meant to suggest was that in other cases, in previous years the results have in many cases been positive and effective.

NEED FOR DECLARATIVE STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE PRESIDENT

Senator MUNDT. Mr. Bell, I have heard a number of my colleagues say and I have said on occasions recently also, but your testimony convinces me of the urgency and the importance of this and I think the time has come for the President of the United States to make a declarative statement of policy. I would hope in a message to Congress, but if not in some nationally televised speech on some important occasion on which he talks to the people and to the Congress to set out what I believe to be the definitive reasons for being in Vietnam and the objectives that we have. But when a man of your stature on a bill of this importance, leaves out entirely any mention of the peace objective in terms of creating a situation in which world war is less likely to occur, you can't blame John and Joan America for writing in and saying, "We are getting a little bit confused as to why we are there." Congresss, I am sure, understands in the main the reasons. I would hope the people do, but I think the time has come now when we face a new situation in a new era with part of the discussions being carried in the United Nations, with resumption of bombing having been ordered by the Commander in Chief when the American people are taken into their confidence and told clearly what this is all about. If it is desirable I think it would be desirable to present it in the form of a resolution which Congress would debate and which I would expect the Congress would support.

Senator MORSE. Would the Senator yield?

Would the Senator have the President's message take the form of a message asking for a declaration of war?

Senator MUNDT. I said that Sunday, I didn't ask him to make a declaration of war. I am not sure to whom he would make an appeal for peace, and I don't know against whom he would make a declaration of war.

Senator MORSE. It is a strange argument that we should kill American boys without a declaration of war.

Senator MUNDT. No, sir, I think we need a declaration of policy, clear and specific, and I would think one could be worked out in terms of the facts which are obtainable for which Congress could vote and have the people understand.

I think it is a bit shameful to have testimony today which would tend to cloud the issue instead of clarify it. I would hope the results are the same.

The CHAIRMAN. The Senator's time is up.

Senator Clark?

MAP SHOWING AREAS OF GOVERNMENT AND VIETCONG CONTROL

Senator CLARK. Mr. Bell, I show you a map issued January 24, in U.S. News & World Report, purporting to show Communistcontrolled areas and contested areas in South Vietnam, and ask you whether in your opinion the map is substantially accurate?

Mr. BELL. I think our maps, Senator, would look substantially different from this in several respects. Some of the areas, sir, that areshown here as contested, we would show as Vietcong controlled. Some that are shown as Communist controlled we would show as either contested or as government controlled. This is a broad general map and doesn't have much detail on it. I am quite sure that any official government map would be significantly different.

Senator CLARK. It is a cause of enormous frustration to me that a map prepared by the Defense Department which presumably represents what they think the situation is, continues to be classified. I can see no excuse for it. And we therefore have to use whatever we can get. That is the best thing I have been able to get.

Senator CASE. Excuse me, would you identify the map?

Senator CLARK. It was a map published in U.S. News & World Report, January 24, 1966.

Mr. BELL. Incidentally, Senator, I see in the text that accompanies this map-there is the statement with respect to the population-that the government controls about 57 percent, which consists of the people in cities, towns, and the ports and peasants in certain areas of the countryside.

Communists control about 23 percent, mostly peasants on farms,. rural people, and neither side controls the remaining 20 percent.

When you take account of the people in the cities and towns this is not too different from the figures I was giving earlier today.

Senator CLARK. Is there any reason in the world why you could not provide this committee with a map which could be public property and which would show your judgment as to what areas the Communists controlled, what areas are controlled by the government, what areas are contested, and what areas are just noninhabitable because they are jungle?

Mr. BELL. I can't answer that, Senator. I am not the authority on these matters. I will be glad to take that question back and consult with the Secretary of State and see what we can do.

Senator CLARK. Let me say not to you, sir, because you know the high regard in which I hold you, both personally and as administrator, I think it is almost a fraud on this committee not to permit us to have a map of what the control situation in this country really looks like. How do we perform our duties of advising and consenting if we can't get a map? I am not criticizing you.

Mr. BELL. Senator, this committee, the committee members, the committee staff are entitled to have any map that any of us have. Senator CLARK. So are the American people.

Mr. BELL. And you have them.

Senator CLARK. So are the American people.

Mr. BELL. No, sir; the only question is whether they should be made public. That is a question, as in any war, of what is legitimate public information and what is necessarily restricted as being related to military operations and so on. That is never an easy question, Senator, as you know.

58-320-66-pt. 1-10

Senator CLARK. Don't you think that to have a well-circulated weekly news magazine publish this kind of a map and then have you testify in open session that it is not accurate just tends to completely confuse the American people.

The CHAIRMAN. Will the Senator let me interrupt? We had a map marked "confidential" supplied by the Defense Department.

Senator CLARK. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. It has been in our possession, but it is classified "confidential." I assume it meant we weren't to give it out to the press. Senator CLARK. My complaint was that they didn't want us to give it out.

The CHAIRMAN. It is all right to give it to the U.S. News. It depends on who gives it.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Bell, since you are in no position to give us a map unless you ask for it, will you please mark on that map the provincial capitals which you contend are in South Vietnamese control.

Mr. BELL. Incidentally, some of them are located in areas shown here as under Communist control and that is one of the reasons why I think this is erroneous.

Senator CLARK. Yes, and my suggestion is that while we may have. nominal control of the provincial capitals many are surrounded and practically under siege by the Vietcong. In any event you will get that back to us if you will at your earliest convenience.

