General GAVIN. My feeling at the moment is the most decisive fight will take place in Thailand on the Mekong. Senator SYMINGTON. Then doesn't that, at least to some extent, nullify your statement you do not believe in the "domino theory"?" General GAVIN. No. I do not think so because there is a prevailing belief in this country that if we fail there it is all the way back to Waikiki. I do not believe that for a moment. Senator SYMINGTON. So if we go to enclaves, and give up the rest of South Vietnam to the Vietcong presumably also you know our tricky situation in Laos wouldn't we be dominoing if we ended up fighting in northern Thailand? General GAVIN, Senator, you said going enclaves, those are your words, not mine. I did not say go into enclaves. I said do the best we can with what we have. Senator SYMINGTON. But you do say "maintain enclaves on the coasts, desist in our bombing attacks in North Vietnam." General GAVIN. That is right. I did not say "go to." I said maintain the forces we now have based in enclaves. THE MILITARY AS A CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY Senator SYMINGTON. Later on in your letter you say, "referring again to the Sky Cavalry concept which we are now employing in South Vietnam, it is the kind of innovation that is generally unpopular in a conservative society, and in the military establishment of such a society." What do you mean by that? General GAVIN. I will tell you exactly what I mean by that. I do not want to impose on your time. I wish we had more time so we could talk about it. Senator SYMINGTON. We will go around again. General GAVIN. A military establishment exists to fight with the means it has at hand, and it must use every physical resource to meet the battle right now. The last thing in the world the military wants to do is to go way out speculating if you had so and so and yet how are we going to win if we do not do this very thing. The shield of time and space we once enjoyed are gone, and we are on the frontline now. I do not think we did well in Korea with 142,000 casualties, and nothing to show for it, except the 38th parallel when we got through, and it was amazing what was done by our opponents in Europe. I do think in our Military Establismment we are conservative, and we resist change, and goodness knows I have been exposed to this one. Change in that establishment is exceedingly difficult. Senator SYMINGTON. You said in this letter: When I retired in 1958, I said that I would be happy to serve as a private in the Army if it were the kind of an army that I wanted it to be. General GAVIN. That is right. Senator SYMINGTON. I tried in my feeble way to make it the kind of an Army that you wanted it to be. General GAVIN. Yes, sir. You were a great help, and I think you were there when I said that. Senator SYMINGTON. Thank you. I was. INTENSIFYING THE BOMBING What worries me is, to the best of my knowledge, every senior officer out there in the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps in South Vietnam today, without exception, felt it was important for us to intensify the attacking of military targets in North Vietnam, to at least make a greater effort to stop the heavy infiltration of troops and ammunition and guns now coming down the various Ho Chi Minh trails. Do you agree with them? General GAVIN. Absolutely. I think I made that clear this morning. Senator SYMINGTON. You did not make it entirely clear to me. Would you bomb the powerplants? I was not sure how you felt about that. General GAVIN. There I am in considerable doubt about it, and I do not think so. Senator SYMINGTON. How about petroleum, P.O.L.? General GAVIN. Isolated obvious sources of military direct supply; yes. Senator SYMINGTON. In other words, you would bomb some of the petroleum but not all? Is that correct? General GAVIN. Yes; I would say so. One must be discriminating about these things. Senator SYMINGTON. Would you mine the harbor at Haiphong as against bombing the docks? General GAVIN. Given a choice, of course, I would mine in preference. Senator SYMINGTON. People with as much military experience as you have, say that we are now getting ourselves in a position where we do not want to use seapower which, except for the Polaris, is, in effect, air-sea power, and do not want to use Air Force airpower because it would not be sporting. They take issue with you with respect to the conclusions of the strategic bombing survey. Incidentally, I have just reread the conclusions of the survey, for both Germany and Japan. Would you supply for the record the statements in those reports in context you think justify the position you took this morning. General GAVIN. I shall. (The information referred to follows:) Hon. J. W. FULBRIGHT, CAMBRIDGE, MASS., February 14, 1966. Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. MY DEAR SENATOR: In the course of the hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday, February 8, 1966, I was asked by Senator Symington to submit data to which I referred, data that came from the U.S. strategic bombing survey. As I recall now, I made reference to the increased production of German armament bearing a direct relationship to the increased tonnage of bombs delivered by the Allies. I am enclosing charts, herewith, from the U.S. strategic bombing survey. Chart No. 4 shows the tonnage drop and the other three charts refer to specific industrial output. Respectfully yours, Enclosures. JAMES M. GAVIN. 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 CHART No. 7 The United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Overall Report. (European War) September 30, 1945. |