. Of course, we used an airlift to supply Berlin when it was blockaded, but no one suggested that that airlift was illegal. Of course, we aided Greece when the guerrillas were moving in from Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, but nobody suggested that our assistance was illegal.

We have probed every conceivable-maybe there are some we have not been able to imagine-but we have probed every possibility of bringing this matter off the battlefield to the conference table. And we had hoped-we didn't know what the chances were; they appeared to be somewhat small, I must admit-but we had hoped on the basis of what a good many governments had told us, including some Communist governments, that, if the bombing were suspended, there might be a chance to bring this matter to the conference table.

Now, the infiltration continued and there were no signs from the other side that they were going to give up their effort. Obviously we can't stop our reenforcements of our own men and can't stop urging others to do the same.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up. I am sorry. We will come back to him.

The Senator from Delaware.

PORTION OF SOUTH VIETNAM BUDGET FINANCED BY UNITED STATES

Senator WILLIAMS. Mr. Secretary, what portion of South Vietnamese budget are we paying, military and civilian?

Secretary RUSK. On military expenses?

Senator WILLIAMS. Both military and civilian.
Secretary RUSK. Both military and economic?
Mr. Bell, would you deal with it?

Mr. BELL. Yes, Senator; the 1966 Vietnamese budget is about 55 billion piasters. Their revenues are expected to be around 21 or 22 billion piasters. They will borrow; there will be deficit credit billion, and we will be providing about 24 billion

creation, to about 10 piasters of the total.

Senator WILLIAMS. We are providing a little better than 50 percent?
Mr. BELL. No; a little less than 50 percent, sir, 24 out of 55.
Senator WILLIAMS. Ten is being borrowed, but I mean of what is
being put up, they are putting up 21 and we are putting up 24?
Mr. BELL. Yes, sir; although the borrowing comes out of the
Vietnamese economy.
It doesn't come from us.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator yield for a clarification?
Senator WILLIAMS. Yes.

REVENUES FROM IMPORT DUTIES OF U.S. GOODS

The CHAIRMAN. What percentage of their Government revenues arise from import duties on goods which we ship into Vietnam? Mr. BELL. I should suppose a fairly significant amount.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, a large part of that 22 billion that they lack we pay in the form of import duties on goods we send there; is that correct?

Mr. BELL. Yes; but we don't pay them, sir. We don't pay those import duties.

The CHAIRMAN. Who does?

Mr. BELL. The people of South Vietnam do from their own income. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Senator WILLIAMS. Do we have to pay any import duties on the aid that we put in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. No, sir.

FINANCING OF FORCES OF OTHER COUNTRIES

Senator WILLIAMS. Are we paying the costs of any of the Korean troops that are there and the troops of other nations that are in Vietnam?

Mr. BELL. The military equipment which those Korean troops are using is provided by the United States. I am sure that a good part