Mr. BELL. I would be glad to.

Senator CLARK. I would like if you could blow that map up a little and I am sure you have the facilities and show the district capitals, including the 16 which are under Vietcong control, or is that classified?

Mr. BELL. I couldn't tell you about the question of the 16, Senator. I will be glad to check them.

Senator CLARK. Thank you.

(The information referred to follows:)

DISTRICT CAPITALS NOW CONTROLLED BY VIETCONG

Thirteen Government of Vietnam district capitals are now under Vietcong control. They are underlined on the map. In some cases, the Government has abolished the administrative district in question and merged it with a neighboring district. In other cases, the seat of the district administration has been moved to another location within the confines of the district. In still other cases, the district administrators reside in another district town or in the province capital and continue to function as a governmental unit to the extent possible.

Vietcong "control" of a district capital does not necessarily mean that the VC are using the town as an administrative center.

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIET-NAM

4- The Convention was promulgated and adopted June 18, 1965.

2. The Prime Minister appoints and replacer el public officials

Hower, decerne affecting positions equal to the rank of Province Chief, Director-General ar higher pt receive the agreement of the National Leadership Commitee (Art. 14 of the Consortion 1.

3-Provincial Councile consisting of from 6 to 15 members were elecled on May 30, 1965 4-Mayors of the autonomous ces and the Prefecture of Saigon are appointed by the Prime Decree 89-MV of 4/9/66 created Municipal Councils of 6 to 16 elected members in the

Decree 67-NV o 19/65 created the Saigon Prefectural Cound of 30 elected members. 5-Regional Administrative Assistants for Civil Aftars are appointed by the Prime Minister ousel Corps Commanders in performance of duties as the Government Delegates Arrete 505-TTP IN 4/19/64.

4-Vage Administrative Commilave of 3 rad members are appointed by the Province Chiefs.
Village Cinsen's Councite of 3 le 11 members are elected.
Decree 203-4/NV. 5/31/54.

LEGEND

NATIONAL BOUNDARY

REGIONAL BOUNDARIES

PROVINCE BOUNDARIES

DISTRICT BOUNDARIES

NATIONAL CAPITAL B

AUTONOMOUS PREFECTURE

AUTONOMOUS CITY

PROVINCIAL CAPTAL OR

CHELF TOWN

OTHER IMPORTANT COMMUNITIES

Senator CLARK. You know I am not going after you,

Mr. BELL. I know that.

Dave.

Senator CLARK. Mr. Chairman, I ask to have printed in the record two articles by Richard Critchfield, Asia correspondent of the Washington Star, which appeared in that newspaper under date of January 24, 1966, and January 25, 1966, the headlines are "Peasants Toil for the Earth Not for a Government" and "Armed Might Versus Reforms"and also when they are printed in the record, the part of those articles which I have underlined also be underlined in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection so ordered.

Mr. BELL. May I say that series of articles by Mr. Critchfield seem to me a very good series. I think there were four of them, weren't there?

Senator CLARK. I have only been handed two by the staff. If there were four I would be glad to have all four of them in the record. The CHAIRMAN. Without objection.

[From the Evening Star, Jan. 24, 1966]

THE PEOPLE'S WAR-PEASANTS TOIL FOR THE EARTH, NOT FOR A GOVERNMENT

(By Richard Critchfield, Asia correspondent of the Star)

TAN AN, SOUTH VIETNAM.-"This earth which formed their home and fed their bodies and made their gods * *

The Asian peasant's deep attachment to the soil he tills and in which his ancestors are buried, described in Pearl Buck's "The Good Earth," is strongly evident here in the Mekong Delta rice bowl of South Vietnam.

It is harvest time now. The golden fields of the great fertile plain between the Mekong, Bassac, and Saigon Rivers are dotted with men and women winnowing the precious rice against tall, curved shelters of plaited bamboo so as not to lose a grain.

In black pajamas and pointed straw hats, barefoot, bronzed by the January sun, the peasants have the sturdy look of men and women who can endure disease, natural disaster and war so long as they have some land to farm.

But very few have land of their own. In Long An, one of Vietnam's most fertile provinces, more than 85 percent of the peasant population are tenants. This landownership pattern may help explain why, despite a tremendous cost in lives and material, the war in Long An is no closer to being won than it was several years ago.

Last year, the heaviest fighting raged in the jungles and rubber plantations north of Saigon, the rain forests and grasslands of the high plateau and in the swamps and rice paddies of the narrow central coastal plain.

But if the main theater of war lay elsewhere, the rice-rich heartland of the Saigon region and the upper Mekong Delta, linked together by Long An, remains the prize for which the war is being fought.

Here, in less than 14 Provinces, live almost two-thirds of the 15 million South Vietnamese.

In June 1964, the summer before the Vietcong began massing multibattalion forces for pitched battles, Long An was held up as the showplace of how a combined Vietnamese-American military and economic pacification effort could defeat a Communist insurrection.

Visitors went to Long An if they wanted to see how the protracted guerrilla war was going in the countryside.

But now, 18 months later, little has changed. There has been no dramatic turn in the guerrilla fighting; the Government has won some villages and lost

some.

There are no signs of any serious deterioration. But there has been no real improvement either; since it is primarily a war of subversion in Long An, the creeping Communist initiative simply has crept further.

Other peasants have replaced the hundreds of Vietcong killed in battle, and American military and civilian advisers agree there are many more Vietcong than a year ago.